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This book explores the personal value of healthy behavior, arguing that our 
modern tendency to praise or blame individuals for their health is politically 
and economically motivated and has reinforced growing health disparities 
between the wealthy and poor under the guise of individual responsibility.
We are awash in concerns about the state of our health and recommen-
dations about how to improve it from medical professionals, public health 
experts, and the diet-exercise-wellness industry. The idea that health is 
about wellness and not just preventing illness becomes increasingly wide-
spread as we find out how various modifiable behaviors, such as smoking or 
our diets, impact our health. In a critical examination of health, we find that 
alongside the move toward wellness as a state that the individual is respon-
sible to in part produce, there is a roll-back of public programs. This book 
explores how this “good health imperative” is not as apolitical as one might 
assume. The more the individual is the locus of health, the less structural 
and historical issues that create health disparities are considered. Feminist 
Existentialism, Biopolitics, and Critical Phenomenology in a Time of Bad 
Health charts the impact of the increasing shift to a model of individual 
responsibility for one’s health. It will benefit readers who are interested to 
think critically about normalization to produce “healthy bodies.” In addi-
tion, this book will benefit readers who understand the value of personal 
health but are wary of the ways in which health can be used as a tool to 
discriminate and fuel inequalities in health care access.
This volume is primarily of interest to academics, students, public health 
and medical professionals, and readers who are interested in critically 
examining health from a philosophical perspective in order to understand 
how we can celebrate the value of healthy behavior without reinforcing 
discrimination.
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Today, however, we are having a hard time living because we are so 
bent on outwitting death.
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Preface: Good health in a time of bad 
health
As this book goes to press, the world finds itself in the grip of a worldwide 
pandemic. Millions of people have died of COVID-19, millions have been 
sickened, and we still are unsure if we can control its spread, given the chal-
lenges of new variants, lack of vaccines, and vaccine resistance. Even surviv-
ing an infection can often mean that one is a “long-hauler” with a dizzying 
array of possible conditions that are created or exacerbated by having had 
it. No country was able to isolate itself, and even if this super-flu is defeated, 
we are now all too aware of just how interconnected and vulnerable we are 
to the next pandemic. At first, exactly how COVID-19 spread was unclear 
and, as everyone reads this book will recall, we were scrubbing down sur-
faces and hoarding supplies. What we learned is the respiratory nature of 
its spread—how it passes unseen from one person to another, particularly 
indoors. We find ourselves at the mercy of others’ behaviors to protect our 
airways from infection. We live in a time of bad health, and we live in a time 
where individual health is no longer, if it ever was, possible to make merely 
a matter of the individual’s behavior.
In this book, I will explore what I call the “good health imperative.” This 
idea fits in well with ideas of “healthism” and “biomorality.” In all these 
views, there is an emphasis on health and life-extension as primary goals 
of individuals and societies. My main contribution is to highlight the idea 
of individual, as opposed to collective or societal, responsibility for health 
production. What I call the good health imperative is the sense that it is 
both rational and moral to better one’s health when one can. This impera-
tive finds its inspiration both in ongoing research into how consumption, 
activity, sleep, air and water quality affect a wide variety of health out-
comes. It also occurs alongside social and political calls to roll back our 
shared responsibility in favor of individual responsibility for one’s “suc-
cess” or “failure.” One of the reasons that the good health imperative can 
paradoxically work against the promotion of better public health is that 
it encourages the justification of rolling back social welfare as everyone is 
now able to “take charge” and become healthier. In such a view, poor health 
is viewed as a personal, or familial, failing, not a social one. Systemic issues 
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such as racism, classism, sexism, and ableism are seen as largely invisible 
backgrounds to the “real” issue—people aren’t doing the right things for 
their own health.
However, not all forms of individual behavior designed to maximize 
health are acts of docility. Healthy self-care can help take a stand against 
a world in which we are encouraged to work for the profit of others to 
the detriment of our own well-being. The fear of suffering and illness is 
a human concern and one that will likely follow us into any social and 
political world. As we learn more about what kinds of behaviors permit 
us to obtain better health, it seems natural to pursue these activities if pos-
sible. Yet, given that the work entailed in bettering one’s health is never a 
completed project—one can always better one’s diet, one’s activity, lower 
one’s stress, better one’s environment, consider the latest treatments or med-
icines—no obvious boundaries to this work exist. In addition, the fact of 
aging brings with it new challenges over time. I ask in this book—how has 
the value of working on one’s health as a project changed our sense of self 
and our sense of health and illness? How does this value relate to other val-
ues that we might hold? Why are laws against smoking and anxiety about 
overweight and obesity such popular laws and topics in a world awash 
with many other pressing social issues? Finally, what might be an authentic 
manner to live and relate to one’s health in our current condition?
Overview of the book
The book begins with “The Good Health Imperative.” This chapter explores 
how in the United States significant political and public health attention is 
spent on three behaviors that are correlated with poor health outcomes: 
poor food consumption/low activity and its relation to obesity, smoking, 
and excessive drinking. I chart how increasingly health is seen as a mat-
ter of the promotion of wellness and not simply the fight against illness. I 
consider the common economic arguments that such behaviors are socially 
costly as questionable given how difficult it is to assess if a healthy long-life 
is less economically costly for society than shorter unhealthier ones. Finally, 
chapter one outlines the idea of a “good health imperative” that exceeds 
economic calls for health reform and makes health a matter of individual 
responsibility.
In Chapter 2, “A Critical Phenomenology of Health and Illness,” I discuss 
how health is not merely about one’s state as assessed by medical profes-
sionals, but how one lives and feels. It explores phenomenologies of health 
and illness starting with Hans-Georg Gadamer’s idea of health as a back-
ground state. It expands to Fredrik Svenaeus’ account of health as a kind 
of being-at-home and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s insistence of health as an 
“I can”—the capacity to do certain desired actions. All these accounts illus-
trate that simply having a certain kind of body does not necessarily mean 
one will feel healthy, even if there is often a strong correlation between one’s 
medically testable state and one’s experience. In critical phenomenological 
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accounts and critical disability theory, we find how ideologies of “health” 
and contextual environments shape the capacity for intentional movement 
and living. In conclusion, it explores the moralism surrounding obesity.
In Chapter 3, “Feminist Phenomenologies and Self-Regulating Bodies,” 
I explore how feminist phenomenologies and developmental accounts of 
bodily control show how bodily habits develop socially. The other’s self-
care rituals and the other’s care of the child teach us how caring for one’s 
body is from the beginning culturally embedded. In the second section, the 
example of contemporary managed female appearance will be discussed 
as an example of how the cultural body can be understood in relationship 
to bodily agency. Feminist consciousness-raising exposes problems with 
such modification and provides bulwarks against the commodification and 
objectification of women’s bodies. However, in the third section, one finds 
that some feminists celebrate the same kind of agentic bodily self-mod-
ification if it is directed toward health rather than a model of aesthetic 
improvement. These arguments return us to a kind of naturalism where the 
body tends toward health and is inhibited by culture instead of the view 
proposed here that health is always contextual and social. Finally, I draw 
attention to how contingent “able-bodied” periods of our life are and how 
much they depend upon structures that have little to do with health and 
illness.
“Biopolitics and Personal Responsibility” is the topic of Chapter 4, 
wherein I outline biopolitical views on contemporary concerns with health 
monitoring, health promotion, and the production of healthy bodies. 
Michel Foucault’s initial discussions of biopolitics provides a ground from 
which to engage in a critical assessment of the good health imperative. The 
chapter turns to cases of campaigns against childhood obesity as examples 
of how identities around good parenting are connected to the production of 
certain kinds of children’s bodies. Using the example of campaigns against 
childhood obesity, this chapter charts how norms of responsible parenting 
are increasingly concerned with state of the child’s health as a marker of 
good parental practice. The development of responsibility as a hallmark of 
health behaviors helps pass over the racist and ableist manners in which 
“good health” policies are carried out and enforced.
A Marxist view of work and surplus labor argue that we are encouraged 
to see our bodies as products is the topic in Chapter 5—“Marxism, Repro-
ductive Labor, and the Body as Fetish Object.” We objectify our bodies in 
order to “produce” the right kind of body. Taking up Marcuse’s idea of 
the bourgeois aesthetic, the chapter explores how the objectified body is a 
delayed fantasy. One’s body will become appropriately healthy in the future 
with just a little more work. I argue that the view that health is a transhis-
torical desire that arises out of a basic human need should be qualified to 
include the historical nature of how we satisfy our needs and desires. The 
contingent cultural nature of need and desire satisfaction changes those 
very desires and needs. Finally, the chapter concludes with a reflection on 
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how our attention to future bodies narrows our focus away from systematic 
causes of health disparities.
The final two chapters examine possible responses to the good health 
imperative. The sixth chapter, “Alternative Visions of Health-Somaesthetics 
and Innumerable Healths,” begins by considering Albert Camus’ idea that 
the artist needs to “create dangerously.” Artists can no longer ignore the 
suffering of the masses, but they also must be wary of becoming mouth-
pieces for pre-existing political arguments. This idea sets up the chapter for 
the consideration of somaesthetics as a kind of creative self-fashioning that 
could include healthy self-care, but would not be necessarily reduced to it. 
Somaesthetics permits a variety of ways in which to see positive self-trans-
formation outside of restrictive norms and is one feminist manner in which 
to consider self-care. The third section considers the possibility of distin-
guishing health and sickliness as not two different biological states, but 
two different manners of living. In Nietzsche’s view, suffering is not to be 
avoided; rather, suffering is intrinsic to his idea of “great health.” A desire 
to reduce the diversity of experience is for him sickliness. This offers a way 
in which to think about promoting health outside of narrow ideas of illness 
and health. Chapter 6 considers if one challenge we face to finding an exis-
tentialist view of the good health imperative is that we might have more 
than one kind of existential self who is responding to our experience. In 
self-care as self-controlled behavior, one cannot necessarily see the desires 
being controlled as less authentic than the freely desired (or conditioned) 
self that attempts to control them. Kathi Weeks’ utilization of Nietzsche’s 
eternal return of the same as a way to argue against the inherent value of 
any kind of work concludes the chapter.
The final chapter, “Toward an Existential Ethics of Working on the Self,” 
considers how we might better situate self-care neither by rejecting it whole-
sale, nor by assuming its necessarily moral value. Drawing on Sara Ahmed’s 
idea of normative paths, I will explore how ableism and heteronormativity 
propose not just what kinds of persons are considered appropriate and val-
ued, but also what the direction of all lives should be. The idea of ambiguity 
from Simone de Beauvoir permits a more expansive idea of possible other 
paths one might take. The chapter looks at how models of work and labor’s 
priority in our personal and political lives make it hard to think outside 
models of consumption and self-improvement. Hannah Arendt’s discussion 
of the collapse of thinking in societies organized around labor will shape 
the conclusion of how we can remain more open to socially engaged models 
of health.
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1 The good health imperative
Smokers, drinkers, and the fat
People in the developed world are enjoying good health in greater num-
bers than ever before. More of us survive childhood, live longer, and have 
access to the best medication, emergency care, and health technologies. The 
“demographic transition” summarizes how prior to around 1800 in Europe, 
“life was short, births were many, growth was slow, and the population was 
young.”1 Prior to 1800, it took 300,000 generations for the population to 
double. Yet after 1800, in only two hundred years, our population doubled 
again and in high-income countries a strongly linear trend toward increas-
ingly longer lives (with the exception of the years during the two great 
world wars) emerged.2 One can ask, with the end of the conviction that 
there is a “natural” end to human longevity, will such a demographic shift 
continue? Are there natural limits to human life? Can we absorb, without 
catastrophe, even larger populations?
Yet, despite this striking change in longevity for humans in the developed 
world (and increasingly in much of the rest of the world), the common 
narrative about the state of public health in the United States, which is the 
main focus on this book, is one of anxiety and doom. We are too fat, ill-
fed, and under-exercised. Too many of us are at risk for cancer, diabetes, or 
heart disease. Our healthcare costs are too expensive; we are too unhappy 
and over-medicated. We eat too much processed food and too few fruits and 
vegetables. There are still smokers and excessive drinkers. Even those of us 
who possess good health are anxiously on guard to maintain it.
What precipitates this concern over health if our longevity has risen 
sharply in recent decades? Part of our concern is the fact that we do live 
longer and hence more people will contract the illnesses associated with 
aging. Diseases such as cancer, osteoporosis, heart disease, arthritis, type 
2 diabetes, and Alzheimer’s are devastating and often expensive. In worlds 
ripped apart by violence, lack of sanitation, no vaccines, and lack of basic 
medical care, death came quickly enough for most to avoid degenerative 
diseases. Now, exposed to them in greater and greater numbers, it is no 
wonder that we feel beset by illness.
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The increase in longevity has also been supported by the growth of birth-
to-death healthcare coverage. Healthcare insurance has permitted many to 
understand healthcare as not just an emergency matter only needed when 
one is suffering, but also as something that entails check-ups, routine care, 
and preventative tests. The US, long lagging behind its peers in the devel-
oped world, passed the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010, which remains 
on precarious ground but seems likely to be preserved in some form. While 
far different from single-payer systems in other developed countries such as 
Canada, the ACA did greatly improve the possibility of being covered by 
healthcare insurance. In 2010 President Obama spoke about the advantages 
of the ACA by saying:
So, starting in September, some of the worst abuses will be banned 
forever. No more discriminating against children with pre-existing con-
ditions. No more retroactively dropping somebody’s policy when they 
get sick if they made an unintentional mistake on an application. No 
more lifetime limits or restrictive annual limits on coverage. Those days 
are over.3
The ACA, often derisively called “Obamacare,” has remained a controver-
sial piece of legislation. Parties on the political right have created numerous 
legal challenges to its authority. A case brought to the US Supreme Court 
challenging the ACA’s subsidies (focusing on six sentences of the bill) was 
defeated 6–3 in June of 2015, leading many to think it is likely safe from sig-
nificant revision, but the Trump presidency and the Republican majority in 
Congress in 2017 led to renewed attacks.4 Under the current Biden admin-
istration, the ACA looks likely to remain. Despite the on-going challenges 
to the ACA, it is largely seen as a victory by public health advocates. Many 
who were unable to get healthcare insurance are now able to get quality 
medical care. Despite a rocky initial rollout, during the first two years, the 
ACA increased the number of insured by 22.8 million people. Some previ-
ously insured people lost or rejected their previous coverage, about 5.9 mil-
lion, for an overall increase of 16.9 million new insured persons.5 President 
Biden has signaled his support for the ACA and has expanded the capacity 
for individuals to enroll after significant cuts during the Trump presidency.6
As President Obama noted, one of the main selling features was the fact 
that the ACA forbids health insurance companies from denying enrollment 
to those with pre-existing conditions. While the ACA is celebrated as being 
neutral in its coverage to the healthy and the ill, it has enshrined the capac-
ity of health insurance companies to offer incentives for individuals to sub-
stitute their behaviors for healthier ones or penalties for those who do not. 
The underlying ideology is that, while we should cover pre-existing condi-
tions for all persons and not deny the sickest of us what they most need, 
we should try and require people to also do what is best, so they do not 
become ill. This draws a line between the idea that persons are responsible 
for their illness, at least in some part, and the idea that some are blameless. 
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One should not be forbidden proper medical care if one has a genetic condi-
tion, but perhaps one should have to pay more if one has smoked and now 
has cancer. Alternatively, I should pay less if I engage in practices likely to 
lengthen my life and reduce my time in the doctor’s office.
The critical importance of prevention, such as in vaccinations or good 
prenatal care, has become expanded to include a variety of behaviors from 
smoking to weight management to good sleep. The business of dedicated 
public health professionals has rapidly grown. Preventing disease and dis-
ability in the populace is now the business of the government, healthcare 
corporations, healthcare charities, education institutions, and private com-
panies. Many workplaces now include various diet and exercise programs, 
workout facilities, and smoking cessation programs. Health insurance now 
addresses more carefully personal self-care practices, and doctors are edu-
cated to ask about drug and alcohol use, smoking habits, diet, and exercise.
The great expansion of preventative practices and the agencies charged 
with encouraging them is based in understanding that certain lifestyle 
behaviors—the kinds of foods one eats, if one smokes, if one drinks exces-
sively—are connected to common diseases. Moderating or reducing the 
poor behaviors and increasing the healthy ones is clearly linked to longer 
life and less use of expensive pharmaceuticals and medical resources. Smok-
ing, alcohol abuse, and overeating are three common behaviors that have 
high correlations to certain poor health outcomes. We also have increasing 
evidence that, after altering such behaviors toward healthier ones, individ-
uals often are able to change their health for the better. The work of public 
health campaigns extends beyond access to basic healthcare, sanitary living 
conditions, and vaccinations. Public health research now extends into what 
one might call “lifestyles” to how to one eats, moves, and works. We are 
able to correlate poor health with anything from television watching to 
workplace stress. But it is smokers, drinkers, and the fat who are the most 
commonly targeted for public health interventions. Their poor health can 
often be avoided, and their deaths delayed.
A UK study on the costs to the National Health Service cites chronic dis-
eases as the leading cause of death globally and goes on to note that “Many 
chronic diseases share common behavioral risk factors such as tobacco 
smoking, unhealthy diet, lack of physical activity and alcohol use.”7 Fol-
lowing the ACA, in 2011 the Surgeon General produced “the nation’s first 
ever National Prevention and Health Promotion Strategy (National Preven-
tion Strategy). This strategy is a critical component of the Affordable Care 
Act, and it provides an opportunity for us to become a more healthy and 
fit nation.”8 This broad ranging document covers a variety of issues from 
environmental depredation to economic disparities as underlying issues 
that must be addressed to promote health. Four of its seven priorities are 
about lifestyle issues—“Tobacco Free Living,” “Preventing Drug Abuse and 
Excessive Alcohol Use,” “Healthy Eating,” and “Active Living.”9 In 2012, 
as part of the ACA, the Prevention and Public Health Fund was created 
under the auspices of Health and Human Services. It is the first mandatory 
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funding to improve health.10 It funds numerous programs, many through 
the CDC, to prevent a number of poor health outcomes from Alzheimer’s 
to smoking to depression.
The National Prevention Strategy and the funding of the Prevention and 
Public Health Fund clearly document the move from seeing healthcare as a 
matter of the ill toward the idea that it is about the well. Sickness is not a 
problem in itself, so much as a problem that wasn’t caught early enough to 
be delayed. The vision is to move “the nation from a focus on sickness and 
disease to one based on prevention and wellness” and the goal to accom-
plishing this vision is to increase “the number of Americans who are healthy 
at every stage of life.”11 Given the complexity of promoting healthy behavior 
and the need to address so many factors beyond individual habitual action—
what reasons might one have to think that we can shift public behavior? The 
answer lies in the recent history of campaigns against cigarette smoking.
Smoking is the behavior with the clearest correlation to disease, and the 
change in smoking habits in the developed world is the best example of how 
health habits do seem modifiable with a combination of prohibition, sin 
taxes, and public information. In 1964, the US Surgeon General published a 
report Smoking and Health which summarized the overwhelming literature 
on the deleterious effects of smoking. In the last 50 years, adult smoking 
rates in the US have declined from 43% in 1965 to 18% in 2014.12 The 
Surgeon General reports that around 20 million Americans have died from 
smoking, and of those 2.5 million are due to second-hand smoke. (Contem-
porary research has called into question the correlation between exposure 
to second-hand smoking and lung cancer—even among those who have 
lived in houses with a smoker for up to 30 years.13) Worldwide, the WHO 
reports that smoking kills 5 million people a year and highlights reduction 
in smoking as an important goal.14
Famously tied to lung cancer, smoking affects nearly every organ of the 
body; it contributes to all forms of cancer, respiratory diseases, cardiovas-
cular diseases, diabetes, immune and autoimmune disorders, adverse repro-
ductive effects, and eye disease. Given the rise in smoking in the developing 
world, it has been estimated that it will cause 10 million deaths per year 
in 2030—making it the single biggest contributor to higher mortality.15 In 
the developed world, public health campaigns against smoking have been 
seen as overwhelmingly successful given the rapid reduction in smoking. In 
1998, the largest civil litigation settlement in US history was the Tobacco 
Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) between four major cigarette produc-
ers (Philip Morris Inc., R. J. Reynolds, Brown & Williamson and Loril-
lard) and the attorney generals of 46 US states. The states argued that the 
tobacco companies were liable for the tobacco-related healthcare costs that 
the states had absorbed. This settlement has provided over $100 billion to 
state governments and is indebted to pay $246 billion over 25 years. While 
the initial spirit of the settlement was to fund tobacco related healthcare 
and anti-smoking campaigns, most states use the settlement money to fund 
a variety of public services.16
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However, two provisions of the settlement are that the companies cease 
in certain kinds of tobacco marketing practices and that monies are to be 
used to fund the anti-smoking non-profit organization now called Truth 
Initiative (formerly the American Legacy Foundation). This agency, along 
with the CDC, has been at the forefront of creating innovative public health 
campaigns to stop smoking in the US. The “Truth” campaign, first tried 
in Florida and funded by the Truth Initiative, centers around creating an 
anti-smoking culture among the young, and it has been largely documented 
as both having a far-reaching exposure and fostering anti-smoking attitudes 
among them. 17 The CDC’s 2012 campaign “Tips from Former Smokers” is 
reported to have driven 1.6 million to try to quit smoking.18 In these adver-
tisements, former smokers with extraordinarily evident disabilities discuss 
their lives and smoking habits. In one ad, a man named Bill sits open-shirted 
on a bed with a clear heart surgery scar visible on his chest, the stump from 
his amputated leg exposed (the prosthesis sitting close to his knee). Bill tells 
us, “If you smoke with diabetes, plan for amputation, kidney failure, heart 
surgery…or all three.”19 A study published in The Lancet that documented 
the effectiveness of this campaign noted:
The Tips campaign was the first, national, mass-media antismoking 
initiative to be funded by the US Government. It reached nearly 80% 
of US smokers and was associated with a 12% relative increase in 
quit attempts within a nationally representative cohort. Based on the 
absolute increase in quit attempts of 3.7%, the public health effect 
of Tips was substantial, with an estimated 1.64 million quit attempts 
made and 220,000 smokers abstinent at the campaign’s culmination. 
Millions of non-smokers reported talking to smokers during the Tips 
campaign about the dangers of smoking, with many referring friends 
and family to cessation services. Our results show the effectiveness 
and public health outcomes of a national campaign using hard-hitting 
messages.20
The sea change in public opinion on smoking has allowed for numerous 
bans on smoking in countries and states. In 2004, Ireland became the 
first country to ban smoking statewide in all workplaces. Following this 
ban, Norway (2004), New Zealand (2004), Italy (2005), Scotland (2006), 
Wales, (2007), Northern Ireland (2007), England (2007), India (2008) 
Brazil (2011), and Russia (2014) all have introduced workplace smok-
ing bans. France (2008) and Spain (2011) announced bans on smoking in 
public places.21 In 2015, Beijing even announced a workplace and public 
area ban on smoking, which is noteworthy given that China is the world’s 
largest tobacco consumer with approximately 300 million smokers.22 Not 
only have many workplaces, restaurants, and shops gone smoke free, even 
outside smoking has been increasingly banned or restricted tightly. Many 
university systems in the US have smoke-free campuses, and hospitals are 
increasingly banning outside smoking.
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One feature of the ACA is to permit offering incentives and penalties around 
health behaviors, an initiative championed by right-leaning politicians and 
advocacy groups. Insurers can charge up to 50% higher premiums for smok-
ers. States may ban or limit these premiums. However, states may not provide 
a subsidy if the surcharges exist.23 Yet protesting penalties is rare because of 
the overwhelming conviction of their value. Increasingly employers, insur-
ance companies, and even states, are encouraging this “stick” approach 
over the “carrot” of free tobacco cessation programs. One option that many 
employers use is simply a direct monthly charge. Washington State’s public 
employees’ insurance plan charges a $25 monthly surcharge for smokers and 
any covered family members.24 Blue Cross Blue Shield of North Carolina 
surcharges for smokers went from $45 to $75 a month over 6 years.25 The 
surcharges are not consistent across states or companies and often present the 
greatest challenges to long-term smokers and the poor. Tobacco surcharges, 
used as a stick to punish smokers, are becoming more common despite little 
evidence of the efficacy of these fees. Contemporary evidence shows greater 
efficacy for carrot incentives, such as bonuses for quitting, and it is only these 
incentives that are associated with higher rates of smoking cessation.26
A blurry line exists between what is an incentive under the ACA and what 
is a surcharge or penalty. If I receive a lower insurance premium because I 
am within what is considered by a BMI table to be a healthy weight, does 
that mean I am receiving an incentive, or are those colleagues of mine who 
do not lie in this range receiving a penalty in the form of higher insurance 
premiums? Moreover, is it not another way of charging for pre-existing con-
ditions if I must go through biometric screening to obtain a lower-cost plan?
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) cited con-
cerns with the fairness of incentive programs under the American with 
Disabilities Act. But Republican-led support for the concept of wellness 
programs pushed back against the EEOC’s concern over the private com-
pany Honeywell’s use of biometric screening in 2014. In 2015 Represent-
ative John Kline (Republican-Minnesota), chairman of the Education and 
the Workforce Committee, introduced the legislation H.R.1189—Preserv-
ing Employee Wellness Programs Act which overrules the EEOC and allows 
employers to engage in wellness programs. Kline says that:
Employee wellness programs not only help control the cost of health 
insurance, but they also promote healthy lifestyles. Remarkably, execu-
tive overreach by the EEOC is actually punishing employers for offer-
ing wellness plans. Congress must take action to rein in this agency 
and provide the certainty necessary for more Americans to enjoy the 
benefits of these innovative health programs.27
Wellness has increasingly become the hallmark of proper approaches to 
healthcare. Smoking is not the only barrier to creating well employees. 
Alcohol abuse and obesity are also highlighted as the other main contribu-
tors to increased healthcare costs.
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It is these three factors in tandem that are seen as creating important bar-
riers to a well society. On some level, one can intuit the connection—alco-
hol is a similarly consumed item and also has addictive qualities; insofar as 
obesity is a result of overeating, one might see it likewise as something to 
restrict. On many other fronts, it seems curious to draw this connection, 
since one cannot give up eating as one can give up smoking. Alcohol is not 
evidently a toxin in all amounts for all persons. It seems the main reason to 
draw the comparison is that both excessive drinking and obesity are seen 
as preventable conditions, and that there are strong correlations between 
obesity and alcohol abuse and higher incidences of illness, disability, and 
reduced longevity.
Health problems associated with alcohol are more complex to analyze 
than cigarettes since, unlike cigarettes, it is not, ceteris paribus, always bad 
for the individual’s well-being. Some amount of alcohol might be benign 
or even beneficial for some people; studies vary on exactly what the health 
benefits of moderate alcohol consumption might be and if this can be gen-
eralized for all persons. Moderate alcohol consumption has been linked to a 
risk reduction in dementia, osteoporosis, atherosclerosis, myocardial infrac-
tion, and strokes. Moderate drinkers also outlive heavy alcohol drinkers 
and teetotalers.28 However, public health research also links any amount of 
alcohol consumption with an increased rate of cancer which is magnified if 
the individual also smokes or is overweight, thus drawing a tighter parallel 
with smoking, which is seen always as a detriment to health.29
A dissimilarity between drinking and smoking is that public health offi-
cials argue that negative health consequences of alcohol abuse also go 
beyond what affects the body directly, from violence to risky sexual behav-
ior.30 The WHO’s report of the negative consequences of alcohol abuse 
ranges from diseases to a myriad of individual, familial, and social harms:
Alcohol is a cause of noncommunicable diseases, including cancers, 
cardiovascular diseases and liver diseases; communicable diseases, 
increasing the risks of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and community-ac-
quired pneumonia; and all types of intentional and unintentional injury, 
including homicides and suicides. Alcohol harms people other than the 
drinker, whether through violence on the street, domestic violence in 
the family, or simply using government resources, notably through the 
costs of providing healthcare, unemployment and incapacity benefits, 
and dealing with crime and disorder.31
While the jury is still out regarding whether or not some alcohol consump-
tion might be beneficial for one’s health, consensus exists that excessive 
drinking is deleterious to one’s longevity, good physical health, and the 
social body.
The third partner to smoking and drinking iis the growing attention to 
overweight and obesity. At first glance, including fat people as a group need-
ing intervention seems like a category mistake. Smoking and drinking are 
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behaviors, whereas fatness is a state. Studies that document the adverse 
effects of higher weight do not provide as clear correlations as smoking 
and excess drinking do with disease and reduced longevity. Critical discus-
sion exists about the focus on weight as an important measure of health.32 
Recent data on women’s weight suggests that obesity has plateaued in the 
last decade and that there might not be an “epidemic” of obesity.33 The data 
on mortality and weight has been varied, many having a U-shaped relation 
between BMI and mortality where the very thin and the very large are at 
risk and the moderately overweight living the longest.34
Despite this debate, the behaviors that are linked with increased weight 
are themselves clearly risk factors in poor health: overconsumption of sug-
ars, alcohol, processed food, and fatty meats, under-consumption of vegeta-
bles, lean proteins, and fruit, and little physical activity are associated with 
the rise in overweight and obesity. Even if individuals are not overweight or 
obese, if they engage in these poor health behaviors, they are at greater risk 
to have the associated illnesses. Heart disease, hypertension, diabetes, sleep 
apnea, asthma, fatty liver disease, osteoarthritis, and polycystic ovary dis-
ease are related to obesity and have shown improvement when individuals 
have lost weight.35 Given these concerns and the rising rate of obesity over 
the last several decades, there has been a strong push to consider obesity 
a public health crisis. This went so far that in 2009, former United States 
Surgeon Generals’ David Satcher and Richard Carmona called obesity a 
threat to national security.36 Able-bodied young men and women are in 
increasingly limited supply to defend the country given the rise in obesity 
and correlated poor health outcomes. First lady Michelle Obama made 
combating childhood obesity her signature program, with her Let’s Move 
organization hoping to end childhood obesity within a generation. (One 
philosophy article even argued that the overweight are a special burden on 
the environment.37)
The cost of smokers, drinkers, and the fat
The comparison to smoking provides the theoretical framework needed to 
justify a war against obesity and campaigns to limit alcohol consumption. 
As noted above, anti-smoking movements in the US and Europe are victo-
ries for public health advocates.38 The war against smoking encouraged a 
wide-spread change in what was originally a pleasurable, socially-accepted, 
and even celebrated pastime. Therefore, the reasoning goes that if we could 
use this model against other bad health habits, e.g., excessive alcohol con-
sumption and obesity, we could reap similar gains.
Alcohol consumption is the highest in Europe, where the average of 
about three drinks a day for adults has remained steady for a decade.39 
Obesity also remains stubbornly difficult to combat. While many positive 
health outcomes arise for obese persons who lose weight safely, diets almost 
universally fail. Study after study, in the debate about what diets are the 
most effective, finds that overall dieting is extremely ineffective in securing 
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long-term weight loss.40 The failure of diets might be more deleterious than 
simply not being effective. One study argued
…the potential benefits of dieting on long-term weight outcomes are 
minimal, the potential benefits of dieting on long-term health outcomes 
are not clearly or consistently demonstrated, and the potential harms 
of weight cycling, although not definitively demonstrated, are a clear 
source of concern. The benefits of dieting are simply too small and the 
potential harms of dieting are too large for it to be recommended as a 
safe and effective treatment for obesity.41
It remains murky if the kind of success found in changes in smoking rates 
can easily be replicated in the other two areas of behavioral change.42 How-
ever, one might conclude that the problem is that the right practice (i.e., a 
program, medicine, incentive, or penalty) has not yet been devised. Once it 
is found, public health will make a big move forward.
Another argument for why wellness must be promoted is the claim that 
the unhealthy are costly to society as a whole. It is rare to read a piece 
of journalism or an academic report on the disease and premature death 
associated with smoking, drinking, and the behaviors associated with over-
weight and obesity without reading about the tremendous economic cost of 
treating such poor health outcomes. In the US there is the cost to taxpayers 
in the form of Medicare and Medicaid, the cost to employers in lost wages 
and increased healthcare costs if they include healthcare as a benefit, and 
the cost to families. There is even concern in the case of the overweight and 
obese about costs associated with jet fuel and other economic costs.43
On one level such an argument seems unequivocal when it comes to 
the socioeconomic costs, not the personal or familial costs of poor health 
habits. The World Health Organization in 2011 reported that the cost of 
smoking was 2.1%–3.4% of gross domestic product (GDP) in Australia, 
1.3%–2.2% of GDP in Canada, and 1.4%–1.6% of GDP in the United 
States.44 A study looking just at the costs of drinking in the United States 
in 2006 found that the cost was, for that year alone, $223.5 billion. Of 
this, $170.7 billion, 76.4%, was caused by binge drinking. “Overall, $94.2 
billion (42.1%) of the total economic cost of excessive alcohol use was 
borne by government, including federal, state, and local government agen-
cies, while almost as much $92.9 billion (41.5%) was borne by excessive 
drinkers and their family members.”45 After all, it is family members who 
are left to pick up the pieces of lost jobs, lost wages, extra healthcare, rehab, 
and legal fees.
Studies about the costs of obesity vary widely—often by billions of dol-
lars. A review article trying to piece together these costs by analyzing high 
quality studies stated that “we estimated that the annual direct medical 
cost of overweight is approximately $266 higher, and the incremental 
cost of obesity $1723 higher, than that of normal-weight persons.”46 Try-
ing to consider these costs in the US alone, the study argued that “If only 
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‘nationally representative’ studies had been used for this analysis, the aggre-
gate national cost of overweight would be $48.2 billion and obesity would 
be $122 billion (i.e. $170.2 billion total or 7.1% of healthcare spending in 
2008).”47 The authors cautioned that this was based in studies with wide 
ranges of costs. However, the authors felt the study was able to conclude 
with some certainty that “the results suggest that the financial burden of 
obesity is at least two to three times greater in the USA than in other devel-
oped countries” and that although the study did not investigate the cost-ef-
fectiveness of treatments, “they do provide data that can be used, together 
with economic analyses of interventions, to estimate how much of the cost 
of weight-related illnesses could be saved.” 48
Yet the idea that smokers, drunks, and the obese are economically costly 
is not clear. The economic argument, if one separates it from discussions of 
the value of health, is that there are a certain set of behaviors—smoking, 
abuse of alcohol, poor food consumption, and low activity—that are cor-
related to expensive diseases that will likely continue to be even costlier. 
Since these behaviors are preventable and modifiable, it would be better for 
society’s economic well-being if the individuals engaged in those behaviors 
changed their lifestyles. This argument seems so obvious it is usually not 
even stated, simply presenting the costs is seen as sufficient to convince the 
population of the need for change.
A modicum of scrutiny makes it hard to find the economic argument 
entirely convincing. Some controversy surrounds just how to think about 
such costs. The clearest habit that causes poor health, smoking, can be 
tracked with monies spent on what are likely smoking-related diseases. 
Since smoking reduces longevity and since the elderly are very costly, smok-
ers might be very good for reducing taxpayer expenditures.49 Assuredly, 
smoking is highly correlated with costly illnesses, but smokers also die ear-
lier than non-smokers, as do the obese and heavy drinkers. The costs to 
society of the diseases of old age far exceed the costs of cancer and heart 
disease. While more expensive medication and treatments for cancer and 
heart disease will likely be developed, elderly ill individuals often require 
24–7 care and can often live for years post diagnosis with Alzheimer’s.50 
One could argue that the familial costs, say children without parents to 
raise them, is a socially borne economic cost that is a result of poor health 
habits. But on the other hand, long-lived parents are often a huge economic 
drain on families.
The longer one lives, the costlier one becomes, since even older people 
in good health contribute little to tax revenue while drawing upon social 
security and government healthcare. Cigarettes and alcohol also produce 
significant tax revenue for states and countries, a factor rarely cited when 
smoking is seen as an overall economic cost. The US legislation against 
tobacco companies has also been an extraordinary boon to state revenue.51 
Thus, if the economic argument is meant to be that overall one’s cost to 
society is greater if one has poor health habits, this seems hard to find 
definitively true. Long lived persons are not a boon to state revenues but 
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typically a drain. Longevity is by no means a money maker for society. A 
healthy long-lived person may cost exponentially more than a smoker with 
cancer. Smokers are less likely to use pensions and social security as long 
as non-smokers. Even considering lost time in productivity due to smoking 
related illnesses, it does not seem necessarily accurate that reducing poor 
health habits will necessarily reduce spending. Instead, it seems likely the 
opposite will occur; as individuals live longer and contract the illnesses of 
old age and have long lives post work.
Since the economic argument is so often mixed with the moral argument 
about the importance of health, it is important to ask if it is actually appro-
priate to see economic costs as a reason that can stand alone for reducing 
bad health habits. If the appeal is to the cost to society as a whole over the 
course of one’s life, there seems to be no definitive argument to be made for 
promoting healthy behavior. If the cost is to corporate wealth, then there 
is an argument to be made. After all, reducing healthcare spending that 
corporations are obligated to spend would be a benefit, as would less work 
time lost to illness and disease. However, studies trying to track wellness 
initiatives in companies tend to find that the benefit is not so much the ben-
efit of healthier employees, but rather moving costs in the form of fees and 
penalties to those that already are unhealthy.52 The savings post-ACA in the 
US thus mirrors the savings pre-ACA—the less the employer pays for the 
employee’s healthcare, the better. If pre-ACA it was not having health insur-
ance, post-ACA it is increasingly moving costs to the least well employees, 
justified by the idea that these are “incentives” or “sticks” to get the fat and 
the smokers in shape.
Of course, the desire to have a long life is not, for the individual, about 
one’s social cost. Yet it is worth underlining that the rhetoric of the good 
health imperative often throws in the financial cost of poor health, as if 
good health and longevity were costless if not actually money-generating. It 
is undoubtedly a financial benefit to my employer if I am rarely ill and use 
little from my employment supplemented health insurance, but it is not so 
clear that my good health makes me overall less costly to society than my 
poor health would. In a neoliberal capitalist economy focused tightly on 
generating money for economic concerns (as will be discussed more fully in 
Chapter 5), it is hard to see why a society would want to foster very long-
lived persons. Rather, modifying health habits must appeal to our sense of 
the inherent value of life and the value of health insofar as it makes life 
better and longer.
The good health imperative
What I call in this text the “good health imperative” is not a new concept. 
Certainly, the value of health and the fear of illness shape human experience. 
As Pascal writes, “Man is but a reed, the most feeble thing in nature; but he 
is a thinking reed. The entire universe need not arm itself to crush him. A 
vapour, a drop of water suffices to kill him.”53 I could die today of everything: 
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from someone texting while driving to poisoned food, from a brain aneurism 
to, as one says in the United States, an “active” shooter. So much of life’s 
absurd ways of dying are outside of one’s sphere of control. Those things that 
I can control, that could help better my resistances to illness or violence, are 
natural for me to try, such as monitoring and improving my behavior. The 
good health imperative works not just from a position of human fragility and 
fear, but also, importantly, from a position of increasing knowledges and tech-
nologies where fragility becomes something one can and should overcome.
Above, it was noted that the move toward prevention is seen as a move 
away from an illness-centered model toward a wellness-centered model. 
Techniques of managing the body and bodies of the social whole come to 
the forefront. In contrast, after contemplating the fragility of human life, 
Pascal calls upon the reader to contemplate the powerlessness of the human 
condition and the nobility of thought. Rather than extending into time and 
space, as pursuing good health encourages, we should thoughtfully reflect:
But, if the universe were to crush him, man would still be more noble 
than that which killed him, because he knows that he dies and the 
advantage which the universe has over him; the universe knows noth-
ing of this. All our dignity consists, then, in thought. By it we must ele-
vate ourselves, and not by space and time which we cannot fill. Let us 
endeavour, then, to think well; this is the principle of morality.54
For the good health imperative, by contrast, one’s improvement is not men-
tal or spiritual, but rather a matter of one’s embodiment. Its call to arms is 
not “consider your soul” but “attend to one’s mortal coil carefully.”
Other terms have been used to encapsulate this contemporary move toward 
seeing health promotion as a moral demand. Concerns over the individual 
well-being of persons who have bad health and the social well-being of a 
society composed of people who fail to maximize their health foster the sense 
that something should be done to promote a population that is healthier. 
The idea of “healthism” has been discussed for decades in English-language 
literature.55 Healthism is, like racism or sexism, the idea that one’s health is a 
measure of one’s value. Often considered to be the most-valued part of one’s 
existence, healthism celebrates behaviors, policies, attitudes, and philosophies 
that espouse health promotion. A 1980 paper by Robert Crawford describes 
his understanding of healthism as “the preoccupation with personal health 
as a primary—often the primary—focus for definition and achievement of 
well-being; a goal which is to be attained primarily through the modification 
of life styles, with or without therapeutic help.”56 Crawford draws attention 
toward how the positive attention toward health is based in a classist ideol-
ogy of self-promotion and individual duty over social, political, and struc-
tural disparities that truly underline good health for all.
Crawford highlights how in the 1970s largely white middle and upper-
class persons grew increasingly interested in health as a lifestyle. Running 
became something for everyone, rather than just for athletes, and attention 
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to diet, exercise, and emotional well-being became personal projects to be 
attended to as seriously as one’s career and family. He highlights two main 
trends: “holistic” and “self-care.” Both movements see individuals as the 
focal point of healthy change, not the medical field, social services, or the 
community. While these “healthists” acknowledge that many health prob-
lems have origins outside individuals, such as the average fare at a fast-food 
restaurant, “since these problems are also behavioral, solutions are seen 
to lie within the realm of individual choice.”57 One can know about the 
poor-quality food and possibly even lobby or advocate for better fast food, 
and hence it is individuals who are the locus of control over their health.
One of the most forceful features of healthism is this focus on choices: 
choices one makes about one’s body, one’s purchases, one’s behavior toward 
one’s body, and one’s time. One does not blame a dog for its obesity or its 
moral cowardice, but one can blame the individual human for failing to 
make proper choices. Contemporary health promotion policies enshrine 
this focus that better health is primarily a matter of getting people to choose 
well. The National Prevention and Health Promotion strategy calls this part 
of its plan “Empowered People” as it notes that:
Although policies and programs can make healthy options available, peo-
ple still have the responsibility to make healthy choices. People are empow-
ered when they have the knowledge, ability, resources, and motivation to 
identify and make healthy choices. When people are empowered, they are 
able to take an active role in improving their health, support their families 
and friends in making healthy choices, and lead community change.58
The proposals that follow include making activity more accessible (such as 
safe stairwells, safe places to walk in dangerous communities), increasing 
the dissemination of basic health information, and making sure the com-
munity is involved in healthy living promotion. All seem eminently reason-
able. But the idea of “empowering” individuals to make the right choices 
suggests that it is the individual that is the main point of change. Instead of 
providing the funds and resources and altering the community for the bet-
ter, the individuals should be “empowered” to change it themselves.
Crawford’s explanation of the individual as the locus of choice model 
is defended now some thirty-plus years later in US government strategy. 
Some concerns of healthists go against current medical advice, often citing 
their freedom of choice as grounds. Holism is often seen as an alternative 
to mainstream medicine, perhaps even opposed to it. The children of holism 
can be found in various movements that define some aspects of what is 
healthy in strong opposition to well-received and well-researched medical 
advice—such as certain diets and the anti-vaccination movement. These 
movements focus on the centrality of choice, a limited comprehension of 
statistics, partial information, and often skepticism about the quality of 
medical advice because of a sense that there are non-health related political 
plays truly motivating common medical recommendations.
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Yet it is difficult to think about how someone could be empowered 
according to the above definition and ever make the unhealthy choice. 
Indeed, what one would hope to do with those espousing unhealthy prac-
tices (such as refusing vaccination) is to help empower them through edu-
cation. The debate between something like the anti-vaccination movement 
and the pro-vaccination movement is one about just what is the healthiest, 
not that one should do what is unhealthy as a matter of personal whim. 
Would one with proper information ever do anything other than “identify 
and make healthy choices”? In the collection Against Health, Richard Klein 
explores the difficulty of thinking outside of healthism:
To be against health is to utter a sharp stupidity because, almost by defi-
nition, we cannot be against health. The very concept of health implies 
a positive value that one cannot but choose, as when Socrates argues 
that one can only choose the good. What is bad may be chosen only 
when it is a better evil, as in cutting off your arm to save your life.59
We certainly acknowledge the difficulties the poor face in affording good 
quality food and having time and safe spaces in which to exercise. Perhaps 
the desire for overeating, smoking, and drinking are expressions of lives 
with few affordable pleasures. But such tales should impel us to make the 
world such that this is not the case for these people. If they could, these 
individuals would not just want to be healthy; the good health imperative 
suggests they would rightly want to make themselves healthier.
Crawford notes that what healthism really promotes is praising and 
blaming individuals for how they manage their health. In so doing, heal-
thism “functions as dominant ideology, contributing to the protection of 
the social order from the examination, critique, and restructuring which 
would threaten those who benefit from the malaise, misery, and deaths of 
others.”60 If I am to be praised for proper attention to my health—eating 
well, exercising, ceasing smoking and excessive drinking, it follows that 
those who fail to do these activities are to be blamed for their health. This 
protects the social order and fails to even question why white, middle-class, 
well-educated persons like myself are in such a position to easily engage in 
such activities and others are not. If my only task in seeing health disparities 
is to “empower” the poor, then when they fail to immediately seize upon 
new options, I can abandon them to their “chosen” fate.
In her book Weighing In: Obesity, Food Justice, and the Limits of Cap-
italism, Julie Guthman reviews a contemporary version of healthism. She 
takes to task the ideology of health being fundamentally a matter of good 
and bad choices. The increased focus on providing better choices in the fight 
against obesity obscures much more fundamental political issues that lie 
beneath the growth of overweight and obesity:
Healthism makes personal health attainment the highest goal, sees 
poor health outcomes as a result of behaviors, and conflates personal 
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practices of self-care with empowerment and good citizenship. Recall 
that healthism is itself a reflection of neoliberal norms of governance, 
since it concedes the rollback of public-sector responsibility for sup-
porting and protecting the health of all and instead places responsibility 
on individuals for their own health outcomes. In doing so, healthism 
tends to neglect—or write off—those without the means or the desire 
to share in these norms.61
Guthman notes that the demonization of fat people becomes more and more 
normal since one can see them as immoral, not just as violating aesthetic 
standards. Most clever 12-year-olds can express the conviction that one 
should be evaluated based on one’s character rather than one’s looks and 
explain that beauty is a contingent standard (even if those same children 
will be subjected to the difficulties of restrictive beauty norms). It seems 
to be the expression of a foolish, petulant, and insecure teenager to judge 
someone on her looks. But to judge someone for being fat—well, that seems 
more acceptable as long as one uses health, and not beauty, as the justifica-
tion. Much like a liar or thief, the fat woman clearly has made the wrong 
set of choices in life.
Guthman points out that those who have, for historical reasons, had the 
best health, the best access to excellent medical care, and the time for atten-
tion to diet and exercise are the healthiest. The poor are the least healthy. 
This is because of systematic, long-term disenfranchisement. She strongly 
criticizes the alternative food movement for encouraging this kind of atti-
tude that one simply must provide the poor with organic food markets (and 
not say, well-paid labor, excellent education, safety and the host of other 
structural reasons why the well-to-do are also well) so they can now make 
the proper choices. What this kind of choice-based ideology fosters is not 
just the blaming of the unhealthy, but the moral uprightness of the healthy. 
“Bolstered by the ideology of healthism, which suggests a lack of personal 
responsibility and knowledge among the fat, those who are not fat are posi-
tioned as more responsible and knowing, regardless of what, if anything, 
they do to be thin.”62 Since the thin, the nonsmokers, those with modera-
tion in their habits, or those with good biometric screenings are now moral 
exemplars, they are even more justified to be the guides to the unhealthy in 
their movement toward better selves.
As Guthman writes, the patina of doing what is best might have a dark 
underbelly; its moral authority justifies inequalities, promotes special inter-
ests, and often even fails to really promote health overall. Jonathan M Metzl 
explains that “even the most cursory examination of health demonstrates 
how the term is used to make moral judgements, convey prejudice, sell 
products, or even to exclude whole groups of persons from healthcare.”63 
The most celebrated feature of the ACA was coverage to all persons, even 
those with pre-existing conditions. However, by allowing for higher rates 
for the unhealthy, the ACA has effectively continued to allow the unhealthy 
and the poor take on the greater burden of paying for their healthcare. This 
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ACA policy is both legitimate and even morally praise-worthy if it is at the 
level of the individual that good health occurs. The state, the health insur-
ance companies, and corporations are responsible to create “empowered” 
choosers—individuals who have the capacity to make the correct healthy 
decisions. Individuals can then be appropriately penalized or praised for 
their choices.
Carl Cederström and André Spicer refer to what above has been called 
healthism as “biomorality,” or “the moral demand to be happy and 
healthy.”64 If biomorality is the overall philosophy underpinning healthism, 
the command is “the wellness command.” This command is both perceived 
as coming from external forces—by the health insurance industry and pub-
lic health programs, and also from internal forces. The guilt felt at failing to 
quit smoking or overeating is a personal guilt—a sense that one did not take 
care of oneself correctly. Even if no one else benefits or is harmed, there is a 
sense that one didn’t do right by the best interests of one’s own body. If one 
has properly interiorized the wellness command, then one sees knowledge 
as tied to one’s personal actions. If I am to be praised for good health, any 
illness is potentially a scarlet letter testifying to my lack of dedication to my 
well-being.
Spicer and Cederström see biomorality as tied to a larger cultural neuro-
sis of the self as something to constantly be perfected in all aspects—citing 
how trend-setting companies are bringing in not just gyms, smoking cessa-
tion programs, and health coaching, but also “productivity gurus.” Google 
and Zappos want their employees not just to be healthy, but also to be their 
very best selves. What this implies is that at any moment, one is not one’s 
very best self. One can always improve. Spicer and Cederström say “What 
is crucial is not what you have achieved, but what you can become. What 
counts is your potential self, not your actual self.”65 Like many in the US, 
my lower cost of healthcare is part of a wellness program called “The Part-
nership Promise.” I have to undergo biometric testing and health coaching. 
While I am by their measurements reasonably healthy, I am encouraged 
in my required health coaching phone conversations, to have “wellness 
goals.” I suggested once that since I have other interests than my health, 
why should I have other goals? Wouldn’t just continuing to do what I am 
doing be sufficient? I was told that everyone can be healthier, that one can 
always do more for one’s health. Finally, the coach said, “but don’t you 
want to be better?”
Medical knowledge—the well-documented knowledge about smoking, 
excessive drinking, and obesity to the less well-documented knowledge 
about stress and unhappiness—becomes moral knowledge. Not wanting 
to live up to the idea of being better seems not just immoral but also sim-
ply unreasonable. “We go from a medical statement that smoking is bad 
for your health, to the shorthand version that smoking is bad; followed, 
finally, by the assertion that smokers are bad.”66 As one can always be a 
more moral person, one can also always be a healthier person and one can 
always fall away from good behavior and become a worse person. If I can 
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always be better, it implies, I am constantly in danger of becoming worse. If 
some healthy behavior—exercising, eating fruits and vegetables—is good, 
then more healthy behavior would be better. While Spicer and Cederström 
note that often the kind of moralizing to create an ever better self can be 
distanced from any kind of empirical research or critical thought; one is 
encouraged to “find one’s inner purpose,” to be “mindful.”67 These ideolo-
gies have no empirical research demonstrating that they produce “better” 
people, rather they serve, as healthism does, to praise those on the top and 
chastise those on the bottom and thus to preserve the status quo.
But, in the case of health, often the recommendations are based in medi-
cal knowledge. After all, we do know that smoking is bad for one’s health. 
Given the growth of work documenting certain behaviors and certain kinds 
of consumption with certain outcomes, it might indeed be the case that 
I could always be better, that is, healthier. I certainly could eat better, or 
be more directed in my exercise, or drink less. Since, like the rest of living 
things, I am aging, my body naturally presents me with more challenges 
that need to be monitored. The decaying body—my new arthritis and diffi-
culty sleeping are simply now signs of exactly why I do need to have well-
ness goals. I can indeed become better.
While this book expands upon these discussions of healthism and bio-
morality, I call this “the good health imperative” rather than healthism or 
biomorality. The good health imperative is a moral injunction that calls 
individuals to better themselves and to make sure others can engage in the 
same practices. My guilt at failing to maximize my health extends to guilt 
at failing to provide a world where everyone is capable of such self-directed 
change. My last health coaching call allowed me to repeat my thought that 
perhaps I don’t need goals, as I seem to be acceptably healthy. I have no 
interest in becoming an athlete or doing any kind of special event like a 
marathon. The coach suggested that perhaps my goal should be to get other 
people I know to engage with me in my healthy practices. “You could help 
others!” the coach cried.
Aside from people who cannot be healthy due to barriers (educational, 
economic, physical, environmental), why might “empowered” people con-
tinue to overdrink, overeat, and smoke? What stops us from being our 
“best” selves? Is it pleasure?The delight of a nice cigarette after dinner, the 
lovely enjoyment of a very full stomach, being drunk, and hanging out with 
friends instead of exercising—these pleasures interrupt and get in the way 
of the constant clear awareness and self-control needed to be healthy in a 
society awash with excess. In Immanuel Kant’s ethical duties to oneself, one 
can see a similar imperative to treat oneself as an end-in-itself—to not use 
oneself as a means simply for passing pleasure, but to make the most of 
oneself and to be worthy of one’s status as a rational being. Unlike Spicer 
and Cederström’s equation of happiness and health, Kant’s duties to oneself 
are not dependent upon happiness, but upon rational self-fulfillment. While 
most of the social and public health injunctions to be healthy do include the 
argument that one will be happier, the grounds for enforcing good health 
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habits must, at least initially, obtain its grounds beyond happiness since 
it is obvious that many are content and even take great pleasure in their 
behaviors.
Even in the absence of happiness in poor health, changing habits is a 
difficult and restrictive process. The imperative toward health argues that 
one should do such behaviors even if one doesn’t enjoy them. Thinking of 
unhealthy excessive consumption as a sign of addiction assumes that not 
all pleasurable moments can be read as moments of “real” happiness. If I 
get pleasure from drug use, that pleasure must be “false” happiness, since 
drugs are bad for one’s health. Thus, one is able to continue to see healthy 
behavior as being properly happy despite the seeming pleasure of those that 
engage in excessive behavior. This kind of pleasure is not real pleasure, but 
signs of a mental health disorder. Klein argues that America’s love affair 
with health promotion revives “an old strain of American Puritanism…this 
new morality views the least indulgence in adult pleasure as the sign of a 
nascent habit on the way to becoming a dangerous compulsion.”68 This 
morality is not without empirical ammunition. Adult pleasures—smoking, 
drinking, drug use, and sex—can be dangerous. Their danger may be inte-
gral to their pleasure. Now, even our most childish pleasures are labeled 
sources of possible compulsion, such as concerns over sugary treats, fried 
foods, and too much time playing video games.
Yet the good health imperative does not leave us with duties as free from 
happiness as Kant’s ethical duties might long term. It provides the promise 
of future, better pleasure. If one does enjoy excessive, unhealthy practices, 
then one should learn to see that unhealthy enjoyment as part of the prob-
lem. Perhaps it is addiction and not “proper” enjoyment. The guilt that 
functions in disobeying the good health imperative is not just that one prob-
ably should put down that beer, but that one would feel so much better if 
one did. Future, far better enjoyment, is to be had at the end of one’s jour-
ney to wellness. In his famous wager, Pascal admits that while it would be 
better to believe in God if God does exist, this doesn’t foster true belief in 
most people. What he then counsels is to act as if one has such faith, which 
means to do what true believers do—go to church, read the Bible. Hopefully 
faith will come.69 Likewise, the good health imperative tells one to go to the 
gym, to stop eating that stuffed crust pizza washed down with Coke—to 
do as the good do and hopefully, like them, your pleasures will be properly 
molded to enjoying the good. As Pascal lectures the cautious non-believer 
who might say “But this is what I am afraid of” Afraid of what? Of losing 
one’s pleasures, one’s life before health? Pascal’s more spiritual advice is “—
And why? What have you to lose?”70 Indeed, what does one have to lose 
but poor health?
The good health imperative calls us to promote our own health as a mat-
ter of personal choice and thus personal responsibility. It also calls on us 
to pursue the health of others. The critique of healthism is often an exam-
ination of how healthism obscures the causes of poor health. Guthman, 
Klein, Crawford, and Metzl are not against health and for illness (a false 
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distinction discussed further in Chapter 2). Rather their criticisms center 
on how the moralizing about individual health obfuscates the systemic 
issues—political, historical, economic, and environmental—that underline 
health disparities. The focus on health as a matter of individual know-how 
and gumption creates a myth that celebrates the status quo, justifies in some 
cases reducing spending on public healthcare, and draws attention away 
from the enormous profits that are being made at the expense of those with 
poor health from food workers’ untenable conditions around the world, 
toxic pollution that causes innumerable illnesses, and poverty that creates 
inhospitable conditions for thriving. If it is just a matter of individuals being 
“empowered” then these issues appear secondary instead of rightly primary.
S Lochlann Jain and Barabara Ehrenreich take to task both the foolish-
ness and the real cruelty of the rhetoric surrounding cancer survivors who 
“fight” their disease through strength of their will. By suggesting that one 
can battle cancer with good thoughts, laughter, and the right mindset one 
initiates extraordinary shame in those who don’t succeed. If cancer is win-
ning, is it because I didn’t want to live enough? Did I fail to be positive in the 
right manner?71 Ehrenrich speaks of her own experience having advanced 
breast cancer in her attack on the cult of positive thinking in Bright-Sided.72 
She writes of how survivors became so enchanted with the (completely 
unproven) idea that one could will cancer away that some called it a “gift” 
that lets one realize one’s true purpose and live one’s true life.73 One can 
immediately understand the person with cancer clinging to such ideas, hop-
ing that good thoughts and the will to live will suffice. But the cruelty is the 
implication that those who die, well, they just didn’t “work” hard enough.
Ehrenreich and Jain argue against such childish mythical thinking and 
argue for real approaches to cancer treatment. Jain notes that if we turned 
our attention away from “hope” and made inroads into combating the 
environmental causes of cancer we could do better for others.
What if, instead of some broad and grammatically, if not affectively 
meaningless aim as marching and riding “for hope,” fundraises 
attempted to ban any one of the thousands of known carcinogens in 
legal use? What if we walked, ran, swam, road not for hope, but against 
PAH, MTBE, BPA or any other common carcinogen? Such an effort 
would require naming the problem rather than the symptom, and rec-
ognizing how we are all implicated. It would require that we invest in 
cancer culture not as a node of sentimentality but as a basic fact of 
American life.74
Guthman draws extensive attention to food policy and the way in which 
food is not just consumed but produced. In the case of obesity instead of 
cancer, Guthman notes how pollution has caused our bodies to alter, mak-
ing obesity more likely for individuals today than in earlier times. “Given 
the profits that have been made on the binge and purge economy and the 
inattention to regulating body-changing pollution, it is clear that we must 
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turn away from the current obsession with individual consumption habits 
and body sizes and engage more deeply with policy.”75 Anti-healthism is 
not anti-health. As Guthman notes, the focus on policy, Ehrenreich’s work 
against the cult of positive thinking, and Jain’s discussion of toxic pollution 
are themselves part of the good health imperative. Anti-healthism is against 
false pseudo-science of the causes of poor health and the pointless politi-
cally conservative tendency to blame the unhealthy for their ailments.
Health, properly diagnosed and understood, is rarely itself critiqued. The 
debate is about just what is health, what promotes it, what excesses are 
allowable, and what excesses should be avoided. A certain sense of the nat-
uralness of our desire for health and longevity pervades most discussions 
on health. But just how do we experience health? How do we experience 
modifying our behaviors if we understand them to be deleterious to our 
well-being? How do we experience the good health imperative? Chapter 
2 discusses phenomenologies of health and illness to better explore the 
nuances of what we understand as health.
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2 A critical phenomenology 
of health and illness
One of the challenges to thinking about the good health imperative is to 
ask the question: what is health? Is health something only medical profes-
sionals can determine? Does health always “feel” a certain way? One argu-
ment is that health is an objective, medical matter. To know what health 
is, consult the most current and well-documented research in the health 
sciences. We know that medical tests can reveal a disease that isn’t per-
ceived by the individual. An all-too-common experience that journalist and 
activist Barbara Ehrenreich reports is the surprise at receiving a diagnosis 
of an aggressive form of breast cancer despite feeling well and having fol-
lowed normal health recommendations—“I have no known risk factors, 
there was no breast cancer in the family, I’d had my babies relatively young 
and nursed them both. I ate right, drank sparingly, worked out…” 1 Much 
of our condition passes far beneath the level of conscious awareness. It 
is beneficial that I do not have to organize my breathing or remind my 
heart to beat or my stomach to digest food; however, this blindness to my 
own biological functioning also means that cancer can grow without my 
knowledge. Drew Leder discusses just how much of our body is truly absent 
from our consciousness—the stomach, kidneys, bone marrow, spleen, and 
liver all remain typically entirely hidden from our awareness. “Unlike the 
completed perception of the proprioceptive body, our inner body is marked 
by regional gaps, organs that although crucial for sustaining life, cannot 
be somesthetically perceived.”2 Of course, in the case of a disorder, these 
hidden aspects of my body might give me signs indicating something is not 
normal, but it is also possible that they might not. To know my own con-
dition appears to require the use of medical tools and the interpretation of 
the results. Health can be understood as a biological state of the body that 
may or may not present its wellness or illness to the individual’s subjective 
awareness.
However, while the state of our bodies understood through the best 
current medical science is an important part of a discussion of health, it 
quickly seems that such a concept fails to really encompass what we under-
stand as health. Someone who feels dreadful and is hardly able to make it 
through a day but passes every test as “healthy” may have met the clini-
cal standard of health as judged by “passing” tests, but not health as an 
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experience of something like wellness, or a lack of suffering. A man finds 
out at 65 that he has slow-growing prostate cancer. This cancer will not kill 
him, and the chances of him even experiencing any side effects are negligi-
ble. On one reading, he does have a disease, but since this illness does not 
affect his life in any determinable manner, it isn’t existentially relevant for 
him. He might feel completely healthy. A woman, on the other hand, suffers 
from headaches and body pains that routinely disrupt her day, yet no test 
has found any source. We could also consider two women who each have 
a common cold. The professional triathlete finds the cold deeply disruptive 
to her future race, whereas the editor finds only mild discomfort. In short, 
while one might be able to declare some general truths about health’s desir-
ability, how one experiences health varies and cannot be understood only 
through what medical testing we currently have available. “Healthiness 
is—as is its opposite also—a totally individually made situation,” writes 
Hubertus Tellenbach.3
In the standard dissemination of the good health imperative, health is 
often described as not having certain ailments, illnesses, physical limita-
tions, and disabilities. The imperative prescribes activities to avoid them. 
One should eat healthily and be active so that one does not contract type II 
diabetes or heart disease. One should stop smoking so that one does not get 
lung cancer. One should avoid excessive alcohol abuse to avoid cirrhosis. 
In the promotion of better health, it might seem that wanting health is an 
obvious personal goal for everyone. But is this because of health or because 
of sickness? Does one desire to be healthy or does one really desire not to 
be sick? Some subjective states are desirable since they are perceived as pos-
itive—such as the joy at seeing an old friend. And some are obviously not 
desired—such as a stomachache. But health is trickier since it isn’t clear if 
there is a positive subjective state called “health,” as there is one we could 
label “joy” or “sickness.”
Hans-Georg Gadamer argues that health is defined best as a kind of 
absence which makes it hard to define in itself. “Health does not actually 
present itself to us.”4 Illness is what presents itself as an object, a Gegen-
stand, something to be addressed, quantified, measured, and mastered. We 
find this distinction in English—one says, “I have a cold” not “I am a cold.” 
Illness can often stand opposed to myself and be a hindrance to my plans 
as so often common ailments like a bad cold throw one’s life into mild dis-
array. Work is missed, dates are cancelled, and one cannot enjoy standard 
pleasures.
Health, on the contrary, does seem to produce a “general feeling of 
well-being” but is not a condition one can easily objectify.5 This distinction 
exists in the English language. We say, “I am well” not “I have wellness.” 
Wellness is indistinguishable from the self. I don’t capture the state eas-
ily in-itself. Gadamer thinks the upshot of reflecting on health means we 
cannot grasp wellness as an object to be contemplated in the manner that 
one can discuss how it feels to have a fever. Health operates as a back-
ground state from which we attend to the other events, issues, desires, and 
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ambitions we have in our lives. Unlike illness which directs us back to the 
body; health often takes us away from the body toward experiencing the 
world with others.
This chapter will describe health as a background state that permits 
extension in the world and with others. In this exploration, I will draw 
attention to how virtual elements of our situation, including our imagined 
futures, color both health and illness, and shape how we extend into the 
world. I consider the case of obesity as an example that is often under-
stood as a condition that limits extension in the world; however, in order 
to understand such limitations, I argue that one must consider the cultural 
manner in which obesity is understood and situated in order to move from 
a phenomenology of health and illness to a critical phenomenology which 
expands beyond the individual situation to the complexity of our social 
situation. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of critical disability theory 
where disability is understood not as a matter of individual bodies, but a 
matter of the way in which those bodies are constituted in our society.
Phenomenologies of illness and disease
In order to address the manner in which one’s experience and the health 
sciences interact, phenomenologists draw a distinction between illness and 
disease. Illness is experienced, whereas disease is what can be known through 
theoretical health sciences. One might have both an illness and a disease. 
One might have something that can be tested and understood through con-
temporary medical practice and one’s experience might be also altered. Or, 
one might have a disease for which one has no experiential correlates, such 
as a slow-growing prostate cancer that is only known through testing. One 
might have an illness that presents no clear markers of a disease such as 
fibromyalgia, known only through symptoms and the treatments looking to 
alleviate symptoms. Or, one might have an illness for which no diagnosis is 
(yet) provided—struggling to express and have the medical community take 
one’s experience seriously. While disease and illness are often conjoined, 
the value of having two categories allows for the rich and varied ways in 
which individuals experience diseases and helps provide better and more 
caring treatments. It also helps to better understand diseases that are greatly 
impacted or even caused by experiences, such as stress, and better allows 
one to address the virtual aspects of illness that are not subsumable to the 
concept of disease.
Illnesses caused by emotional and situational conditions demonstrate how 
often matters that extend beyond the individual’s body permit health. An 
example of the close ties between the external and internal worlds of one’s 
body is stress cardiomyopathy, also referred to as “broken heart syndrome”:
[A] condition in which intense emotional or physical stress can cause 
rapid and severe heart muscle weakness (cardiomyopathy). This condi-
tion can occur following a variety of emotional stressors such as grief 
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(e.g. death of a loved one), fear, extreme anger, and surprise. It can also 
occur following numerous physical stressors to the body such as stroke, 
seizure, difficulty breathing (such as a flare of asthma or emphysema), 
or significant bleeding.6
One can test for cardiomyopathy, but the stress that caused it cannot be 
so viewed through any kind of medical testing. One can speak in terms of 
causality, but the causality of stress cardiomyopathy is not the same as the 
causality behind a sprained ankle. Moreover, in order to understand the 
cause and to care for the patient, one must engage with an individual’s life 
experience and not the body as an object.
If illness is only understood as identical to disease, then the body becomes 
the container of it. When stress is considered a factor in health, such as in the 
above example, it is often seen as something that “enters” the body and that 
should be eliminated, like an infection. However, this doesn’t adequately 
capture the fact that stress cannot be investigated under a microscope or 
found with an x-ray. One can track the effects of stress, but stress arises 
from a shifting complex of experiences including an individual’s relation-
ships, ambitions, and environment, as well as imagined futures. The agony 
of a broken heart is constituted in part by knowing that the beloved will no 
longer be there to shape one’s future. One’s habitual manner of envisioning 
the future has been broken.
The underlying problem with a natural model where the body is a thing 
that can be best understood by medical science is that it separates out the 
body that can be monitored from the body as it is lived. In what phenom-
enology calls the natural attitude, what frames experience, and thus also 
constitutes it, is invisible. For instance, I do not often attend to the fact that 
much of the way I understand myself and others is dependent upon the 
possibilities and the limits of the English language. When I learned a for-
eign language reasonably well, I encountered the curious fact that it might 
very well be that I have not ever considered certain emotive states, rela-
tionships, things, or even senses of time because of my native language. In 
the phenomenological attitude, I must bracket out my investments to try 
and highlight how I am really seeing the world, and it becomes clearer that 
my language is not a transparent tool that allows me to get to the truth of 
things, but rather something that partially shapes my experience.
In many cases, curing the body seems to be an objective, biological mat-
ter—is there a medication or operation that can end or delay the disease? 
However, these cases should not tempt us to forget that the cure is only 
sensible in a particular individual context. Cases like stress and cardiomy-
opathy remind us of this clearly. Even seemingly completely “objective” 
diseases such as cancer are not lived by each person in the same manner. 
Medical practice always is occurring in an existentialist frame—it is about 
certain, particular living individuals and their own unique situations. The 
seeming clarity of medical tests is easily disputed when one thinks about 
the first-person experience of being told one’s test results. What should I do, 
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as will be discussed in Chapter 7, if I find my fetus has a propensity for a 
certain disability? What course of action should I take if I find out I have a 
chronic illness? Life is inherently uncertain and the meaning of any medical 
test must be interpreted in context of the individual’s particular situation.
One tendency is to try and separate my life as a body—the body that has 
this cold, that has this high blood pressure—and my “real” life—my family, 
friends, and work. But this separation doesn’t make much sense, as it is 
only by means of this body that I can engage with others and with my work 
and hence why one cannot clearly draw divisions between the medical and 
lived body. Helen Fielding argues that the body as lived cannot be read like 
a medical chart because “the body we live is always enmeshed in varying 
degrees of ambiguity; it is the site of possibilities and potential relations that 
by definition can never all be actualized or even explicitly articulated.”7 Part 
of the difficulty of grasping what defines health is that it is inseparable from 
the complexities of being a sentient being. Getting a bad result at the doc-
tor’s office produces fear, since even if the science of one’s ailment is known 
to some degree of certainty, it remains a question how one will actually live 
with that disease. Hence, we need a method to discuss how the body is lived 
to get a sense of just what health and illness are.
This is not to dispute the value of scientific inquiries into promoting 
health and fighting illnesses. Douwe Tiemersma points out that medical 
interventions and prescriptions, “specialized and reductionistic as they may 
be,” have greatly improved the lives of many.8 However, he cautions that 
the only way to understand the value of the health sciences is its connec-
tion to curing. One cannot understand the cure without thinking about the 
patient as a human, not simply as an object to be understood in the same 
way one might be curious to understand the position of the planets or the 
atomic weight of gold. For Tiemersma, this is why the health sciences can-
not be part of the natural sciences. “Without this perspective medicine loses 
its own basis and vanishes among the natural and technical sciences. The 
human, curative intention is constitutive for medicine.”9 There are sciences 
whose pursuit is simply out of interest—that is, one wishes to understand, 
say, the nature of matter or the origin of the universe as we know it. But 
health sciences do not operate in this context, since to introduce the idea of 
health is to introduce a human value.10 If one meets a doctor who studies 
cancer, one automatically assumes that the intention behind the study is to 
help cure, or at least better treat humans with cancer, and is not an intellec-
tual curiosity about how cancer operates.
The challenge to trying to integrate experience is the variance subjective 
accounts provide. Who is to say that one account of one’s experience with 
illness is more accurate than another? If one is committed to the validity of 
experience, it seems one is left in a kind of vague relativist approval of the 
importance of experience without any way of really continuing a critical dis-
cussion of it. What a critical phenomenology provides is a way to consider 
the relevance of experience thoughtfully. It examines not just first-person 
accounts of sensations of pains and pleasures, but also a way to include the 
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manner in which moralities about how we care for our bodies, policies and 
laws about our bodies, and the way in which we are enculturated to see our 
bodies also affect our experiences of health and illness. This does not result 
in fixed dictates about health, but ongoing collaborative examinations that 
provide insight into how to think about health and illness as lived. Linda 
Fisher summarizes this point saying that phenomenology provides:
…the capacity to move from the singularity of the standard first-person 
narrative to an account that seeks to identify, describe, and analyze 
generalities and typical features of the experience as such, while exam-
ining how this experience resides within and intersects with the broader 
lifeworld.11
Phenomenology looks to acknowledge the relevance of the first-person per-
spective without collapsing into relativism. Above, Fisher discusses the idea 
of this work “intersecting” with the broader “lifeworld.” A lifeworld here 
can be understood as how one’s ideas of health are determined by the way 
health is meaningful for oneself based on one’s social, cultural, and particu-
lar position in society.
The phenomenologist who set the standard for thinking critically about 
the body was Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who said in his first book-length 
work, The Structure of Behavior, that the body is the bearer of “a dialec-
tic” that is negotiating the ambiguous and fluid experience of being alive. 
He writes, “All the problems seem to be eliminated: the relations of the 
soul and body—obscure as long as the body is treated in abstraction as a 
fragment of matter—are clarified when one sees in the body the bearer of 
a dialectic.”12 Building off this quote, the standard objective medical model 
is to see the body as such an abstract “fragment of matter.” But for a phe-
nomenologist, we do not experience our bodies as “matter.” I encounter my 
car as a material thing, and when the mechanic reports about trouble with 
engine these facts are about its objective constitution. But what my doctor 
says about the test results does not refer to the same kind of object. As a liv-
ing thing, I do carry with me facts that are in every way physical and hidden 
from my subjective introspection—such as my blood pressure or glucose 
level—but also this information is only meaningful when understood in 
its relationship, its dialectic, between myself and my situation. No test can 
“find” anxiety about one’s loved one, concern about one’s job, or affection 
toward one’s favorite writer even if these parts of one’s lifeworld loom large 
in one’s sense of what a life worth living is.
Literature inside and outside academia has focused on the importance of 
thinking seriously about our embodied condition. In Western philosophy, 
this is often juxtaposed with certain trends emerging from post-Cartesian 
philosophy. Famously in the Meditations, René Descartes drew a separa-
tion between the mind, or soul, and the body, arguing that they are distinct 
metaphysically. One can use this discussion to argue for the immortality 
of the soul and the death of the physical body in religious contexts, but 
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more relevant for the contemporary Western epistemology and ethics is the 
philosophical tradition which considers “mental” discussions as separate 
from “physical” discussions. Thus, one can investigate Kant’s categories of 
understanding and his ethics without needing to talk about the kinds of 
bodies that think such thoughts. One would thus refer to “subjects” rather 
than to “humans.” To speak of humans is to refer, at least implicitly, to cer-
tain kinds of bodies. Many philosophers do not follow Descartes in think-
ing that the mental inhabits a different kind of reality from the physical, 
arguing that what we think of as mental content is indeed bodily. They are 
materialists insofar as they assume that with the death of the human body 
comes the death of the thinking subject, but they still conduct their philo-
sophical work without believing that it is important to consider how the 
thinking thing is constituted by its lived body.
The move in phenomenology toward taking the body seriously might 
lead one to assume a kind of additive study where the phenomenologist is 
also interested in how the brain functions or how the digestive system oper-
ates. Despite phenomenology’s insistence that one must take into account 
bodily being to contemplate thought, its approach to embodiment is not 
simply to study the body as a scientist would do and add this knowledge to 
philosophical insight. Indeed, Descartes himself was a dedicated scientist of 
the body—one of his earliest works being a study of the eye in the Optics.13 
Knowing the workings of the brain and the body may be compelling, but 
phenomenology’s focus is on the experiencing body. This would neither be 
how one thinks abstracted from how one lives, but also would not be how 
one is physically abstracted from how one thinks, feels, and interprets one’s 
experience. Consider the previous examples regarding health. The science 
of a disease is of critical importance to those that currently have that disease 
and to those that may in the future. However, the very reason one has a sci-
ence of diseases is because of the precarity of human life—that is, existential 
issues of birth, development, suffering, and death.
The “why me?” that passes the lips of anyone hearing a dismal diagnosis 
is not fully answered by learning the science of one’s condition. The “why” 
refers not to a question about the body as an object understandable to 
some degree by medical science, but to what it is to be human—that is a 
thing whose existence extends ultimately, without desire or intent, to death. 
Tellenbach argues that health is about overcoming illness, which itself only 
makes sense within the backdrop of death. “And because life and death are 
very strongly connected, health is basically: overcoming illness.” 14 As one 
does not offer a healthy lifestyle prescription to a pebble, neither does one 
to a god. It is our eventual demise that makes the project of health relevant 
for us, and that demise is about being a sentient, thinking being not simply 
having a body. As Fisher argues “…health is defined in opposition to illness, 
as the absence of or resistance to this ever-threatening Other, the negative 
foregrounding and delineating the positive.”15 The threat of suffering, per-
haps death, of being abnormal, of no longer being able to do what one loves 
colors not just illness, but health as well.
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Health as a being at home and being capable
A few years ago I sprained my ankle, which was irritating. I couldn’t find 
a good way to sleep and found hobbling around tiresome. However, as a 
professor it didn’t really make that much of a difference for my life and 
long-term projects. If I were a professional athlete, such a common injury 
could end my career and could cause me to enter into a depression—trying 
to assess how to structure my now completely altered life. When speaking 
to an athlete about this example, she told me that she expects injuries and 
to work toward recovery. If she worried excessively about avoiding possible 
injuries, this would inhibit her performance. I found this quite different from 
how I relate to possible injuries; I would find it not surprising to live my 
entire life without ever needing rehabilitation for injuries. Thus, sprains are 
both more common and more disruptive for athletes. When Merleau-Ponty 
insists upon the body as a dialectic, he asserts that all thought requires 
the body as a ground to orientate it and provide it with its precondition 
for meaning. What the sense of what a sprain is depends upon the lived 
situation. When Gadamer discusses how health is a background state that 
permits the rest of living to occur, this highlights how the body also operates 
in the background as a horizon. It guarantees our normal activity and when 
it is disrupted we find ourselves uprooted. Merleau-Ponty writes that the 
body is a “latent horizon of our experiences, itself ceaselessly present prior 
to all determining thought.”16 In health, the body is in the background, hid-
den from conscious awareness, and thus individuals can extend themselves 
into the world and busy themselves with projects. Leder describes how our 
body in its ecstatic extension toward the world “moves off to the side.”17 
The more I become engaged with a project, the less my bodily function-
ing comes to the forefront. Athletes in particular must allow their habitual 
styles of embodiment fade out of conscious awareness (including conscious-
ness of the possibility of injury) in order to perform.
In illness, the breakdown of normal functioning reminds us of our body. 
Leder describes how pain places what he calls an “affective call” on the 
individual.18 In an example of a tennis player playing before pain and then 
after, Leder explores how the relationship to the world around him and his 
own body shift:
The feelings of wind, sweat, and breath, and effort placed no great 
affective demand on the tennis player. His attention was free to roam 
elsewhere despite strong bodily sensations. However, when the charac-
ter of these changed from those of vigorous well-being to the unpleas-
ant, it is as if a magnet had reserved poles, reorganizing the experiential 
field inward.19
When one’s well-being is altered, an illness, a broken heart, a stressful sit-
uation at work, an ill friend, one is aware how much health as a back-
ground bodily state connects to what one intends to do, not just what one 
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is doing at that moment. The future does not stretch out like a series of 
interesting possibilities to the depressed, but rather seems altogether unap-
pealing. Hence why simply saying “oh look, there is so much to enjoy!” is 
at minimum unhelpful and at maximum hurtful. In depression, the desire 
to extend into the world, to think, to experience, and to be, is interrupted. 
One is trapped in the present, unable to make bodily what one might be 
able to grasp intellectually. Health and illness must be understood within 
the framework of the body as lived in order to grasp what is at stake for 
the individual.
In order to see what illness exposes, we must see how intentionality plays 
a role in how the body cannot be understood as disconnected from its sit-
uation, both in its real and virtual aspects. In the example of my ankle 
sprain, I quickly found all types of activities to be challenges that I never 
would have considered before, since my body was well habituated to move 
around in the world without my direct attention. David Morris notes that 
illness changes one’s access to the world: “But in experiments, illness and 
disruptions, something pre-philosophical can intrude and testify against 
this subject-object distinction. Specifically, illness reveals itself not simply 
as an absence of the proper function of the body or its parts, but as a viv-
idly experienced change in one’s access to the world.”20 What was injured 
was the unreflective “I can” of my body, and it was replaced by an “I can-
not” of my normal activities. Many phenomenologists, such as Husserl and 
Merleau-Ponty, have described the corporeal (or bodily) “I can.” This is 
a form of motor intentionality that is pre-personal in the sense that the 
individual has no personal knowledge of how the action is physically exe-
cuted. The body can completely fade into the background, not because it is 
not relevant, but because it encompasses the entire experience. In habitual 
walking, I do not think about walking; I think about where I am going or 
what has been on my mind lately. But when I cannot walk, I realize that 
my object—going to the kitchen—was only possible with a body that could 
do so. Gadamer says “Health is not a condition one introspectively feels in 
oneself. Rather, it is a condition of being involved, of being in the world, 
of being together with one’s fellow human beings, of active and rewarding 
engagement in one’s everyday tasks.”21 One can go out with friends, go for a 
walk, take care of one’s children, and put in extra hours at a project. Illness 
disrupts such activities. When I’m ill, I often can’t do my everyday activities. 
My body becomes a kind of thing that imposes itself between myself and 
my plans.
Merleau-Ponty argues that motor intentionality is actually the basis upon 
which later mental intentionality finds its ground. Merleau-Ponty thinks 
that the body’s mute connection with the world precedes our conscious, 
cognitive manners of taking up the world: “In our opinion Husserl’s origi-
nality lies beyond the notion of intentionality; it is to be found in the elab-
oration of this notion and in the discovery, beneath the intentionality of 
representation, of a deeper intentionality, which others have called exist-
ence.”22 First, I move and connect with the world, and upon this directional, 
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instinctual level I find my conscious intentionality such as having an atti-
tude, a conscious desire, or a plan. Thus, when Merleau-Ponty states that 
“Consciousness is in the first place not a matter of ‘I think that’ but of ‘I 
can,’” he highlights that first we act in the world and use this to build our 
later abstract capacity to reason.23
Work in child development is interesting to consider from this perspec-
tive, limitations in early movement in cases of disease, disability, or abuse 
often are strongly correlated with difficulty taking up higher-order cogni-
tive tasks.24 An impediment to habitual ways of interacting with the world 
through illness exposes the need for motor intentionality for our other pro-
jects. In my ankle example, one must include not just the immediate thing I 
cannot do—walking without pain—but also the impact this had on my pos-
sible and virtual life. Getting to my office, driving, and teaching standing up, 
all became objects of uncertainty, when normally I would not think of these 
behaviors, but rather what I hoped to do at the office, what I was going to 
lecture about, or where I was going to drive. Merleau-Ponty describes this 
larger part of intentionality—toward the situation and world, both in its 
immediacy and in its possible worlds as the intentional arc.
Let us therefore say rather, borrowing a term from other works, that 
the life of consciousness—cognitive life, the life of desire or perceptual 
life—is subtended by an ‘intentional arc’ which projects round about us 
our past, our future, our human setting, our physical, ideological and 
moral situation, or rather which results in our being situated in all these 
respects. It is this intentional arc which brings about the unity of the 
senses, of intelligence, or sensibility and motility. And it is this which 
‘goes limp’ in illness.25
In illness, the body does often appear as this type of thing since it is stop-
ping me from doing those things my healthy background body permitted 
me to do. In illness, I no longer extend out into the world, but I collapse 
into myself. A specific illness does not affect every similar body in the same 
way since everyone’s intentional arcs are not parallel. Since having a child, 
I dread common illnesses like a cold or flu, and suffer far more. There is 
not enough space to simply relax and get well, rather one has to figure out 
how to drag oneself through taking care of another person and in the pro-
cess expose one’s dependent as well to one’s illness. If one has a precarious 
employment that requires consistent attendance, illness is likewise much 
more devastating than for someone who can take time off work and be 
assured of an income. From the phenomenological point of view, to suggest 
that objective illness (the condition of the body) and subjective illness (the 
stress that one has dependents or that one is worried about paying rent) are 
possible to distinguish is false.
Working between an acknowledgment of the role of the doctor and the 
experience of the patient, phenomenologist Fredrik Svenaeus argues that Mar-
tin Heidegger provides us with the most valuable way of thinking about how 
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the lived body experiences health and illness and what happens when one’s 
intentional arc “goes limp.” Heidegger’s idea of “Unheimlichkeit”—unhome-
likeness—is key to Svenaeus’ account of illness, and he argues that through a 
certain reading of this concept we can “understand how illness is experienced 
precisely as a not being at home in my own world.”26 This is not only to asso-
ciate illness with an anxious, uncanny sentiment, but it is also to elucidate 
how sickness changes one’s attunement, one’s background. The focus on home 
is important in Sveneaus’ account. The idea of unheimlich in German pre-
sents a translation difficulty. In the typical translation, “uncanny,” one retains 
the idea of the peculiarity of the unheimlich but loses the “heim” or “home” 
that is present in the German. This is an important association for the idea of 
attunement that shifts in illness. With Heidegger, there is an existential issue at 
hand, “an unfamiliarity with the world—the very world that is a part of my 
own being as a being-in-the-world.”27 Being ill is not being-at-home, not being 
able to attend to the world or to allow one’s embodied nature to fade into the 
background. In a similar vein, when one is in a foreign environment, all sorts 
of mundane activities which are thoughtless at home—moving from place to 
place, purchasing goods, consuming food—become difficult. As a tourist, I 
might enjoy these challenges since they are based in my desire to experience 
something new, but illness as “unhomelike” presents a much more persistent 
and undesirable set of difficulties. I can’t go to work, I can’t care of my son, 
I can’t even eat—I am myself and yet my body seems like a foreign burden, 
calling to mind Delmore Schwartz’s poem “The Heavy Bear”: “The secret life 
of belly and bone, /Opaque, too near, my private, yet unknown.”28 I am not at 
home even in the most familiar of locales: my own body.
In health, as Gadamer and Merleau-Ponty note, one’s body fades into the 
background in order to take up projects in the world. Thereby, one feels “at 
home” in as much as one doesn’t have to conceptualize one’s embodied sit-
uation; one rather attends to the tasks at hand. Illness, in Svenaeus' reading 
of Heidegger, would generally be characterized by an attunement of unho-
melikeness. Since “attunement” in Heidegger means attuned understanding 
as a being-in-the-world, we would here find an outline for conceptualizing 
illness as a mode of understanding. After all, my understanding of walking 
and its relevance changes dramatically when I can no longer so do easily. In 
my ankle case, I was at my house and yet found myself not at home as it had 
become a space of inhospitality. Attunement is also about how the world 
is open or closed to me. S Kay Toombs eloquently describes how when her 
multiple sclerosis advanced to the point that she required a wheelchair, the 
world became entirely reshaped. Space was not objective, it was a matter of 
the composition of the space and how it framed her bodily motility.
The answer to the question, “Is it too far to go?” has little to do with 
the distance that can be measured in feet or yards. For the person in a 
wheelchair, the answer depends in large part on what is between here 
and there. Are there obstacles that prevent the use of a scooter, is the 
terrain suitable for a wheelchair?29
A critical phenomenology of health and illness 39
It is easy to fall into the naturalist tendency to see space as a matter of 
objective measurements and fail to see how one’s tacit, background embod-
iment is contributing to that bias. To the person whose body does not fit 
easily into our current world, the background world is evident. Thus, in 
illness our nature as embodied beings is often disclosed with more clarity 
than when we are caught up in our everyday ambitions and plans.
Svenaeus argues that while it is true that one’s existential condition of 
finitude is brought to light by illness in a way that is often ignored in health, 
another aspect of our being-in-the-world, being at home, is ignored. I am 
not always experiencing a world of foreign intrusion where my body is a 
heavy burden; I often blend harmoniously with the world and others. I feel 
at home with myself and others. In cases of bodily disruption, we see how 
even when one can take up a cognitive content, one cannot make “sense” 
of it because one’s basic bodily intentionality is disrupted. When I am not 
attending to my body and engaged in the world, it seems particularly objec-
tified when my body “breaks”—that is, interferes with what I want to do. In 
some kinds of experiences, I might turn toward the unattended-to aspects of 
my experience, such as thinking about the walls of the coffee shop or some 
small noise the person next to me is making rather than remaining focused 
on my task. Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s work on a healthy body schema is 
similar to the idea of home-ness in Svenaeus and Heidegger, where home 
is not just about the current physical situation, but also the anticipated 
future that is virtually experienced. In the Phenomenology of Perception, 
Merleau-Ponty’s analysis serves to point out that positivist, mechanical 
accounts are unable to account for the way dysfunctional bodies behave. 
Moreover, they fail to even understand normal, everyday embodiment.
In her description of her chronic and degenerative illness, LAM (lym-
phangioleiomyomatosis), Havi Carel notes that not only did her world 
shrink due to physical inability to engage in the biking and hiking she had 
previously enjoyed, but her relations to others in the larger social world 
radically changed, leaving her—as Svenaeus would say—homeless with 
her friends. Her illness became a strange elephant in the room that no one 
wanted to address:
The status quo seems to be this: don’t talk about your illness and we 
won’t talk about our health, our healthy children, our pleasingly pre-
dictable lives. We won’t talk about how everything worked out fine 
for us, give or take a difficult labour, a premature baby, or a divorce. 
This bitterness in me has nowhere to go. It has no place, no name. It 
is verboten. The strict limitations on what I may or may not say to my 
closest friends manoeuvre me into a more socially palatable position: 
being courageous. How brave I am. How uncomplaining. How cheerful 
in the face of a heavy, sometimes unbearable load. First I am set up in 
a social context that forbids me from talking about my illness. Then, 
when I turn to other topics, I discover the social reward: I am seen as 
brave, graceful, a good sport.30
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The homelessness that Carel experiences is not just a personal condition: the 
ill disrupt the homelikeness of those in their close circles with their unruly 
bodies that require constant care with their inability to engage together in 
previous activities or to fall into traditional topics of conversation.
Part of my bodily background includes the bodily backgrounds of those I 
love. I am co-constituted by them. There are few ways to express how shat-
tering it is when someone you love is seriously hurt or how little anything 
else matters when this happens. Merleau-Ponty writes that my intention-
ality and that of others are connected—“It is precisely in my body which 
perceives the body of another, and discovers in that body a miraculous pro-
longation of my own intentions, a familiar way of dealing with the world.”31 
Recently a good friend of mine died after a long-term, devastating bout 
with cancer. Her children and husband became ill too; not of cancer, but 
of the stress of their worlds collapsing. Things after a good week seemed 
more possible and open. After a bad week: everyone was lost again. This 
took her body sharply out of the background, placing it front and center. 
No one was at home anymore; everyone felt homeless and at the same time 
incapable of making the world more hospitable for her. To expand upon 
the idea of hidden harmony and body schemas, the way that both health 
and illness intend out into the lived situation and into possible, imagined 
situations involves not just the individual but also all those who have built 
their own lives with her as a key member. One cannot discuss human health 
and illness as a series of discrete individuals having closed experiences, but 
one in which bodily backgrounds are intertwined.
In phenomenologies of illness, illness is seen as a disruption and breaking 
of habitual modes of being, interacting, and doing. Some phenomenologically 
inspired suggestions for better care are not in-themselves revolutionary, as 
they fit into other contemporary concerns about the reductive state of med-
ical practices that encourage treating the body as a problem to be corrected. 
Too often, healthcare workers are not provided with the training or time 
to consider the ways in which illness as an experience reaches far beyond 
perceived pains or disruptions that can be monitored by specialized testing 
and equipment. While much actual medical practice often remains reductive 
and treats the body as an object, theories, both popular and academic, about 
how to provide better care have increasingly embraced what can be called 
holistic and interpersonal approaches. In such approaches, patient and phy-
sician are encouraged to search for, as S Kay Toombs describes it, a shared 
world that requires the physician to gain insight into the lived experience of 
the patient, including the patient’s close family and friends.32
In the phenomenological description of the experience of not-being-at-
home, the disruption in one’s intentional arc and breakdown of easy being-
with-others—is not only a revelation of dysfunctional experience, but also an 
inversion of the thematic and unthematic. In health, the everyday operations 
of one’s body fade into the background. When I’m having a cocktail with 
friends or lecturing, I neither attend to nor consider my body schema unless 
I trip, cough, or have some other little awkwardness befall me. This isn’t to 
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say that in the natural attitude one lives like a disembodied mind coinciden-
tally inhabiting a body. Of course I feel hungry; I have to find a restroom; my 
feet hurt after standing too long. But these bodily reminders are at best ones 
that I hope to take care of so as to no longer have to be conscious of them. 
While it is true that illness brings to the forefront the embodied nature that 
we can often forget when occupied with our plans and invested in our ideol-
ogies, the way it narrows experience so sharply to the immediate also often 
occludes the manner in which we are often at home in our bodies and in the 
world. The intentional arc that connects the embodied subject to the world 
is disrupted—referring endlessly back to the body as an obstacle. In the cases 
where an illness is overcome, such as in the use of a cane, what is valuable is 
when that cane becomes a natural extension of the subject and thus causes 
the disability to fade into the background. Cases where the illness makes 
itself constantly known seem to disrupt Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of 
the role of the importance of the unthematic in normal bodily functioning.
In his discussion of the work of Gelb and Goldstein regarding Zeigen 
(to point) and Greifen (to grab), Merleau-Ponty illustrates that we cannot 
understand the disparity between the two with mechanical models alone. A 
patient might, for instance, be incapable of pointing to his nose unless he is 
allowed to grab it.33 The more concrete movement—grabbing—is possible, 
whereas the more abstract one—pointing—is not. This is curious, since it 
does not seem evident that physiological differences alone could cause this 
discrepancy. In Gadamer’s language, we can see how the patient who can-
not point cannot take up projects in the world. In Merleau-Ponty’s words, 
the body schema allows my body to become an “attitude” that is “directed 
toward a certain existing or possible task.”34 This makes the healthy, nor-
mal body schema concerned with one’s situation in the world, including 
one’s not-yet-actualized future intentions. Mechanistic explanations cannot 
understand the possible, the imagined, or the not-yet. It is impossible to 
explain why one can grab (indicate what does exist here) but not point 
(indicate the possible future) on physiological descriptions alone.
Any physiological explanation becomes generalized into mechanistic 
physiology, and any achievement of self-awareness into intellectualist 
psychology. Such mechanistic physiology or intellectualist psychology 
then brings behavior down to the same uniform level and wipes out the 
distinction between abstract and concrete movement, between Zeigen 
[to point] and Greifen [to grab]. This distinction can survive only if 
there are several ways for the body to be a body, and several ways for 
consciousness to be consciousness.35
In this passage, Merleau-Ponty draws our attention to the diversity of styles 
of embodiment and leads us toward questioning unitary understandings of 
health. Possibility is not just a matter of the physical capacity to do a cer-
tain skill but also the imagination’s understanding of a complex set of lived 
future possibilities.
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Academic discussions of the value of Merleau-Ponty’s work often de-em-
phasize the social and imaginative aspects of the “I can” in favor of thinking 
of isolated cases of active embodiment as the guide for non-ill experience. 
Hubert Dreyfus’s famous article “Intelligence without Representation” sets 
the ground for later discussions about the way normal or healthy embod-
iment is characterized by “maximal grip” on a situation.36 The idea is that 
through habituation one learns a skill—say, how to walk—and that once 
it is normal and at its best functioning, one no longer has to attend to it. 
Any skilled bodily activity—such as playing tennis or piano—one finds that 
the more one attends to one’s grip or the position of one’s fingers, the less 
the body can fade into the background and be the location for where the “I 
can”—I can play this song, I can walk to work, I can serve this ball—hap-
pens. This kind of space one inhabits to feel comfortable is to feel at home 
in one’s body, to feel that one can reach out and be in the world safely and 
surely. Both illness caused by a physical impairment and objectification can 
cause one to be unable to feel at home, and in a more limited sense, can 
cause one’s body to feel awkward and lumbering while trying to learn a 
new physical skill.
Gayle Salamon evocatively presses what she calls the “fallacy of maximal 
grip” in Merleau-Ponty studies, pointing out that the model of an individual 
trying to make an action habitual is neither reflective of Merleau-Ponty’s 
work nor of the experience of disability.37 Merleau-Ponty’s work can be 
used to stress grip in Dreyfus’ sense, but the discussion of grip in the Phe-
nomenology is about how the world grips me. My healthy embodiment is 
very much about being in the kind of situations not just where I can, but 
where I am pulled (or pushed) to do certain things. Salamon examines a case 
of Mary Felstiner’s memoir of living with rheumatoid arthritis where the 
standard individual-centered idea of maximal grip is obviously disturbed. 
In Dreyfus’ terms, Felstiner’s inability to effortlessly do basic movements 
like dress, grasp an orange, and write would seem to lead her to a lack of a 
coherent body schema.
However, in Merleau-Ponty’s description of the case of Schneider, the 
patient whose lack of normal embodiment exists—it isn’t that he can’t grip 
the world, rather it is that he has to, like Felstiner, actually grip his own 
body to put himself into a situation. Many people can enter into a social 
conversation easily—attending to the other but not having to organize one’s 
body to respond appropriately. Schneider has to “grip” himself—to con-
sciously recall what is supposed to happen in an everyday conversation and 
try to organize his body to do what is appropriate, which usually results in 
failure. Describing Schneider’s attempts at friendship, Merleau-Ponty notes 
that they usually end poorly because he makes the decision to engage “in the 
abstract” and never “spontaneously.”38 Likewise, Felstiner must consciously 
grip her body’s chronic condition and the degree that it may or may not be 
able to do certain movements. Salamon writes, “Grip is deployed in both 
cases not as a way of enmeshing seamlessly with the world, but as a means 
of methodically composing the body as a substitute for an unthought, and 
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not foreclosed, enmeshment with the world.”39 Thus, it is hard to think of 
grip as solely a matter of unthematic healthy bodily functioning. So often 
grip is the means by which the body must deliberately negotiate its fissures 
with the environment, not just its effortless connection. In addition, use of 
sports metaphors often employs behaviors that are isolated from normal, 
complex social situations. It is true that individual skilled motor activities 
like playing a sport, an instrument, or riding a bike demonstrate the way 
in which learning and habituation work with each other. However, out-
side those exclusively employed in such activities most of us spend much 
of our waking hours engaged in ambiguous social situations, even those 
with which we are quite familiar. Negotiating a meeting with co-workers 
isn’t exactly effortless in the same way that mastering a song is because the 
piano’s reaction to my efforts is predictable; my colleagues are not. Our 
lives even without chronic illnesses often require a kind of taking one’s 
body consciously, even awkwardly, as we consider how to behave in situa-
tions with other individuals. Without attention to the possible worlds that 
constitute the present, including the worlds of others, one might consider 
health to phenomenologically be something about one’s current capacity to 
do some physical set of actions. While this may be part of health in some 
respects, health requires a lifeworld that considers not just the lived body 
interaction with predictable instruments, but with persons who are rarely 
so clearly understandable or capable of being “mastered.”
As our lifeworld includes others, it also is situated in the larger social-polit-
ical-cultural world. One’s position in that world is not the same as everyone 
else has but largely determined by histories of how privilege and power have 
made certain positions more likely to be in situated where the path of healthy 
behavior is easier. For instance, when considering health, research clearly doc-
uments that if we examine statistics of health outcomes in any society, we can 
often find significant disparities. Half the countries in the world have a longer 
life expectancy than the poorest in the United States. The connection between 
communities and health has long been documented, where communities with 
few health services, little food access, and simply the stresses of poverty are 
highly correlated with poor health outcomes. Even cases of individuals who 
had no previous history of heart failures were found to have their cardiovas-
cular health risk level to be far higher if they lived in impoverished neigh-
borhoods.40 Hence, we can see that if we pursue a phenomenology of health 
from solitary positions, like a phenomenology of bike-riding, we will likely 
not think to explore structural reasons that shape our abilities in such a way 
that we can only see them in comparative analyses.
Health as morality: obesity and disability
In the quote from Ehrenreich that began the last chapter, we see that part of 
her surprise was that she had been healthy—she had worked out, ate well, 
and refrained from excess. So what can we conclude about those who didn’t 
do as well as Ehrenreich? How do we approach those who fail the good 
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health imperative? Donald McKenna Moss discusses from a phenomenolog-
ical framework his work with morbidly obese patients who had undergone 
weight-loss surgery. Patients expressed how they felt they were “something 
from outer space” and wanted to “rejoin the human race.”41 Moss argues 
that the obese in his study express a broken sense of bodily ownership. The 
non-obese person, Moss argues, has a fluid sense of the body where it fades 
into the background, but at the same time it is fundamentally possessed and 
gripped. In distinction, Moss writes:
The obese individual frequently distorts the basic ambiguity and fluid-
ity of the human body, to seize fluid lines and set them into a perma-
nently fixed self-definition: I am always this attractive face, I am never 
this grossly obese body; this body that you see is never me, I am always 
this beautiful personality that resides invisibly inside this hulk.42
Moss ties the experiences of the obese—both their objectification in the 
social world as well as their failures at dieting—to augment this feeling 
of not having, or being capable of, responsibility for the body. He doesn’t 
argue that everyone is always responsible for their bodies—rather that what 
seems to be off-kilter in the obese is their rigidity about their bodies and 
self-image.43 He concludes that these problems with ownership might arise 
from early childhood where the child had conflicts with parents in various 
ways about who has control over the child’s body (noting that anorexics 
also often find themselves in power struggles with their parents).44
What is interesting to consider here is how the ownership is tied to a lack 
of spaces where the patient is at home. Moss strongly connects a sense of 
not-being-at home to their feelings of being incapable of moving easily as 
well as being objectified by others. Not-being-at-home is not only tied to 
reduced motility and physical suffering, it is also connected to the situa-
tion. So few places did the obese feel at home, usually it was only at their 
actual home and while there, due to family members, often only in their 
room alone. Other spaces were ones of objectification, of “mirrors”—be 
they other persons, family members, or actual mirrors—that remind the 
obese their bodies are not acceptable.45 From a phenomenological point of 
view, it seems less that the experience of being obese needs to be understood 
as an issue of perceived agency and more of unheimlichkeit (homelessness).
A widely discussed study found that prior to the introduction of televi-
sion in Fiji, women were praised for being large, dieting was rare, eating big 
meals that would by some standards be considered excessive was normal, 
and body dissatisfaction was low. Within a surprisingly short amount of 
time, the female islanders increasingly saw themselves as needing to diet, 
purge, and refuse to engage with long-standing traditions surrounding 
food.46 When thinking about Moss’ patients, one wonders that if they lived 
in Fiji prior to television, what would that have meant for their senses of 
being-at-home? Is it possible to neatly separate out the “real” distortions 
to intentionality caused by being large and those caused by worlds who 
A critical phenomenology of health and illness 45
refuse to be hospitable to certain bodies? When obesity is called a “disease” 
by public health officials, one must wonder if one can understand illness 
as something one can objectively distinguish from the historical and social 
situation, including the moralization about certain kinds of behavior and 
bodies.47
One could argue as Karen Synne Groven and Gunn Engelsrund do that 
many women who pursue weight loss surgery due to obesity are obviously 
affected by fat-phobic worlds and objectification, but that the justification 
for many women was also that they wanted to be able to do more, to live 
more literally and figuratively lightly in the world in order to accomplish 
their ambitions.48 The authors argue that one cannot neatly dissect the cul-
tural obsession with women being slim from the personal desire for move-
ment. Yet, Groven and Engelsrund argue that radical weight loss surgery is 
a way to transcend their situation and acquire greater freedom, they have 
not “given up” and lack willpower.49 Movement is, as already discussed, 
necessary for our primary intentional connection to the world and others 
and hence weight loss surgery can enable that extension even if weight bias 
unjustly contributes to a sense of limitation. A distinction is drawn here 
between aspects of one’s embodiment that are limited by unjust biases and 
those that are limited by one’s individual embodied condition. Even if these 
two are intertwined, one might conclude that bettering the parts of one’s 
individual embodied condition, such as becoming lighter, would be of benefit.
In the acclaimed computer-animated science fiction film WALL-E, one 
encounters a dystopian future where round people fly around in chairs to 
support themselves, looking at screens instead of doing physical activity. 
This strong association of fatness with laziness and moral ineptitude colors 
the film. Since the future fat people require chairs, they cannot dance, and 
it is dancing that most enchants the charismatic lonely robot WALL-E, who 
watches old clips of Hello, Dolly! In order to watch the film as it is intended, 
we must see these flying chairs as negative, as signs of the future humans’ 
distorted and unhealthy style of living. We perceive the fat persons flying 
in chairs, drinking what appears to be sodas, and watching individual TVs, 
as buffoonish and morally culpable for not realizing the true magic of life.
But of course, is it not possible to watch WALL-E and see these flying 
chairs and think—well, wouldn’t that be beneficial to many? Little personal 
flying chairs! Wheelchairs are integral parts of embodiment for many per-
sons with disabilities who do not see them as impositions on their bodies, 
but ways they can extend into the world. Surely technological advances like 
glasses, canes, and prosthetic limbs are not unhealthy signs of illness, but 
rather means through which one can extend more fruitfully into the world. 
I am at home with my glasses and dreadfully lost without them. Glasses 
augment my motor intentionality. As one ages, one will likely need more 
aids for movement, sight, and hearing.
Merleau-Ponty writes that movement is just as bodily when it uses 
devices to interact with the world citing, for instance, the movements of 
a blind man.50 The tip of the cane becomes the end of the body’s schema, 
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much like the tennis racket is a natural extension of the movement of the 
tennis player. In Toombs’ description of moving around the airport in her 
scooter many of the impediments were design flaws; it is easy to conceive 
of spaces where she could extend more fluidly into the world. Likewise, 
one could imagine the world becoming more hospitable for the obese with 
assistance in movement, larger aisles, and better seats, so they too would 
be at home in the world. In Toombs’ accounts of her degenerative multiple 
sclerosis, we read of the decline of her ability to do certain movements. 
She writes, “For instance, attempting to put on pantyhose on immobile 
legs requires the most elaborate contortions and exceptional patience.”51 
In addition, Toombs notes how it is not her physical limitations, but it is 
instead just as importantly the reactions of other persons to her difference. 
At the airport, people without asking will pick her up like a thing to move 
her from one seat to another. She has become dehumanized and objectified. 
If her husband or another upright person accompanies her, strangers will 
not speak to her but rather address the standing person. “Can she transfer 
from a wheelchair to a seat? Would she like to sit at this table? What would 
she like us to do?”52 The “I can” that Merleau-Ponty speaks about above 
is interrupted not only by the condition of her body, but also by others in 
their refusal to see her as someone capable of either motor or mental inten-
tionality. One’s possibility of extending into the world is highly dependent 
on the normative structure in which others have shaped our shared world, 
including the possible technologies, spaces, and social norms that shape our 
abilities. Jenny Slatman writes that it is a mistake to think of bodily aids and 
adjustments as rare and used only as a means to ideally return bodies back 
to “normal,” noting that “it is actually more normal to meet someone with 
a prosthesis than without one.”53 Glasses, canes, hearing aids, artificial hips 
and knees, are commonplace. Slatman says that many still attach a kind 
of nostalgic investment in a “natural or untouched, pristine body.”54 Often 
the labor of the good health imperative wants to return us to a state that 
does not exist. Instead, it is an operative ideal where if only under the right 
care, medical intervention, and aid we can finally get back to “good,” that 
is undisturbed, “pristine” embodiment.
This idea of health as a matter of good directed work that will end up in 
producing pristine bodies influences our conception of disability. Persons 
with disabilities are often considered blameless, unlike the obese, but still 
considered persons who one would assume would want to organize their 
lives to minimize their disability and if possible get rid of it if there is work 
that could be done to accomplish this. Such a move is often based in the 
assumption that disability is a species of illness—and as such is always a 
detriment to the one who has a disability. In critical disability studies, we 
can consider the idea of “compulsory able-bodiedness” which functions, 
as Robert McRuer says, “on a logical contradiction—able-bodiedness is 
simultaneously assumed to be the supposed ‘natural state’ of any body and 
yet is a state that all of us are striving to attain or maintain.”55 The idea 
of compulsory able-bodiedness helps us question the idea of independent 
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movement as a requirement for both a healthy and flourishing life. Impor-
tantly it also draws our attention to the ways in which able-bodiedness is 
often invisible to us even as it constitutes our socially shared existence. Lisa 
Guenther points out—the way in which something like systemic racism, or 
here able-bodiedness, affects one’s subjective and intersubjective experience 
is about “ways of seeing, and even ways of making the world that go unno-
ticed without a sustained practice of critical reflection.”56 In order to criti-
cally examine health and illness, we have to likewise consider how the push 
for health may in fact deepen marginalization of non-able bodied persons.
Ableism not only produces discrimination, but also fails to actually capture 
how disabilities are lived. One reason is likely that for the able-bodied, one 
might imagine disability like being oneself, but with a lack or reduction—
that is parallel to illness. In such imaginings, disability is thus seen as a dep-
rivation. Joel Michael Reynolds calls this the “ableist conflation,” where one 
assumes that disability is primarily a deprivation.57 We can see the influence 
of some forms of phenomenology in this conflation if we understand indi-
vidual aid-free skilled movement as indicative of health. In such a view, those 
who cannot execute certain kinds of movement—walking, seeing, hearing—
might be seen to be somehow unable to intersect as meaningfully with the 
world. Sean Aas has pointed out that disabled people are often understood 
falsely as unhealthy because a certain view of impairment encourages this 
view.58 Even in phenomenologies of disability, phenomenologies of illness 
are often the points of departure to talk about disability which again under-
lines the idea that illness and disability are inherently connected.59 If illness 
is always to be avoided, mitigated, and controlled, then disability would 
always seem to be a problem—like obesity—hopefully to be solved.
In conclusion, one way to distinguish between intentionality that is dis-
turbed due to illness and that due to an ill society would be to ask: What 
would need to change in order for people to be more at-home in their sit-
uation? In the case of a mass-marketed ideal of beauty creating a sense of 
personal self-loathing, it seems that it is something external that needs alter-
ation—those very economically driven ideals of beauty whose real aim is to 
sell us products and practices. After all, if I were comfortable with my body, 
I might wish to buy this face cream, but I would not feel shameful if I did 
not. But if the answer is that something could be promised, like a greater 
capacity for extension in the world, then it would seem to be about health 
rather than social norms. This idea underlies much work in thinking about 
the value of the unthematic functioning of the body as the heart of healthy 
embodiment. However, while such models work well for individual pursuits 
that can be discussed abstractly from one’s embedded cultural situation, 
say, piano playing or driving, it is hard to clearly separate out something 
like movement from the engineered social spaces in which we all live and all 
were raised, the technologies that aid or hinder us, and the biases that shape 
how we are viewed and treated.
Feminist phenomenologies of the body, such as Salamon’s discussion above, 
highlight how the kind of models of abstract individual performance repeat the 
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problem of thinking that one can perform a phenomenology of illness or health 
without thinking about discrete concrete bodies. Instead, we are not a general-
ized capacity for health or agentic, self-directed action, but are always individu-
als whose natures are not independent of the meaning of the differences between 
us. The challenge for a critical phenomenology is to explore how differences 
that might appear “natural” and about individual bodies, such as the idea that 
health is something one either has or has not, are often determined by models of 
“natural” or “normal.” Exploring other kinds of embodiment can help dislocate 
this idea of a singular kind of “right” body, as Elizabeth Grosz writes:
There are always only specific types of body, concrete in their deter-
minations, with a particular sex, race, and physiognomy. When one 
body (in the Western, the white, youthful, able male body) takes on 
the function of model or ideal, the human body, for all other types of 
body, its domination may be undermined through a defiant affirmation 
of a multiplicity, a field of differences, of other kinds of bodies and 
subjectivities.60
Instead of thinking simply of movement as the way in which we can situate 
what is an extension of health or one of social oppression, such as in the case 
of obesity above, we can consider how the specificity of situations makes say-
ing what a body capable of movement is much more complex. There is cer-
tainly, as Julia Jansen and Maren Wehrle note a manner in which normality 
represents “an individual ‘I can’, that is, the dispositions and acquired abilities 
of a subject that enable her actions and movements within a given situation 
and environment.”61 In such a manner, we can think about a capacity such 
a bike-riding or feeling at home outside worrying about the “field of differ-
ences” raised above. However, they also point out that from a Husserlian 
point of view, the possibilities, the “I can,” of any individual is always about 
the “existent norms and power relations of the respective society and time.”62 
In Chapter 3, I will look more into the work in feminist theory to think about 
the work women do for beauty as similar to the work one is encouraged to 
do for health—work that is neither simply coerced, nor simply free.
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3 Feminist phenomenologies 
and self-regulating bodies
To consider how self-control is learnt and why certain kinds of self-control, 
like healthy habits, are celebrated above others, first, one must ask—how 
does any kind of self-control develop? How does our basic bodily capac-
ity for healthy (or unhealthy) behavior form? What possibilities for altera-
tion are there? The first section of this chapter will argue that control over 
one’s basic bodily movements and thereby the capacity to alter one’s habits 
is a developmental acquisition. Attention to the development of self-con-
trol exposes how much of bodily self-control develops prior to intellectual 
capacity for representing one’s action and is learnt in familial and social 
settings. One’s own self-care was first and foremost learnt through care and 
witnessing the other’s self-care rituals. Our bodies are from the beginning 
culturally embedded and understood. In the second section, the example of 
contemporary managed female appearance will be discussed as an exam-
ple of how the cultural body can be understood in relationship to bod-
ily agency. Feminist consciousness-raising has explored the problems with 
such modification and provides bulwarks against the commodification and 
objectification of women’s bodies. However, in the third section, one finds 
that some feminists celebrate the same kind of agentic bodily self-modifica-
tion if it is directed toward health rather than a model of aesthetic improve-
ment. These arguments return us to a kind of naturalism where the body 
tends toward health and is inhibited by culture. The chapter will conclude 
thinking about feminist discussions which try and distinguish between bod-
ily agency in health promotion as constituted by repressive and limiting 
cultural norms, but also as a possible site of feminist self-care.
The development of agency to care for the body
In the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty states that he views 
the first 25 years of his life as “a prolonged childhood that had to be fol-
lowed by a difficult weaning process in order to arrive finally at auton-
omy.”1 Certainly, this idea meshes well with our intuitive understanding 
that if there are agents that can be held responsible for their actions; adults 
have this burden in a way that children do not. In Beauvoir’s Ethics of 
Ambiguity, a similar disjunction between the agency of an adult and that 
54 Feminist phenomenologies and self-regulating bodies
of a child exists.2 For Beauvoir, while children are not free as adults are, 
we cannot compare them to enslaved adults. Children are not oppressed 
in their lack of relative freedom with adults, but rather they are ignorant 
because they have not had sufficient time to acquire the knowledge needed 
to see a situation as malleable instead of as a given fact. The oppressed per-
son has had time “refused to him,” whereas the child has not had enough 
time to understand her agency.3
Beauvoir does not conclude that therefore the child is to be treated as 
being without agency, as perhaps one might treat an animal. She writes that 
although they have not acquired enough time to be free in the way adults 
are, “the child has a right to his freedom and must be respected as a human 
person,” and continues to write that childrearing itself is a practice of open-
ing freedom to the child.4 But what constitutes helping children become 
free? Certainly, the kind of intellectual freedom one might have to refuse 
inauthenticity and embrace one’s existential condition is not something one 
can teach right away. To open up freedom to a child is not so much pro-
viding the child with intellectual choices first and foremost, but helping 
the child become capable of performing basic movements—eating, dressing, 
walking, sitting, toilet training, and speaking. These key aspects of motility 
and self-care provide the groundwork for more sophisticated decisions and 
plans. If we understand agency as something that develops over time but 
is, in some nascent form, present in the child, how does the adult form of 
motor agency arise— the kind that could be turned toward the methods of 
self-care that one associates with healthy behavior?
Some philosophers have thought that what must be occurring in any kind 
of willed, free, intentional action is what is called a “representation,” or a 
type of thought that then is relayed to the relevant neurological network 
to activate the action. So, when I wash my face, some kind of fairly com-
plex, but largely unconscious, set of thoughts occurs that are connected to 
the kinds of willed movements it takes to wash my face—something akin 
to “now I shall wash my face.” This makes deciding to wash my face and 
deciding who to vote for the same kind of free action. One can explain rea-
sons why I’m more likely to wash my face this way or choose this candidate 
since representations that I have experienced that have become sedimented 
and unconscious (say, when my parents told me how to wash my face, 
or what my social circle thinks politically). Mental representation seems 
appropriate for considering some of my actions and many of my judg-
ments—after all, one often does ponder certain aspects that involve choice, 
or one wants more clarity in what one is considering—whom to vote for, 
what car to purchase, what this author means.
Yet, if one thinks about our habitual actions that are agentic but not 
evidently the result of conscious deliberation, Merleau-Ponty’s work on 
embodiment labors against thinking that bodily freedom can be explained 
in the same way that we can imagine intellectually choosing one idea over 
another. He provides a compelling alternative to thinking about agency with-
out reducing all willed action to mental representations that are somehow 
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communicated to an obedient body. Consider the following example from 
Komarine Romdenh-Romluc where she intends to go for a picnic by bicycle. 
On her way, her mind wanders, and she bikes to work before remembering 
her original destination.5 Many of us are familiar with such an example of 
a conscious thought being interrupted by the body reproducing its habitual 
action; I often find myself driving to my son’s school when I mean to go 
somewhere else, since it is a common destination.
Romdenh-Romluc uses this everyday example to ask what is going on 
in the distracted bike-riding. It doesn’t seem that one can say she had two 
sets of mental representations that were unconscious—one saying to her 
“ride your bike to the picnic!” and the other “ride your bike to work!” 
and somehow the latter thought won. Instead, alongside Merleau-Ponty 
she argues for a different kind of intelligence—that of bodily habit that 
took over when she got on her bike. However, this habit is not some kind of 
unconscious reflex. After all, when one drives accidentally to work instead 
of the store, one attends to all the normal varying signs—traffic, lights, etc. 
The bike reminds the body of its usual purpose and the body “takes over” 
once the mind is distracted. In another example, while I might think to 
myself, “shall I have some coffee?” once the coffee is made, I don’t need to 
think about drinking from the cup. Rather my body intuitively knows how 
to manage a cup, and I can attend to other matters. If you said—“now use 
your coffee mug as a hat!”—this would require me to represent it to myself 
and think about what movements I should make to engage in “hat-coffee-
cup,” but normally I don’t think about how to use a mug. My body knows; 
I’m free to think about other things.
My facility with coffee drinking is because I have drunk coffee for over 
25 years not only every day, but typically for most of the day. I drink about 
four cups of coffee a day, which means I have successfully negotiated the 
drinking of tens of thousands of cups of coffee (give or take a few that I 
managed to spill). However, the world acquires its hues of salient affor-
dances over time. I was not always so expert at drinking from cups. As every 
parent will testify, young children are terrible at drinking and eating with-
out making a gigantic mess. Developing the skillset to help them become 
expert enough so that the objects of cup, spoon, and plate do not need to 
be attended to directly requires the formation of certain kinds of deliberate 
bodily control. In continuing her story, Romdenh-Romluc writes, “Suppose, 
e.g., that in turning down the road toward work, I knock over a small child. 
I am worthy of blame.”6 She points out that even though her bike riding has 
occurred in a non-representational, tacit manner, she is still responsible for 
her actions, just like if I accidentally intuitively drive to work instead of the 
store, I am still in control of my driving and rightly responsible for any acci-
dents I cause. However, if we reverse the ages and the characters and sug-
gest the small child is the one who inadvertently knocks Romdenh-Romluc 
over, we would not hold the child accountable. The right to hold someone 
responsible for their actions suggests we consider them capable of some 
kind of control—both mental and physical. An adult has both the mental 
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wherewithal to pay attention and the physical capacity to control one’s 
movement. The child’s agency, on the other hand, is developing, and certain 
forms motor control and attention are not expected.
As it seems hard to imagine that one is representing one’s everyday intu-
itive actions in the world to oneself, Merleau-Ponty additionally argues 
against the idea that the complex kind of reasoning of someone who 
believes in representational theories of action could be present in the young 
infant. Already in his early work, The Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty 
argues against thinking that the child is representing objects or in some 
fashion “cross-checking” objects in a “logical” manner to determine the use 
of an object.7 Rather, babies explore the world with their bodies both by 
their haphazard movements letting them encounter objects as well as their 
increasing capacity to direct their attention to compelling objects. As they 
develop greater motor control, the world increasingly opens up to them. 
When teaching an infant to hold a spoon to eat, one works on coordinat-
ing the increasing muscle strength and control with the goal of eating with 
the food (mostly) going in the mouth. This repetitious social experience is 
always accompanied with an adult to aid the child, and usually this adult is 
opening her mouth in tandem, perhaps unconsciously, saying some version 
of “open up!” The most basic agentic movements required for survival, such 
as eating, occur as social events with constant feedback from the caregiver. 
Merleau-Ponty writes that biting has an intersubjective significance for the 
fifteen-month-old upon seeing the adult do so.8 Indeed, even very young 
infants will open their mouths in imitative response to adults. Adults too 
will kiss and mock bite infants’ toes as a form of care and connection.
Merleau-Ponty argues that certain expressions, like smiles, are not inter-
preted but understood immediately. If I had to understand a smile the way 
I understand a foreign language, one would expect children to have delayed 
responses to common human expressions like smiles and frowns since they 
would need to devote time to interpret such gestures. For neurologically 
typical persons, smiling is like laughter—its meaning is understood imme-
diately, without additional effort. The contagiousness of laughter demon-
strates how joy can transferred immediately, just as the sight of someone 
weeping does not require us to ponder what such an action means, but only 
to wonder at its cause.
A mother smiling at her baby, talking to it, caressing it, and feeding it 
all model the baby’s first experiences as building a sensible world, with the 
mother’s bodily extension into the world the path on which the infant will 
build hers. The other’s movement is what Merleau-Ponty terms “the com-
pletion of the system. Others can be evident because I am not transparent 
myself.”9 Others provide the key of how to take up objects in the world by 
their behavior toward such objects, including how they look at the world, 
and how they move in the world.10 Moreover, the other’s body as a bearer 
of behavior is how I learn to move purposefully myself. It isn’t just that I 
mastered drinking from cups in my own private trial and error, rather I sat 
at a table with my parents for countless meals watching them eat and drink. 
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It is hard to think of many basic self-care movements—eating, drinking, 
dressing, washing—that are not also movements that one witnessed others 
countless times enacting in the course of one’s childhood. In learning bod-
ily self-care habits that then can become sedimented to the degree that we 
need to attend to them minimally as we consider our other life projects, we 
can see how interpersonal experience shapes motor intentionality. Exten-
sive discussion in developmental literature considers the importance of the 
other’s behavior for healthy development. In particular, the formative role 
of imitation in development has been stressed to indicate how from the 
very beginning, prior to language or even most gross motor control, we are 
responding to the other’s actions with our own.11
In the Sorbonne lectures in child psychology and pedagogy, Merleau-Ponty 
argues that in the case of the child working between understanding her 
body through a mirror and thus working toward understanding how one 
is seen, no “reduction takes place permitting the convergence of two givens 
into one via some sort of intellectual effort.”12 Merleau-Ponty argues that 
one must over time come to understand this “duality” between one’s sense 
of natural extension in the world, and the fact that for others we appear as 
a discrete object in the world. If it were about acquiring a kind of intellec-
tual representation of one’s image, then the child would either “understand 
it or not understand it.”13 The baby would either look at herself and think, 
“Oh yes!” or “What?” Instead, following the work of Henri Wallon, Mer-
leau-Ponty argues that the infant’s specular image is understood first and 
foremost by attention toward the familiar image of the parent who is likely 
holding the child and saying, “there you are!” The infant looks to the par-
ent and through comparison increasingly comes to make sense of her own 
image. Understanding oneself as something that can be viewed requires 
“the reorganization of the personal life and relations with others as well.”14 
One sets the stage upon which the infant starts to increasingly understand 
that her cries can only be attended to if someone is present, or the young 
toddler who looks around for an audience before crying over a small fall. 
This requires not just understanding that unless heard, a cry doesn’t elicit 
a response, but also that one is something seen, and thus in some sense like 
others. This is not just the case for the important understanding of one’s 
body as a thing in the world like other bodies, but also for all basic motor 
actions. Our first movements in the world are within this social space, not 
individual explorations.
Merleau-Ponty’s thesis of a non-representational motor intentionality 
that underlies our conscious deliberate actions can be understood as both 
primal in the adult as well as primary as it constitutes our earliest experi-
ences. The interpersonal nature of development can often be missing from 
discussions such as the bike-riding example, which is a rather solitary event. 
Motor intentionality’s development is deeply tied to the experience of the 
other’s movement before one comes in complete possession of one’s own. 
In Chapter 2, I argued that while these phenomenological descriptions are 
critical to understand how one experiences health, often they use adult, 
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individual pursuits as a model and pass over the developmental and social 
nature of our actions. When I interact with objects, it is through the oth-
er’s interactions with objects that I come to form my own capacities. Mer-
leau-Ponty centers my first capacity to grasp any object, to move in the 
world at all, as coming from “the very first cultural object, and the one by 
which they all exist, is the other’s body as the bearer of a behavior.”15 What 
I learn from others is not just how to hold a spoon or cup, but what these 
cultural objects do. In addition, the other as a cultural object means I learn 
how bodies are situated in our social world. Since my own understanding of 
my body occurs with others, my own body is also a cultural object.
Right after Merleau-Ponty writes that he finds his past to be the grounding 
for his current autonomy in the Phenomenology, he notes that he is never 
quite acting either voluntarily or rationally: “voluntary and rational life thus 
knows itself to be entangled with another power than prevents it from being 
completed and that always gives it the air of a work in progress.”16 This other 
power is natural time. Unlike the child in Beauvoir’s account who has not yet 
grasped time, adult time has agency but at the same time has a kind of closure 
that the child does not experience. The difference is that the child has not 
acquired habitual action and is capable of spontaneity—the concept wherein 
Merleau-Ponty places freedom in development. The polyphonic babbling of 
infants and the random explorations of space in toddlers demonstrate not 
just that they have less bodily control than adults, but also that they are less 
trained about how to use their bodies and what objects are acceptable to 
interact with in what ways. If one has ever witnessed in horror when chil-
dren decide to lick something like a public handrail or stick some random 
pebble from the ground in their mouths, one sees a kind of spontaneous 
move toward engagement with the world that has been well educated out of 
adults. Handrails are for putting hands on. Stones are for stepping on. But 
to toddlers, such a knowledge is not yet present, and they are merely using 
their propensity to engage with the world. Development and the formation 
of habitual bodily self-control that provide the ground for complex agency 
are based upon the loss of some of the natural spontaneity one witnesses in 
the child because children have not fully sedimented what cultural objects 
are meant for in their society. North Americans often discover that our com-
pulsions about showering daily, changing clothes daily, standing with some 
distance from strangers, infrequent touching of others, wearing swimsuits in 
saunas and at beaches, and eating in a certain manner with certain utensils 
are often quite different in other cultures. One may have no particular intel-
lectual investment in one’s culture’s bodily training but will still find it very 
hard to alter, even if one can appreciate another manner of being with others.
Merleau-Ponty cites that the work of J.L. Moreno’s psychodramatic ther-
apy as providing useful lessons in spontaneity, “We must consider as an 
acquisition of child psychology to have learned, with Moreno, to reveal the 
avatars of spontaneity in social integration.”17 Moreno would set up dra-
mas not just to help a family overcome relationship trouble—but to explore 
social conflicts like racism with individuals who volunteered to participate. 
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By putting people in settings where they are free to play out a role, More-
no’s work reveals how it is possible to recapture our social spontaneity.18 
Simply intellectualizing what is possible does not reveal the same kind of 
spontaneity that the acting out of roles does. Like the toddler, when pre-
sented with a new situation and asked to act it out, adults find themselves 
surprisingly more capable of acting freely when asked to perform, rather 
than simply asked to consider a different perspective. Later in his discussion 
of method in child psychology, Merleau-Ponty argues that we must stop 
seeing the child as a reflection of our adult state and instead “awaken our 
proper spontaneity” in order to understand how our behavior is not fated.19
What is the relevance of this developmental account for the good health 
imperative? If our primary and primal bodily agency is largely non-rep-
resentational and based on the developmental acquisition of understanding 
both the body and its actions in a cultural space, it becomes more obvious 
that it is harder to modify. The demand to eat differently, move in another 
fashion, or alter how I care for my body can be hard to reconcile with a long 
history of living in a certain manner. It is fairly easy to have to complete 
some travel reimbursement paperwork that I never was previously required 
to fill out. I will strongly object to the absurdity of the bureaucratic excess 
and probably complain about it to anyone who I think may be sympa-
thetic, but it isn’t difficult for my body to coordinate itself to enter in some 
information on a form. Yet to be asked to eat differently or stand closer to 
strangers is effortful for me, even if I might very well be able to understand, 
and even desire the better digestion or happier connections with others.
Unlike children we have a long sedimented history of living in our bodies 
in a certain manner, change is not easy. The good health imperative is ask-
ing individuals to work against sedimented behavior toward conscious and 
deliberate new behaviors. Yet, in order to change our behaviors to healthy 
ones, spontaneity is not called for by the good health imperative. Deliberate 
change is dictated by experts of how to act with assorted tools, practices, 
metrics for evaluation, and tests. This encouragement to work on behav-
ior modification for health is difficult to explore due to the complexity of 
developmental agency, our cultural bodies, and the intersection with medi-
cal advice and social pressures. As our bodies are cultural objects, it would 
be helpful to examine a parallel practice in the case of female aesthetic 
self-management as an example of socially mandated body modification 
that arises from a particular time and culture.
Female self-regulation
Merleau-Ponty lectures that gender tells one little at birth about the child, 
but when one considers the situation, one sees how a child will be pulled in 
particular directions—particular cultural “vectors.”
To say at birth, “It is a boy” or “It is a girl” is to say almost nothing at all. 
However, whoever says “boy” or “girl” speaks of a situated individual. 
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The child is situated in a force field which at every moment represents a 
particular nuance of masculinity or femininity. In this field, the child is 
subjected to vectors that draw him in different directions.20
In The Second Sex, Beauvoir documents the disparity between the expecta-
tions of what a woman sees as her major life goals and what a man does. 
She writes regarding marriage that “No young man, however, considers 
marriage as his fundamental project.”21 In France in 1949, women were 
encouraged to see their “adult” goals as being dedicated to the establish-
ment of a marriage and then a family. Without a husband, a woman would 
occupy an abject space of spinsterhood and possible impoverishment. Beau-
voir’s seminal point that grounded all later feminist thinking was to indicate 
that being a good woman was a matter of training, not of anatomy. When 
Beauvoir writes about becoming a woman, she writes about how the end-
less prescriptions about how to be a woman indicate its contingent nature 
as a cultural set of actions rather than a causal result of a certain biology. If 
a lack of a husband is seen as a failure for being a “real” woman, it encour-
ages anxiety on the part of all women—married or not—to make sure to 
obtain and retain a man.
Modern mores on marriage have changed, and even in my conserva-
tive state of Tennessee, I meet few female students who consider marriage 
as their only important goal in life, even if it remains a primary one. My 
female students are likely to describe themselves through their majors, their 
friends, and their hobbies, much more in keeping with their male coun-
terparts. Does that mean that women are now experiencing themselves as 
equals to men? That being a woman isn’t a project? While marriage may 
not hold as central a role, women in developed societies must have strict 
discipline when it comes to be sufficiently womanly. Women—young, old, 
married, single, with children, childfree, educated, poor, professional, lab-
orer—work on their looks. To be a woman today is to be a self-regulated 
product.
To dress nicely, to tend to one’s face and hair, the removal of some body 
hair and maintenance of skin, and to maintain a certain size is never fin-
ished, and is repetitive and wildly asymmetrical to the demands made of 
men. Roslyn Diprose points out that when understanding the position of 
women, we must not attend just to what any rational person would consider 
obvious forms of oppression.22 As Sandra Lee Bartky concisely states—“Of 
course women are persons; of course blacks are human beings. Who but the 
lunatic fringe would deny it?”23 The situation of women in the developed 
world is a disparity in expectations. Diprose writes that “I think the central 
issue in redressing women’s social subordination within patriarchal social 
relations is not so much male control of women’s bodies as the ways in 
which women’s bodies are socially constituted in relation to men.”24 The 
skeptic of the gender-specific nature of such discussions might point out 
that exclusive models of ideal looks exist for both men and women, thus, 
one could not argue that women “have it worse” than men. These models 
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provide varying degrees of policing of certain kinds of behavior and pun-
ishments for those that violate them. Short men face discrimination in job 
applications as do Black men. Thus, obviously certain ideals of appropriate 
“male” appearance regulate behavior like appropriate “female” appear-
ance. In some cases, men who violate masculinity norms are met with far 
more violence than simply not being sufficiently well-kept as a woman. The 
difference in how men’s bodies are monitored is, however, not primarily one 
that is concerned with agentic grooming—that is, one might discriminate 
against a short man or a Black man, but one does not assume he could be 
otherwise. A fat woman, a woman without makeup, a woman who fails to 
monitor her facial hair—these are all women who are judged as not failing 
to be “right” but failing to do the right thing in their bodily self-control.
The one parallel that some men experience about grooming is appearing 
“effeminate”—wearing makeup, walking a certain way, or wearing certain 
clothes. However, women who fail to maintain their appearance do not 
threaten the male psyche in the same manner. Indeed, the disapprobation 
they meet comes from all genders. Women who do not display certain kinds 
of grooming are seen as failures rather than threats. Thus, the responsibil-
ity of women for self-regulation is vastly disproportionate to men. This is 
not to say that men are not also perceived as being responsible for agentic 
bodily molding. However, in the case of fatness as being a signal of inap-
propriate grooming, women are more likely to have internalized anti-fat 
attitudes, to see themselves as needing change and substandard. Studies in 
industrialized Western societies on gendered differences in relation to anti-
fat attitudes have tended to find that women are more likely to have inter-
nalized the idea that their bodies are insufficient, and men less likely to have 
internalized thinness norms and to perceive their own bodies as needing 
change.25 Women are more likely than men to diet, express concerns about 
their weight, and more likely to seek weight loss.26 Alejandro Magallares 
and José-Francisco Morales note that this “helps explain why anorexia ner-
vosa and bulimia nervosa occur predominately among women.”27 While 
certainly everyone is shaped by norms of what “normal” or “healthy” or 
“beautiful” bodies should be, women are more likely to see these issues as 
something about their own relationship to their bodies.
The inferiority complex well described by feminist philosophers is that the 
female body is something that is in itself insufficient. What young girls learn 
from older women, and what women learn from each other, men, and the 
market is that their bodies require modification according to an ever-expand-
ing set of products, techniques, and practices. To be a woman is to work 
on one’s appearance. This demand is increasingly one that should be prac-
ticed at all ages—infant girls have pierced ears and teenagers have sweet 16 
spa parties (complete with make-overs). Waxing one’s pubic hair is now for 
many women simply another common ritual, and all cities and most Amer-
ican towns have waxing salons devoted exclusively to this practice. Older 
women are provided with products, surgeries, and techniques to ameliorate 
the effects of aging. One might point out that the delight in female beauty, 
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just or not, like sexuality, is a fundamental element of human nature. One 
might as well yell at water for being too wet. However, what is unique about 
today’s ideas of women is not the objectification of women, but the idea that 
all women of all ages should devote their time modifying their looks. This is 
not the delight in Nefertiti, Aspasia, or Lucrezia Borgia as rare instances of 
fine female beauty. Rather, the idea is that even the housewife, the 60-year-
old, the student, the doctor, and the cook should all make more of themselves 
even if they won’t go down in the annals of great beauties of world history.
Consider, for instance, our contemporary interest in the beautiful bod-
ies of female celebrities. Gossip about the king’s beautiful mistress or the 
ingénue of the opera is not a new phenomenon. We can think too of the 
old stories we tell young girls of beautiful princesses who are loved simply 
because they are beautiful and passively needing aid. However, what marks 
our contemporary accounts is the documentation of the mechanics of their 
beauty. Sleeping Beauty is born beautiful, just as she born a princess. Her 
tale justifies both the adoration of beauty and the rightness of the monarchy 
and the status quo. Unlike Sleeping Beauty, however, our interest in con-
temporary beautiful celebrities is very much a concern with how they work 
on their bodies, not just that they have those bodies as a gift from God. 
Beautiful women are no longer just objects to be viewed or possessed, as in 
a museum, they are objects to become. How does Kim Kardashian contour 
her face? What is Halle Berry’s exercise routine? How can I too lose my 
post-baby weight? In a typical woman’s magazine, the delight in the beau-
tiful celebrity is married to the other pages with detailed discussion of how 
to be that beautiful woman (accompanied naturally by advertisements for 
such products). As the self-help guru Oprah likes to say: “be your best self!” 
since the one who is reading this magazine clearly won’t do.
Beauty as labor in the contemporary capitalist market, or according to 
the French maxim—il faut souffrir pour être belle (one must suffer to be 
beautiful)—suggests that we can and should select a beauty ideal and then 
work to approximate it. Any particular body is just a different set of issues 
to be addressed with different products and practices. Bartky explains:
It is a fact, that women in our society are regarded as having a virtual 
duty “to make the most of what we have.” But the imperative not to 
neglect our appearance suggests that we can neglect it, that it is within 
our power to make ourselves look better—not just neater and cleaner, 
but prettier, and more attractive.28
For this to make sense, women must be convinced that they are not good 
enough already; how they appear to others is a problem, but most impor-
tantly a problem that they can (and therefore should) fix. Even a woman 
whose appearance is considered to fit the ideals of youth, weight, skin tone, 
hair luxuriousness, and curvaceousness is under no less pressure. She too 
must engage in rituals of defense against aging and work constantly to 
maintain and perfect her look.
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What the objectification of women creates is not only women feeling 
observed and separated from their bodies, but also women believing in a 
tremendous amount of agency on their part to achieve the right body. It 
is only their lack of sufficient effort, willpower, or the right combination 
of diet, exercise, and body modification that is holding them back. Luna 
Dolezal notes that one of the features of having a female body is pervasive 
shame.29 This shame requires that I devote time and the attendant series of 
deliberate bodily movements to bodily self-care to lessen my feeling of not 
having done enough. Why wouldn’t I want to improve myself if I can? If I 
want to look a certain way and fail, I have only myself to blame.
Women consider how they appear to others even when the others who 
wait in judgment are not likely or potential sexual partners because looking 
competent for a woman is to look managed. After all, if one isn’t interested 
in finding a potential mate who wants a certain socially sanctioned aesthetic, 
one still has strong reasons to monitor one’s appearance. Failing to look 
maintained as a woman means failing to be taken seriously. While earlier 
theorists, such as Beauvoir, pointed out the futileness of female narcissistic 
practices—someone will always be more beautiful, and age catches up with 
every woman—parts of appearance management are very practical. Johanna 
Oksala correctly points out that such rituals are themselves no longer nec-
essarily futile endeavors that will never “pay” women for the time invested. 
Rather, looking a certain way has simply become another tool in a successful 
neoliberal woman’s tool belt—not designed to please the male gaze but to 
pass into situations that will be economically successfully for her.30 Looking 
old, hairy in the wrong places, fat, unkempt, and makeup-less have all been 
highly correlated with less success in professional circumstances.31
Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex is a developmental tale of women—
from young girl to teenager to married woman to old age—to highlight the 
way women are oppressed by restricted social norms and also how they 
participate in their own submission. Since one is enculturated from birth 
to understand that one needs to make one’s own body reflect the cultural 
body of ideal women, the progression of docility in women is a matter 
of training. In our contemporary view of bodily agency and responsibil-
ity, a woman sees her body modification as a choice—hence, to reject it 
seems to reject liberation. Why wouldn’t I want to improve myself? When 
Merleau-Ponty discusses the infant at the mirror, we can extend that orig-
inal nascent attention to that image to the particularities of the discipline 
women are taught and teach themselves. My image in a mirror I see is not 
simply as I’m seen by others—for better or for worse—but rather a work in 
progress, a tableau on which I can perform an art. For many women, it is 
as normal to see one’s body as something to be worked on as it is to drink 
from a cup. In English, one can say “I have to put my face on,” which means 
I have to put my makeup on. This idea of putting one’s face on underlines 
the idea that one’s essence is very much how one makes oneself.
Merleau-Ponty doesn’t just write that I learn from the other’s behavior, 
say, by imitation, but that the other is the first cultural object that permits 
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other cultural objects to have their significance. Understanding the roles 
between men and women is not a matter of understanding the difference 
in their bodies. Rather, one must understand the difference in their actions 
which will be constituted in the social world, not as a set of reflexes react-
ing to particular levels of testosterone or arising from the possession of a 
uterus. For instance, one can think of how gender identity is perceived, 
as Sara Heinämaa discusses, not as a permanent substance, “but the con-
tinuity of a mode of acting—comparable to that of a habit, a style, or a 
tradition.”32 What I learned from my parents primarily is not any set of 
ideologies about the relative differences between men and women, but how 
my parents moved, talked, and engaged with each other and others in the 
world. I learned how to attend to my body as my mother attended to hers: 
not as ideology about women, but as an everyday practice.
In the Phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty speaks about how sedimentation 
in our life makes the habitual manner of acting “privileged” for us but 
is still capable of being “shattered” by freedom. However, he also notes, 
“And yet, after having built my life upon an inferiority complex, contin-
uously reinforced for twenty years, it is not likely that I would change.”33 
The Merleau-Ponty who views the last 20 years of his life as permitting 
his autonomy also sees how his freedom is possibly constrained by habits 
whose long development might make it difficult to perceive them, much less 
change them. As noted above, certain ingrained habitual responses to the 
environment—how I walk and how I hold a cup—are difficult to modify. In 
a more complex manner, how I attend to my body—how I care for it, how I 
view its status—developed in a world in which sex roles are one of the most 
significant ways in which we organize our society. To liberate myself from 
any particular body management ritual at any one time is easy, to liberate 
myself from a world in which I am habituated to see my very self as a pro-
ject is as hard as to change the way I walk.
While certainly many find beauty work a source of pleasure, it is also 
work that takes away from other pursuits and very often is met with ambiv-
alence and self-degradation. Feminist thought permits another manner of 
thinking about these rituals. Many women, when learning of institutional 
sexism, find a language to help express their frustration and alienation 
within environments that are supposed to be “normal.” The recent #metoo 
movement highlighting the pervasiveness of sexual harassment led many 
women to reflect that they had been subject to harassment, but failed to 
really identity it since it was seen as simply “the way things are.” Articu-
lating personal stories and exploring them can help uncover those fields of 
experience for which no name has been given but that still structure our 
worldviews. Elizabeth Grosz has argued that an indispensable part of any 
structural critique is that it connects with the lived experience of individu-
als. One has to show how such norms affect a woman’s embodiment, even 
women who do not identify with feminism, by exploring the experiences of 
women. Grosz argues that we must attend to experiences—“…I would con-
tend that without some acknowledgement of the formative role of experience 
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in the establishment of knowledges, feminism has no grounds from which 
to dispute patriarchal norms.”34 To bother objecting to the intensity of the 
demands of beauty rituals, one must connect to the experiences of women 
and explore manners in which what might seem “just how things are” is in 
fact merely one culturally contingent way of organizing our social life and 
by no means the only one we can imagine. Moreover, a full exploration of 
such rituals can explore their negative aspects instead of simply seeing them 
as one of many choices women may make.
Normalization works to minimize the relevance of the diversity of actual 
experiences into encouragements to repeat the pre-determined path. It 
encourages us to point toward a similar goal of beauty rituals where “spon-
taneity” is read as pre-packaged options of say choosing a different hair 
style, having tattoos or not, or running or lifting weights for fitness. The 
idea that agency is contained within worlds where one has “choices” tends 
to develop a model of agency qua consumer consumption. I can choose 
“how I look” like I can choose what sandwich I want. Not only is my body 
obviously not an infinitely moldable object, but the choices are also estab-
lished before I arrive—just like what sandwiches I can purchase at the café. 
However, there is not an alternative “right” or “natural” way to be. The 
idea that not wearing makeup is the solution to the tyranny of beauty sim-
ply reinstitutes the moral norm of a particular right way of being. Rather, 
feminist thought helps us identify these processes and render them contin-
gent. In so doing, their bonds over our senses of self and other are loosened, 
and we can explore new ways of living.
If one considers the time, attention to detail, and requirement for being 
considered sufficiently presentable, let alone attractive, one sees how it is 
a training that refuses other alternative ways of caring for oneself. Impor-
tantly, women are not themselves in charge of the structure of the choice 
itself. Thus, to say one chooses to care for oneself through beauty labor 
is dissimilar from saying one chooses to read a particular book, since 
there are real social costs to not engaging in the practice of body modifi-
cation. Oksala points out that idea of personal choice “effectively masks 
the systematic aspects of power—domination, social hierarchies, economic 
exploitation—by relegating subjects the freedom to choose between differ-
ent options while denying them any real possibility for defining or shaping 
those options.”35 I can choose this makeup or that shirt, but if I wish to 
enter into normal social discourse, I must modify myself to certain stand-
ards. Opting out is not a viable possibility.
A feminist view is not to argue against beauty rituals themselves. Beauty 
rituals are not inherently degrading, or unnatural, or sites of submission. 
However, if we do not see them as contingent, they may they narrow our 
experiences and limit the possibilities of spontaneous agency in our embod-
ied condition. Oksala argues that “the aim of feminist practices of con-
sciousness-raising is not the exposure of a deep inner self or an original and 
authentic womanhood, but rather the problematization of the normalized 
self.”36 Choice models that present the subject within a pre-given choice 
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do not permit spontaneous new manners of engagement with the world 
and others, since the model places the agency in the decision about options 
over which we have no control. While certainly some of life is about decid-
ing between options, much of life is characterized by living in sedimented, 
habitual, culturally contextualized manners in which we continue along 
certain paths. These paths need to be brought out of the background and 
into the forefront where we can examine them, a topic explored more fully 
in the last chapter with reference to Sara Ahmed’s discussion of orientation.
One can surmise that one of the vast contributors of the managed female 
aesthetic is not the desire of men as much as the desire of corporations to 
find new products to sell. It appears that the body becomes a site of infinite 
improvement. It seems that there is no end to finding problems; ones that did 
not exist before and can now become sources of products for sale. Lines in an 
aging woman’s face, hair everywhere but the head, and cellulite throughout 
the body are all now sites of betterment. We see routines formerly devoted 
just for athletes, models, porn stars, or actors now becoming part and parcel 
of everyday practice with all the attendant purchases required—contouring 
one’s makeup, removing one’s pubic hair, obtaining a completely tight body, 
getting aesthetic plastic surgery, and using Botox. We see men’s bodies too 
become landscapes of improvement and the attendant assumption of a lack 
of willpower in men who fail to discipline themselves appropriately.
One question that faces a critical examination of the way in which we are 
trained to take care of ourselves is—how does one determine what kinds 
of self-care in fact limit our experiences and which ones broaden them? If 
I am raised from infancy to embody a certain style of self-care, change is 
a struggle against sedimented habits and norms. In addition, self-care is 
often sold to women as a kind of empowerment and thereby dieting and 
exercise are sold not as means to obtain a certain look, but as ways to be 
healthier. There are manners in which this is evidently merely a means to 
sell more products, but feminists also have championed self-care as a kind 
of self-transformation. Below I will discuss how feminists have used health 
as a tool to argue against beauty rituals and some dieting and exercise and 
what might be emancipatory rather than limiting styles of living.
Feminist alternatives
Susan Bordo’s book Unbearable Weight highlights how the obsession with 
“perfect” managed bodies increases women’s sense that their bodies are 
something to be molded into submission.37 The National Eating Disorders 
Association (NEDA) reports that around 10 million women live with eat-
ing disorders such as anorexia or bulimia. The highest rates are among 
girls and young women.38 Only a minority of people who meet “stringent 
diagnostic criteria” for eating disorders receive mental health care.39 What 
is alarming about the lack of treatment for persons with eating disorders is 
just how dangerous having an eating disorder is: anorexia nervosa has the 
highest mortality rate of any psychiatric condition, including schizophrenia 
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and bipolar disorders.40 However, the funding to cure anorexia pales in 
comparison to less common but more widely publicized disorders such as 
Alzheimer’s disease and schizophrenia. In 2005, approximately 2.2 million 
people lived with schizophrenia, and the NIH funded 250 million dollars 
for research. Approximately 10 million people have eating disorders, but 
only 12 million dollars was given to study anorexia nervosa.41 Anorexia 
may receive little funding because it is seen as an exaggeration of “normal” 
dieting practices. Moreover, since women suffer from anorexia dispropor-
tionately to men, and since the model of a good woman is someone who 
correctly regulates her body, then anorexics, like the fat or the hairy, are just 
failing to take up their agency properly.
Bordo discusses how “female” disorders that vary in time can be understood 
as forms of protest. The rise of agoraphobia after women were encouraged to 
adopt hyper-stylized forms of domestic perfection, passivity, and deference to 
male authority in the post-World War II era can be read as a kind of embod-
ied protest: “The housebound agoraphobic lives this construction of feminin-
ity literally. ‘You want me in this home? You’ll have me in this home—with 
a vengeance!’”42 In our contemporary age of eating disorders, one can read 
these excessive demands to perfect one’s body as extending the idea to its 
conclusion—“my body will know no limits; it will be thin to the point of 
disappearance!” To know that the evaluation of one’s worth is tied to the eval-
uation of one’s appearance makes women self-conscious in situations where 
such concerns limit their free behavior, similar to how an illness can restrain 
one’s extension in the world. Iris Marion Young’s famous piece “Throwing 
Like a Girl” describes how this habitual self-consciousness affects basic bodily 
motility, from throwing to confidently jumping over a stream.43 Only under 
reflection can she expose this tendency. Normally, her hesitancy would not be 
an object of consideration, but rather her habitual and undisclosed manner of 
being in the world. Part of the work of feminist phenomenology has been to 
expose how the feminization of women has resulted not just in particular sex-
ist ideologies, but practices and disciplines that shape women’s relationships to 
themselves, others, and the environment that surrounds them.
Since beauty labor is designed to create a certain appearance, one would 
learn to think very carefully about how one looks rather than how one feels 
to the point that one cannot feel good unless one considers oneself to look 
good. One cannot be at home in one’s body without the attendant vigilance 
to make sure one’s appearance meets a certain standard. Considering how 
potentially unhealthy such hyper-self-consciousness is, the feminist trend 
in the last several decades has been to raise consciousness about how con-
stantly needing to monitor and manage one’s looks fails to permit one to 
live a flourishing life. One cannot confidently use one’s body in strenuous 
physical settings or work deliberately toward complex projects that demand 
one’s full attention if one cannot feel comfortable without monitoring one’s 
appearance. In addition, such body work excludes one from working in 
other arenas. Bordo writes, “Through the exacting and normalizing disci-
plines of diet, makeup, and dress—central organizing principles of time and 
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space in the day of many women—we are rendered less socially orientated 
and more centripetally focused on self-modification.”44 Feminism directs 
our attention also to what we are not attending to when we are working 
on our bodies—to the rest of our lives, to politics, to work, to the greater 
world. Feminist theory has enabled one to see not just the contingency of 
aesthetic practices, but also the harms of them. Women’s sense of selves as 
bound up in plastic and impossible ideals of female beauty affect not just 
their identity, but their time, effort, and ultimately their freedom. Consider 
here Cressida Heyes’ discussion of Weight Watchers where Foucault’s ideas 
of biopower, as will be discussed in the subsequent chapter, can be used to 
explain the way our bodies become normalized.
…normalization is enacted through ever-finer measurement and closer 
surveillance of the subject population. For example, standard height/
weight tables are themselves a macro-tool for normalizing the popula-
tion—for taking a vast and diverse group of people and establishing a 
‘normal range’ to which every individual bears some relationship. Devi-
ation from the norm is then (falsely) read as proof of behaviors that 
can be pathologized, just as conformity is (falsely) taken as evidence of 
health and good conduct. Bio-power here thus operates both at an epi-
demiological level, and at the level of the production of a weight-based 
moral identity in the individual.45
The charts of weight help establish bodies that are “normal” and that are 
within what is considered the healthy range and bodies that are not—that 
is those that exceed it. One is being “good” if one gets one’s weight to 
be within the right part of the chart and “bad” if one does not. Since the 
whole endeavor is not just about one’s moral goodness, but one’s health, 
one should be especially contrite to fail to have taken proper care of oneself.
In the above quote, Heyes obviously suggests that such charts themselves 
do not promote good health. After all, Heyes writes how this encourages 
an unhealthy normalization with her parenthetical “falsely.” Most people 
regain the weight they lose on a diet, which is not healthy. Alongside this 
physical failure is the moral shame one has for failing to do what is right by 
one’s very well-being. “Losing weight and regaining it is not only bad for 
one’s physical health, or disappointing as a failure to conform to a beauty 
norm. It is also an ignominious defeat for one’s efforts to create an ethical 
way of life.”46 For Heyes, it is not that the self-care that diets espouse is 
unethical. In fact, she calls for more careful attention to self-care as part of 
the pursuit of an ethical way of life. What Heyes argues against is the false 
bill of sale that diet programs provide when they argue that they provide 
one with more freedom (to run around with the grandchildren!). Instead, 
they not only operate through normalization procedures that are directed 
at wide scale public control, but they also don’t even provide the original 
promise—that of weight loss—and hence produce not just a lack of healthy 
benefit, but actual reduction in one’s well-being.
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Bartky suggests that if women are able to reject beauty standards, they 
might find more a more natural kind of happiness:
Repressive narcissistic satisfactions stand in the way of the emergence 
of an authentic delight in the body, too: The woman unable to leave 
her house in the morning without ‘putting on her face’ will never dis-
cover the beauty, character, and expressiveness her own face already 
possesses.47
Popular forms of body appreciation often stress ways in which one can 
learn to enjoy one’s body for what it can do instead of what is looks like to 
others. Indeed, the success of feminist consciousness-raising helps to explain 
the shift in the marketing of the diet-exercise industry away from dieting 
as about looks toward the idea of dieting (and its attendant other forms of 
size management) as about wellness. I’m not dieting to fit into a bikini; I’m 
dieting to play with my son! While certainly there is no shortage of products 
and practices devoted toward changing one’s appearance, there is a grow-
ing interest in body modification, such as dieting, as being about a kind of 
healthy self-care. No feminist would argue one must spend time modifying 
one’s body to fit into a limiting view of what a woman should be, but per-
haps one should do so if it is about health. Indeed, if a sense of health or 
nature underlies the argument against excessive beauty work—then feminist 
might in fact call for healthy labor as valuable. Rosemarie Tong has argued 
that despite risks to the infringement of individual rights concerning body 
image and a weight-obsessed population, the costs of an increasingly over-
weight society justify certain initiatives. She argues for “common-sense” 
approaches like legislation that bans soft drinks at schools, funds nutrition 
education in schools, subsidizes walking and bike paths, and provides tax 
incentives to employers that allow for fitness breaks.48 We also can see other 
feminist takes on the need to create healthier bodies represented in blogs 
such as “Fit is a Feminist Issue,” where the authors sell items for purchase—
such as coffee mugs—to celebrate their new fitness achievements, and pro-
mote others to achieve their fitness goals in a feminist manner.49 Bordo 
reads obesity alongside self-starvation for achieving a certain weight as a 
kind of symbol of the “contradictions” of the social body: “contradictions 
that make self-management a continual and virtually impossible project.”50 
The unhealthiness of each body is seen as self-evident in her work, as is the 
idea that health is something we should work to obtain. Bordo does not put 
the blame on women for their size or suggest that their freedom is misused, 
rather she points out the impossible situation that women are forced into 
where ill-health is a likely outcome.
Samantha Murray’s The “Fat” Female Body explores the example of fat-
ness as it is constructed both within the fat activist movement and within 
the larger anti-fat world. Murray writes that public health policies directed 
toward encouraging “proper” eating and exercise are not educational so 
much as disciplinary.51 But this discipline is not to be administered centrally 
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by the government; rather, it is to be instituted at the individual level. People 
in the developed world are aware of the correlation of obesity and over-
weight with poor health. Thus, public health policies do not inform people 
of the problem; rather, they provide different methods, rules, and tools for 
how to master the wayward body that are similar to aesthetic self-regu-
lation. Murray notes that despite the seemingly population-wide focus of 
public health policies, they depend upon a certain idea of the self-agentic 
individual controlling herself.
Murray writes that this kind of “humanist/individualist logic” is so pow-
erful that any data provided to contradict it is often rejected.52 The over-
whelming evidence of the failure of diets is such an example. The blind 
insistence that the individual has the power to change her weight and thus 
should underlines how the the good-health imperative is a moral issue, obe-
dience to it both a mark of both health and goodness. “Given the oft-pro-
claimed ‘objectivity’ of medicine, it is telling that the very ways in which we 
separate ‘pathological’ bodies from ‘normal’ bodies is just as much about 
upholding morality as it is about ‘health.’”53 The consequence of fatness 
being something one can overcome with proper action implies that those 
who have not overcome it are to blame. The fat itself is not the problem—it 
is the individual within the fat or the self who controls the fat. This creates a 
divided self, where the true self is some kind of disembodied will that exerts, 
or fails to exert, its influence over the mundane body.
In her discussion of fat activism, which is often explicitly feminist, Murray 
draws a different face on the same problem. Fat activists argue for fatness 
as simply a descriptor that holds no necessarily normative value about a 
body any more than curly hair or freckles should. Fat bodies can be healthy, 
beautiful, and sexy. If fat people are ill, they should be treated with the same 
care and dignity as anyone else. When the topic of health is approached, 
fat activists are often allied with movements such as the Health at Every 
Size (HAES) movement.54 HAES and other researchers, critical of the war 
against obesity, argue that dieting is largely deleterious for one’s health, 
rarely successful, and that little evidence exists that proves fat people are 
doomed to lives of poor health.55 Contrasting with the war against obesity’s 
focus on using weight as a measurement for health, critics stress healthy 
activity and eating for all people of all sizes and draw attention to studies 
indicating that the link between health and weight is not as conclusive as is 
often argued. But these arguments are themselves well situated within the 
good health imperative, the debate is merely what kinds of agentic control 
are possible and what promotes the best health.
Murray argues that the autonomous liberal subject haunts the seemingly 
emancipating politics of such fat activism. She points out that a type of 
disembodied agency underlies fat activism, where one is replacing one set 
of negative stereotypes with positive, celebratory ones. In order for such 
a model to work, a type of Cartesian dualism must be implicit, where the 
mind is seen as free in relation to the body. The celebration of fleshliness 
and of fat is counter to the dominant norms. “The ‘fat goddess’, standing 
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firm against the world with her cottage-cheese thighs akimbo refuses nor-
mative ways of knowing: the knowledge others believe they have of her.”56 
But to celebrate one’s fatness against the dominant aesthetic norm requires 
the now-liberated fat person to be separated in a different fashion from her 
body. “One must be ‘fat and proud,’ with no grey areas, no contradictions, 
no questions, no ambivalence.”57 Such a project is based in the idea that the 
core self is the individual’s will. I am what I judge myself to be; I am not 
what others judge me to be. Murray observes that the same humanist/indi-
vidualist logic appears to be at play in much fat-positive literature, and the 
true nature of our embodied selves remains hidden. “As women, our bodies 
have been made strange to us: projects we are set apart from, and even 
the language we employ to talk about our bodies constantly moves from 
our flesh to ourselves.”58 The female cultural body is still a project, one is 
encouraged to now see one’s “attitudes” as the project, instead of one’s fat. 
Thus, I can either, in the case of the war against obesity, modify my eating 
and exercise to fit a certain model of health and beauty, or in the case of 
fat activism, I can alter my mind to stop seeing my body as loathsome. If 
the public health outcry tells us to change our bodies, fat activists tell us to 
choose to change our minds. If we have not managed to easily do so, then 
more intensive work on the self is needed to now “love” ourselves.
The idea that one must change, one’s body or mind or body, is drawn out 
in Heyes work where she notes the co-opting of feminist self-care in the rit-
uals of mass-marketed dieting in Weight Watchers. She argues that while the 
patriarchal disciplinary practice in dieting produces an “appropriate femi-
nine behavior and appearance,” dieting is not only about achieving a cultur-
ally sanctioned look, but is “also a process of working on the self, marketed 
and sold to women with particular resonance, that cleverly deploys the dis-
course of self-care feminists have long encouraged.”59 Feminists encourage 
women to work toward good self-care against the dominating, normalizing 
ideals of what a woman must be. There is something positively emancipat-
ing about taking care of my health in the face of a society demanding that 
I should devote my time to the care of others or some impossible ideal of 
beauty. Women learn not just how to modify their behaviors when work-
ing on dieting, but also an empowerment that comes with detailed careful 
attention to self-regulation—the “active, creative sense of self-development, 
mastery, expertise, and skill that dieting can offer.”60 We can see these pleas-
ures too in abundance in other forms of body work such as mastering a 
difficult piano piece or running a marathon. One cultivates new capacities, 
new pleasures, and new ways of taking up consciously one’s habits and 
finding joy in new attitudes. Heyes contrasts docility with capacities to care 
for the self. She argues that a type of self-care is desired, one that would 
be agentic and chosen for feminist rather than normalized aims. She writes 
that some of the practices obtained in weight loss meetings—“improving 
awareness of one’s own habits and feelings, or assuming responsibility for 
choices about how to live”—should be refocused.61 She says that increasing 
awareness of good self-care will produce individuals who are not docile 
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and can find good ways to care for themselves. “Central to this awareness is 
the possibility of uncoupling new capacities from docility, and of recruiting 
those capacities to care for the self.”62
Yet, how is one to tell if one’s labor is self-care or docility? One idea might 
be to suggest that an activity, such as excessive beauty rituals, is unhealthy 
promotes docility if it limits one’s capacity to engage with the world in a 
variety of ways, including ones that have not yet been explored. In distinc-
tion, self-care permits one to extend more meaningfully and happily into 
the world. As discussed in Chapter 2, health is often marked as the capacity 
for the body to rest in the background and in some kinds of body modifi-
cation, the body may always be an object to be disciplined into submission, 
never allowing one to fully engage in the world. Thus, it isn’t that there is a 
“natural” self that should not be covered with make-up or a particular way 
in which you should eat or move. For some, the delight in self-modification 
is one of life’s charms: for others, a set of oppressive rituals. Whether such 
activities are expanding or restricting must be answered based in the indi-
vidual lived circumstances, not abstracted from it.
Yet, one of the problems with beauty labor is that there are no natural 
boundaries to it even if it can often be pleasurable. One can take minimal 
time attending to one’s appearance, or one can take most of one’s free time. 
Makeup, hair, wardrobe, skin care, and also the work that could be for either 
beauty or health (or both)—exercise, these activities can be argued to create 
docile bodies—bodies who willingly regulate themselves and in so doing fail 
to challenge the status quo by supporting capitalist motivations, encouraging 
shame and self-loathing, and reducing one’s possibilities to explore new ways 
of being. Yet, health work is so similar to this kind of labor it is hard to view it 
at not producing docility even if it does promote health. Health work also has 
no obvious limits. One’s diet can always receive further care; one can work 
on sleep, on exercise, and as our research progresses, we can find in further 
detail other aspects of diet and exercise as well as other parts of caring for our 
human bodies that could receive improvement. Both require purchasing cer-
tain items and avoiding others (such as certain foods) and practices (quitting 
smoking, beginning yoga). Both are socially sanctioned and praised and entail 
real economic benefits. Failure, or perceived failure, is penalized with social 
and professional marginalization and higher medical care costs. Both require 
seeing the self as a constant project that can never be completed.
The actual agentic actions that one engages in for health versus for beau-
tification do not present a clear line in their enactment, even if the ethos 
behind them is different. The kind of deliberate, educated, practice, and 
product centered work that we see with beauty rituals also surrounds good 
health behaviors—in particular if one’s body or behavior is judged to be 
unhealthy. The discipline to get an unhealthy body healthy is structurally 
similar to the discipline to beautify oneself. I must educate myself, or be 
educated, on how to reduce my blood pressure by learning what food to 
buy and how to eat it. Instead of a tutorial on how to straighten my hair, 
I can follow the gym instructor on how to get fit. In both cases, one works 
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to rid oneself of bad habits and work to build new and better ones. Both 
require a concern for one’s body as it meets some external standard, say, 
BMI, or how far one approximates an external beauty ideal. Both require 
constant modification based on physical changes—age, illnesses—and envi-
ronmental changes—work schedule, physical location.
Changing one’s habits to healthier ones can often produce pleasures and 
capacities that were rare or even unknown in one’s former state. In Chap-
ter 6, I discuss somaesthetic philosophies that can be understood to focus 
and delight in such new pleasures in a potentially less normalized manner. 
It could be that docility can be avoided if one’s self-care produces such a 
pleasurable and capable self. However, docility is also defined by adherence 
to certain norms in our contemporary biopolitical state discussed further in 
the next chapter. Given how pervasive the norm of the good health imper-
ative is and its constant demands, it is unclear if it is a state that produces 
more capacities, or those newly discovered capacities are merely the sign 
that one’s body now “fits” into a contingent, narrow world which will be 
discussed in the last section of the following chapter.
The concept of health can be used to work against the unhealthy ways in 
which bodies are normalized. My longevity and very existence depends on 
my health, and those can be threatened or at least diminished in quality if 
I cannot relate to my body in a way other than as a bad, imperfect object 
to be beautified. Yet, the concept that there is a healthy me underneath the 
normalized me that could be unveiled with the right consciousness-raising 
or phenomenological exploration is a curious proposition. If I am actively 
suffering, there may exist a pull away from such suffering and toward a 
more stable state where the ill body no longer renders my plans impossi-
ble to achieve. But, as discussed at the conclusion of Chapter 2 regarding 
obesity and disability—is my suffering obviously a result of some natural 
condition, or the social context wherein I am encouraged to view myself as 
unattractive and/or unhealthy, and thus I will suffer? In Chapter 4, I delve 
into work in biopolitics to better understand the view of personal responsi-
bility inherent in the good health imperative.
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4 Biopolitics and personal responsibility
It is true that I (and most other persons free from any debilitating illness and 
with sufficient means) could better my (their) health. The idea that through 
a series of choices, I can responsibly improve my well-being might seem as 
obvious as any state I wish to improve—such as my piano skills, my parent-
ing, or my teaching. For all of these, I need to attend to my current practice, 
inform myself of what information or training I need, and apply myself. 
However, these other examples are not universally shared, desired future 
states for others. Not everyone is a parent, teacher, or pianist. There is noth-
ing inherently unreasonable about not wanting to embody these things. On 
the other hand, being healthier appears to be something universally desired. 
If it is not, we might wonder if the person is ill-informed or irrational.
Biopolitics is a wide-ranging field of study that encompasses many dif-
ferent disciplines, but its common thread is understanding the connection 
between scientific/social interests in life and political/economic interests. 
This chapter examines how biopolitics explains that our current state is 
not only a continuation of existential human concerns, but rather a new 
way of policing bodies. This chapter is not a summary of the vast multidis-
ciplinary discourse on biopolitics, but an examination into how this work 
can help elucidate how the human subject becomes a modifiable object of 
policies, norms, and laws. It discusses how we are normalized and why we 
do not reject normalization as oppressive. Using the example of campaigns 
against childhood obesity, this chapter will explore how norms of responsi-
ble parenting require the good health imperative as part of proper parental 
behavior. Visible responsible parenting takes ideological precedence over 
invisible reproductive labor. While desiring the health and well-being of 
one’s children is not necessarily culturally or historically located, the cur-
rent model of responsible parenting passes over the racial disparities in par-
enting, health, and reproductive labor.
Foucault's biopolitical revolution
Michel Foucault’s thought provides an analysis of the regime of self-im-
provement that colors our contemporary experience. In many of his ear-
lier works, Foucault explores how shifts in power (such as power in the 
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hands of the government) and knowledges—in particular the growth of the 
sciences surrounding the human—underwent significant transformations 
over time. On a certain level, this claim tells us nothing new. Obviously, 
systems of governance and the sciences have changed radically. I am not 
ruled by a king; I know that the earth rotates around the sun. Foucault, 
however, does much more than this kind of evident historical analysis in his 
works. He argues for a certain understanding of the relationship between 
power and knowledge that comes to shape not just practices and policies, 
but actual ways in which we understand ourselves. While only some of his 
work directly addresses biopolitics, much of his writing works against the 
tradition of thinking that there is a kind of universal “human nature.” Few 
reject that we are conditioned by our culture, but Foucault argues that we 
are deeply constituted, shaped, and molded. His work traces how changes 
in political regimes arise not from “better” ideas, but from a complex of 
what we would think about as traditionally political and economic inter-
ests, “power,” as well as “knowledges.” Knowledges, in particular the human 
sciences of medicine, psychiatry, psychology, and the social sciences, in both 
their academic and applied settings, come to shape political investments 
and in turn are shaped by those investments. Instead of viewing sciences as 
independent of politics or politics as independent of the sciences, Foucault 
sees them as intertwined. In addition, this combination of knowledges and 
power comes not just to rule, well or poorly, subjects but to actually trans-
form their subjectivity. Before considering his work on biopolitics, I will 
discuss his understanding of discipline and docility.
While Foucault’s texts Discipline & Punish and Madness and Civiliza-
tion are concerned with carceral institutions and asylums for the mad, he 
also appealed to the way in which such concern for bodily control was 
used in other institutions like schools and the military for the large-scale 
control of various populations. He tracked how innovations in research as 
well as political and historical shifts moved power from being about rulers 
and their whims to a systematic control of the population as a whole. Such 
broad control requires a means to monitor the population, track its perfor-
mance, and refine its control. Most importantly, it requires that the subjects 
of control become different kinds of subjects—they must become trained to 
self-monitor and control themselves.
The discipline in Foucault’s research is about how we are trained, with-
out explicit force, to control our bodies in routine and precise ways—such 
as a student who learns to sit, listen, and write for defined periods and then 
move for other defined periods, or an employee who learns how to do the 
same at work. One might also think of the precise and long-term train-
ing that an athlete or musician learns in order to execute without atten-
tion complex motions for certain kinds of performance. However, in these 
cases, there is no assumption that such training should apply to all persons. 
One may become a musician, but one isn’t abnormal if one doesn’t become 
one. Foucault is interested in not how bodily training works and becomes 
habitual in various optional activities (like hobbies), but the ways in which 
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certain kinds of bodily training arise as ways in which a large number of 
diverse bodies are disciplined to conform.
This kind of control is not perceived for many reasons. Since its purpose 
is to manage at the population level, if it is effective, it appears simply as the 
way things are. Consider the way in which our bodies are taught through 
education and workplaces to control themselves in certain ways within cer-
tain time frames. In school, one learns how to sit and listen, how to consider 
the day to begin in the morning and to end in the evening, and how eating, 
using the restroom, talking, and running all have certain predetermined times 
and places in which these activities are acceptable. In addition, one learns to 
see education as a series of tasks with various grades attached to these tasks. 
This provides a good training to easily accommodate oneself to professional 
workplaces where one similarly needs to control one’s body, for instance at 
meetings, at one’s desk, the particular ways to complete various tasks, pro-
jects, and assignments. After all, who doesn’t go to school and sit, who doesn’t 
wake up and go sit at a desk at work? It isn’t just normalizing—it is normal.
Another reason it is hard to perceive how individuals are trained is that 
variations are permitted, and any individual thus has the sensation of 
choosing particular activities. After all, one can choose a major in college, 
and one can choose to vote for this candidate over that one. What Foucault 
underlines is that it is at the level of controlling the body that we find power, 
not at the level of controlling opinions or attitudes. If one uses explicit force 
or explicit indoctrination, one exposes the vulnerability of power. If one 
understands from where power emanates, one can try to hide, work against 
it, fight it, or at minimum intellectually reject it. In addition, it is inefficient 
for controlling large numbers of persons. What one really needs is a pop-
ulace that obeys without constant monitoring or force. One needs trained 
persons who do not perceive their situation as a result of oppression, but 
rather focus on the small set of choices they have and concern themselves 
on how their choices compare to others. Conformity is based not in a con-
scious obedience, but in blindness to disciplinary regimes.
In pre-Modern eras, one might wish for a better king or a better govern-
ment in the way that one might wish for a better parent. The rights of the 
king were absolute but also located within him. The bloody infighting of 
many royal families testifies to the need to physically be in the role to have 
the power. The people’s affection or hatred may promote, impede, or even 
overthrow a ruler, but the ruler did not “manage” the people—he ruled 
them well or poorly. However, as populations grew and condensed in cities, 
previous forms of controlling the mad and the criminal were insufficient. 
Populations were now not only in need of more systematic control for rea-
sons of taxation, managing criminality, and insanity, but also for the spread 
of disease. A beneficent or cruel ruler alone could do little to monitor and 
manage the population. One needs some way to understand what the con-
stitution of the population is, what means could better manage it, and also 
what could better foster it to various ends. One needs human sciences and 
a stable bureaucracy that will enact the role of population management. 
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Foucault argues that in order for new forms of disciplinary power to take 
shape, one needs an interplay of the growth of power and more sophis-
ticated forms and knowledges about how to enact such power. Without 
refinement, power would remain in its essentialist and brute form where 
one only obeys out of fear of a particular actor or actors.
In the case of schools and workplaces, sciences—such as pedagogy and 
management science—arise alongside the increasing number of individuals 
within those institutions. Since we now exist in such social and easily mon-
itored spaces it isn’t just that we are trained, we are subjects from which 
to obtain more information. Studies are conducted which permit contin-
ual modification and refinement that allow us to be trained with greater 
efficacy. Academics study management science, the performance of various 
existing management structures, and produce research which finds its way 
into popular management books and journals for managers to consider in 
their workplaces. Education researchers track, monitor, and assess various 
ways in which students perform well or poorly. Foucault notes that the 
ongoing refinement by the social sciences provides a means “not to punish 
less, but to punish better; to punish with an attenuated severity perhaps, but 
in order to punish with more universality and necessity; to insert power to 
punish more deeply into the social body.”1 While corporeal punishment in 
schools has been on the wane, if not outright forbidden, one might argue 
that punishment has been greatly lessened at schools. However, a Foucauld-
ian analysis would point to how the growth of monitoring, tracking, meas-
uring, and requiring various benchmarks for students, teachers, schools, 
and school systems is a much deeper way in which students, teachers, and 
systems are controlled even if this punishment is “attenuated.” Foucault 
already documented, in the early sciences surrounding mental illness and 
criminal justice, movements away from corporeal punishment and torture 
as ineffective in rehabilitating individuals toward systems of observance 
and behavior training that better control individuals and (if possible) make 
them capable of re-entering the social body.
While it can seem only rational to collect information on populations for 
research, Foucault documents the extraordinary difference this now com-
monplace collection of demographic data is from previous eras where only 
those of prestige were considered models for scrutiny and documentation. 
Now each individual in a workplace, school, hospital, or prison is a possible 
case study. Not only that, but every insurance holder, credit card user, and 
internet user are cases to be monitored, studied, and used for disciplinary 
techniques.2 Unknown to Foucault but well known to us now, we can mon-
itor the population with clearer and finer detail through our interactions 
with technologies to produce ever expanding sets of big data for research-
ers, corporations, and governments to use. Ultimately, one does not want 
to obtain individuals who are simply automatons through our educational 
and workplace environments, but ones who retain and effectively use their 
training. One wants individuals who are normalized but also productive and 
innovative when it would be economically valuable for the worker to be so.
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The political investment of the body is bound up, in accordance with 
complex reciprocal relations, with its economic use; it is largely as a 
force of production that the body is invested with relations of power 
and domination; but, on the other hand, its constitution as labour 
power is possible only if it is caught up in a system of subjection (in 
which need is also a political instrument meticulously prepared, cal-
culated and used); the body becomes a useful force only if it is both a 
productive body and a subjected body.3
A well-taught student should become a productive prospective employee, flex-
ible to the demands of a changing job market. It would be poor practice to 
produce students with no capacity for reflection on their labor or capacity to 
change their work. Good employees are productive within the system, willing 
to take on new responsibilities and find new solutions to potential problems.
If we consider this discussion in reference to the good health imperative, 
we can see how self-monitoring and modification are considered to be de 
rigueur for proper behavior. To return to the example of the athlete who 
trains her body, we can see how we have moved in the last decades to a 
space in which it is commonplace for average persons to engage in athletic 
practices that previously would have been reserved for the professional or 
hobbyist in the 1950s and 1960s. In a world where only athletes work out, 
one would feel no particular need to engage in such practices unless such a 
hobby appealed to one any more than one feels the compulsion to practice 
an instrument if one has no inclination.
The manner in which it is typically considered completely acceptable to 
chide, encourage, and monitor bodies that fail to adhere to health stand-
ards of self-regulation—smokers, drinkers, the obese—demonstrates that 
the social body willingly accepts that attention to one’s health is no longer 
just a practice for the few. As research has allowed us to track the effect of 
certain behaviors on likely health outcomes, we can increasingly develop an 
idea of the responsibility of the individual to practice the right behaviors 
and the moral duty of the society to create worlds in which this is possible. 
Normalization in the case of health should be understood not as producing 
identical bodies—which is, as of yet, impossible—but producing the right 
kind of identity in relation to one’s body.
It is acceptable in such a model of a proper identity that one may have 
greater or smaller challenges, like those due to genetics, but as long as one 
understands that taking proper care of one’s body is important and behaves 
accordingly, one has adopted the right kind of identity. One can think here too 
of our ideas about wealth. While it would be foolish to think that the person 
born into millions and the person born into poverty have the same starting 
ground for personal wealth accumulation, both persons can adopt the right 
identity toward their actions by taking it upon themselves to make the most of 
their options and thus to increase their personal wealth. If wealth and health 
are perceived to be gifts of birth, then one can’t really encourage normaliza-
tion. Rather they must be achievable states that everybody can work toward.
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Yet how does the individual experience such a demand if she does not 
find herself in the group of the healthiest performers? The role of compari-
sons is critical to the labor of good health, much like how career successes 
and failures reduces the sense of being normalized by the workplace and 
increases focus on the behaviors of particular individuals in the workplace. 
I can attend to my recent paper publication or my appointment on a com-
mittee at work. I can determine whether my colleague seems to be doing 
better or worse than I and consider what I could do to improve my situ-
ation. In the case of health, I will never be a world class athlete, but I can 
engage in a variety of activities to improve my physical fitness. In addition, 
I can monitor others in my workout classes, my work, my social world, and 
place myself in relative comparison to them. This will provide me with an 
assortment of possibilities of minor improvements, both on my own con-
dition and in relation to others. Foucault notes that in order for docility to 
be encouraged, one needs levels of micro-control, and individuals must be 
invested in such levels of difference if they are to be properly docile. This 
is because it not only provides finer capacities for control, but also for our 
purposes fosters the sense of personal control which is born out of distin-
guishing one’s behavior from one’s neighbor.4 In the case of health, one 
can work toward monitoring one’s own physical states and then improving 
upon them: if one has gained or lost a ½ pound, if one has done yoga or 
CrossFit today, if last week, one didn’t eat any candy, if one ran a 5-k, a 
marathon, or an Ironman. Within those highly regulated competitions, did 
one best one’s previous time? Has one’s blood pressure reduced since the 
last test? “The judges of normality are everywhere,” Foucault writes—from 
the person on the street to your face in the mirror that judges if you have 
succeeded or failed.5
One finds a sense that previous forms of government, while often ran-
dom and brutal, provided a certain amount of freedom from normalization 
as these forms of governments had not the knowledge, nor the means to 
manage the populations so completely. Unless one received the attention 
of the sovereign or another power source, little was provided, and simi-
larly, little was expected. In his discussion of madness in the Middle Ages in 
Madness & Civilization, Foucault romanticizes the “ship of fools” (Narren-
schiff) and the idea that mad people were seen as features of nature rather 
than persons to investigate and alter.6 As the mad presented no challenge 
to the sovereign’s power, they didn’t demand his gaze. However, as societies 
became larger and more integrated, the mad could be destabilizing and thus 
became an object of study and regulation. In addition, his work on normal-
ization and biopolitics makes any knowledge and any use of power to reject 
another form of power as always themselves establishing new modalities 
of possible normalization. After pointing out the way in which we can see 
biopolitics played out in the Nazi concern with health and hygiene to justify 
their racism, Foucault claims that socialism likewise uses biopower for its 
own ends. He lectures that not only did socialism not critique biopower, 
but also, that it took it up, “developed, reimplanted, and modified it in 
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certain respects,” and that like Nazism its guidance is “the essential function 
of society or the State, or whatever it is that must replace the State, is to 
take control of life, to manage it, to compensate for its aleatory nature, to 
explore and reduce biological accidents and possibilities…”7 This kind of 
discussion has led some to connect with and explore contemporary anar-
chist ideology of rejecting the state in any form and others to ask about 
Foucault’s libertarian streak.8
We find a common experience of subjectivity in certain histories and times 
that organize themselves around the norms prevalent at that time. This work 
is called “subjectivation”: to highlight in our contemporary biopolitical 
times how we are encouraged to see certain parts of us as things to control 
and work on and others as optional. Thomas Lemke writes that subjectiva-
tion is “the manner in which subjects are brought to work on themselves, 
guided by scientific, medical, moral, religious, and other authorities and 
on the basis of socially accepted arrangements of bodies and sexes.”9 In 
writing about sexuality, Foucault notes that in retrospect we can wonder at 
all the devices used by religion to make the body an object of sin, mistrust, 
and condemnation. To think that my body, my desires, and my very being 
is something sinful that I should see it as a problem rather than a space of 
happiness, joy, and connection is almost impossible for me to imagine. As a 
secular person, I read such discussions with interest but find no particular 
space upon which I can connect to them other than a historical oddity and 
feel relieved I don’t have to endure such superstitious beliefs.
However, Foucault writes that this body-positive/sex-positive ideology 
today is also constricting, even if its appearance is liberatory. We are now 
encouraged to see ourselves as needing to love our sexuality, to spend time 
fostering it, and to make it a centerpiece of our identity. Foucault challenges us 
to ask if this is actually more freeing that the sex-as-sin ideology of the past.
We are often reminded of the countless procedures which Christianity 
once employed to make us detest the body; but let us ponder all the 
ruses that were employed for centuries to make us love sex, to make 
the knowledge of it desirable and everything said about its procedures. 
Let us consider the stratagems by which we were induced to apply all 
our skills to discovering its secrets, but which we were attached to the 
obligation to draw out its truth, and made guilty for having failed to 
recognize it for so long. These devices are what ought to make us won-
der today.10
We can likewise ask about health and loving care for our bodies. While 
there are many pleasures and benefits to such behavior, it is certainly mark-
edly different than living in a time where one is encouraged to work on the 
state of one’s soul, one’s intelligence, or one’s status as a citizen. While all 
promote a feeling of inadequacy that must be met by self-control and dis-
cipline, their contents and the way in which they work in conjunction with 
other economic and social pressures is quite different.
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Yet, while this discussion helps elucidate some aspects of the way in 
which bodies are disciplined to be healthy, one might return to the question 
of why so many institutions, from governments, to employers, to schools, to 
non-profits, take this call so seriously. What justifies this particular increas-
ing interest in encouraging exercise among the non-professional athlete 
population and not the demand that we should instead spend our free time 
educating ourselves? From a personal point of view, one could simply point 
to the increase of research that documents certain behaviors with longer, 
healthier lives. But Foucault’s later work in biopolitics helps explore just 
why this became an interest for systems of power and thus how institutions 
take this call more seriously and systematically than other obvious pressing 
social issues.
In the History of Sexuality Volume I, Foucault discusses how the right of 
the sovereign moves from the right to take life—say to order an execution—
toward a kind of government rationality that views its purpose managing 
all lives.11 Previously the sovereign’s right would be seen in his power to 
kill, to forgive, and to enact policies that suited him without any interest or 
research into the population as a whole. Foucault sees contemporary pol-
itics as increasingly about management of populations in order to obtain 
better control over them. “Biopolitics,” Foucault lectures, “deals with the 
population, with the population as a political problem, as a problem that 
is at once scientific and political, as a biological problem and as power’s 
problem.”12 The population—rather than the glory of the King, or God, or 
the interests of the few—is the proper target of biopolitical control.
In his lectures at the Collège de France, Foucault discusses various ways 
in which changes at the end of the eighteenth century created an interest in 
managing endemics as well as epidemics. Foucault takes epidemics to be 
cases of disease that quickly spread, killing many. The development of bet-
ter means to address plagues or similar epidemics developed with improved 
science and methods of enforcing public order. Endemics are illnesses that 
were difficult to eradicate that “sapped the population’s strength, shortened 
the working week, wasted energy, and cost money, both because they led to 
a fall in production and because treating them was expensive.”13 Obesity, 
smoking, and alcohol/drug abuse are all often called epidemics, but this term 
endemic helps distinguish them from pandemics or plagues. The poor health 
of the obese, alcoholics, or smokers don’t require a single cure, like a disease 
might, but a range of institutions, policies, and practices to defeat them. In 
order to work on the health of the population, biopolitics “will establish 
not only charitable institutions (which had been in existence for a very long 
time), but also much more subtle mechanisms that were more economically 
rational…insurance, individual and collective savings, safety measures, and 
so on.”14 Foucault argues that it is critical for biopolitics to establish “regu-
latory mechanisms” which will “establish an equilibrium, maintain an aver-
age, establish a sort of homeostasis, and compensate for variations within 
this general population and its aleatory field.”15 He calls these “security 
mechanisms” that are designed to produce regularized populations.16
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While Foucault is considering the past as the birth of these biopolitical move-
ments toward monitoring, controlling, and fostering health in the population, 
we can see today similar concerns. The growth of public health, the interests of 
corporations, governments, health insurance agencies, charities, and schools 
all contribute to a complex set of policies, norms, and laws that are designed 
to police unhealthy behavior and encourage proper behavior. However, one 
might conclude that while producing conformity and perhaps also senses of 
guilt, such as the shame discussed in the previous chapter for not “producing” 
the right body, it is better for governments, and other institutions, attend to the 
health of the populace. However, as Foucault and other thinkers of biopolitics 
have underlined, biopolitical regimes are filled with extraordinary tolerance 
and appetite for death, such as in the case of the Nazi regime which in part 
promoted itself as about health. We have learned in the wealthiest country in 
the world, we are completely fine with well over half a million people dying 
from COVID-19. It is actually possible to let many people die, many others 
suffer, and still stock market prices will increase, well-to-do people will be fed, 
clothed, and cared for and can continue pursue their concerns. In reference 
to COVID-19, Antonio Pele and Stephen Riley write, “Biopolitics has been 
designed and evolved only and strictly for economic purposes and to enable 
the ongoing development of capitalism.”17 Preventable deaths and illnesses are 
not in principle problems. They rise to the status of being problems only if they 
threaten the neoliberal capitalist development and well-being of those who are 
its main beneficiaries; a trend that will be explored further in the next chapter.
The case of childhood obesity
If the body is the paper on which the script of health normalization is written, 
one comes to an immediate difficulty. Bodies are wildly variable. Friedrich 
Nietzsche rails against the moralizing of not just Christianity but all of West-
ern morality for desiring uniformity, and in the pursuit of such uniformity, 
moralists have to create shadow worlds of souls and gods to try and handle 
the uncomfortable fact of diversity: “Reality shows us an enchanting wealth 
of types, the abundance of a lavish play and change of forms—and some 
wretched loafer of a moralist comments: ‘No! Man ought to be different.’”18 
The moralist strives for uniformity and will insist on it even in the face of 
reality demonstrating the wild variations in human life and experience. For 
Nietzsche, the only way to achieve this uniformity is to create false worlds 
and false things, like souls. The concern of the good health imperative seems 
eminently practical and does not promote unreal beings. However, as the 
religious moralist finds, the moralist of the good health imperative must deal 
with the fact that bodies vary in any population in health, and also any one 
body varies widely over the course of its life. To discipline all this variety for 
a well-managed population seems an impossible task.
Promoting healthy behavior is not going to produce identical bodies the 
same way a factory could produce identical automobiles. What biopower 
needs is the capacity for bodies to be carefully distinguished and each 
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fostered in relative comparison to alleviate their disparities and to motivate 
better performance. Such a power needs “continuous regulatory and correc-
tive mechanisms” in order to “qualify, measure, appraise, and hierarchize.”19 
Diversity is not eliminated; rather it is reorganized as “distributions around 
the norm.”20 If the encouragement was to compete at the Olympic level, I 
wouldn’t even bother trying. My body is not going to do such things. But, if 
the point is to be better than other bodies to obtain lower cost health care, 
this I can do. I can also distinguish myself from previous states. Researchers 
can track various kinds of bodies and various interventions and see which 
bodies respond best to various policies. One can track groups of persons 
over time and determine what carrots and sticks produce the best behavio-
ral outcomes and then return to refine the system.
To move from this more general discussion to a particular one that 
explores the rationale of a biopoliticized world and its effects on our every-
day lives—consider the radical increase in interest in children’s weight and 
thereby the various metrics to measure, determine, and influence it and, 
in so doing, change parental behavior. The number of children classified 
as overweight or obese has grown in a relatively short time frame, some 
calling it a pandemic of this millennium. 21 Overweight and obese children 
are more likely to become overweight and obese adults and suffer from a 
variety of poor health outcomes. This body of research in the demographics 
of children’s biostatistics is used to justify a variety of interventions in the 
bodies of children, their schools, and their homes. But it isn’t just the bodies 
of overweight or obese children that are targeted, rather the rationale is that 
all children’s bodies must be safeguarded against overweight and obesity in 
order to ensure a properly healthy future.
We can see in the regulation of children’s bodies the biopolitical concern 
with population management in the policies and interventions to create dis-
ciplined bodies. However, a problem with this is that children are not seen 
to be capable of taking up the burden of the good health imperative, as they 
are not in control of their food consumption and activity levels in the way 
adults are. Since children are not seen as responsible for their behavior in 
the same way as adults, and because children become adults, targeting their 
parents as the locus of proper healthy behavior is increasingly common. In 
the United Kingdom over a five-year period, 74 children were removed from 
their homes on the basis of obesity.22 In the Journal of the American Medical 
Association, a defense of such a practice was published in a commentary 
citing the dramatic health outcomes possible for a life of obesity and federal 
law that defines child abuse and neglect. In this defense, Lindsey Murtagh and 
David S Ludwig argue that there are cases where removal of the child from 
the home may be necessary. Interestingly, they acknowledge the possibility 
that some obese children (although they note a small percentage) may have 
an unrecognized genetic disease that contributes to their weight, but except 
for leptin deficiency, “no new therapeutic options” are typically available 
and thus “an intensification of the home-based behavioral interventions” are 
needed which have already “proven unsuccessful in these families.” 23 Citing 
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extensive research on the psychological toll that removal from one’s house 
produces in a child, not all physicians agree with the conclusion of these 
authors that removal from the house would produce better health for the 
child, but the general rationale is not uncommon. If a child is found to be 
obese, an intense program of training at home is demanded, and if the child 
has a special disease that makes weight loss difficult, an even more intensive 
home practice is needed in conjunction with medical care. In addition, this 
work calls upon all parents to monitor their behaviors noting “Even relatively 
mild parenting deficiencies, such as having excessive junk food in the home 
or failing to model a physically active lifestyle, may contribute to a child’s 
weight problem.”24 When drawn to a story about a child whose obesity is 
shocking, any parent reading the story is reminded of the dangers of obesity 
in children and exhorted to take up the mantle to monitor the weight of one’s 
child more carefully. The authors conclude with the justification for further 
governmental programs calling for “investments in the social infrastructure 
and policies to improve diet and promote physical activity among children.”25
Another possible tactic to encourage good parental behavior is shaming. 26 
The State of Georgia, like the rest of the southeast United States, has a high per-
centage of overweight and obese children. A controversial campaign in 2012 
placed billboards with fat children in black and white photos looking grim and 
headlines that all start with “WARNING”, followed by lines such as “It’s hard 
to be a little girl, if you are not”, “My fat may be funny to you, but it is killing 
me”, “Fat prevention begins at home, and the buffet line.” A television spot has 
a child asking his mom, “Mom, why am I fat?” Children’s Healthcare of Atlanta 
designed the program Strong4Life specifically targeting obesity and overweight 
in children. Their flashy and engaging webpage provides a series of tips and 
strategies for parents to promote health from birth onward. The justification 
for the ad campaign was the rationale that parents were not taking childhood 
obesity seriously and needed to be reminded how devastating it is for children’s 
health. If one can attach proper nutrition and exercise to the identity of what 
a good parent does (and thus what constitutes a bad parent), one foreseeably 
could achieve better compliance with health behavior recommendations.
Another trend in the US is to put the child’s weight on their report card 
or to provide a weight report card. Arkansas was the first state to do so in 
2004 to work toward stopping the advancement of overweight and obesity 
in children.27 The letters provided some general tips on how to increase 
exercise, reduce screen time, and provide better nutrition. Dr Joe Thompson 
argues that “I think the alarm bell should be sounded that this epidemic 
may be advancing much more quickly than previously predicted.”28 This 
trend unites the concern for future populations with the demand for parents 
to make sure such future populations are properly healthy. The non-profit 
Trust for America’s Health whose motto is “Preventing Epidemics. Protect-
ing People” echoes the idea of the oncoming epidemic nature of childhood 
obesity with their report “F as in Fat: How Obesity Threatens America’s 
Future 2010.”29 It argues for the alignment of non-profits, schools, state and 
federal governments to work together to create a good future.
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Foucault uses the term “apparatus” to discuss “a thoroughly heteroge-
neous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, 
regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, 
philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions.”30 An apparatus is 
how one can see within this ensemble a certain discourse about sexuality 
emerging. “Thus, a particular discourse can figure at one time as the pro-
gramme of an institution, and at another it can function as a means of jus-
tifying or masking a practice which itself remains silent, or as a secondary 
re-interpretation of this practice, opening out for it a new field of rational-
ity.”31 These different fields not only take up sexuality differently, but they 
also inform each other and cause changes in its contemporary constitution 
and force. Foucault also says that the apparatus has a “strategic function” 
that responds to an urgent need.”32
We can see an apparatus surrounding childhood obesity as well as a 
growth of regulatory mechanisms that track bodies and track the success 
of various interventions. Some of its players are charities, but particularly 
in the US, charities function hand-in-hand with governmental operations, 
specifically within schools. We see the role of medical and health care 
research, interest among the exploding academic and professional field of 
public health, the pressure of insurance agencies, the moral calls to take 
better care of children, the economic concern about future healthy work-
ers, and military concern about future sufficiently healthy soldiers. We can 
see increasing interest in legislation from banning junk food at schools 
and policies to bring back more recess forming. While the institutions 
involved do not overall necessarily share the same missions or goals, we 
see a webbed relationship around this issue of obesity in a shared drive 
to creating a slimmer population. Foucault lectures that the norm is what 
circulates between the disciplines of particular bodies—such as exercise 
programs for children and teaching nutrition in schools—and the regula-
tory mechanisms are what track and encourage population wide behavior. 
“The norm is something that can be applied to both a body one wishes to 
discipline and a population one wishes to regularize.”33 Johanna Oksala 
explains that
What distinguishes Foucault’s analyses of social practices from those 
of a number of other thinkers is not only the idea that practices always 
incorporate power relations directly and causally manipulate the sub-
jects in them, but that the rules of discursive practices are intimately 
tied to social norms.34
A norm determines how a scientific knowledge by becoming accepted will 
come to have sway over certain policies and decisions. However, the dis-
covery itself will not be digested or acted upon unless it participates in the 
norm which serves other interests, as many a frustrated research scientist 
will lament when a well-documented concern receives no attention, but one 
with little scientific substance hits the headlines.
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Problematizations
Foucault pointed out that what any apparatus creates ends up also pro-
ducing certain ways it can be rejected. After all, the good health imperative 
does not always easily dovetail into the kinds of desires that corporations 
and governments may share. The productive nature of docile bodies—ones 
that will not just obey, but be good workers—also means a certain inher-
ent possibility to destabilize the system that creates them. Foucault briefly 
discusses how the increasing interest in using power as biopower created 
individuals who see their rights as tied to not just the right to not be killed, 
but the right to live in a certain way—“The ‘right’ to life, to one’s body, 
to health, to happiness, to the satisfaction of needs, and beyond all the 
oppressions or ‘alienations,’ the ‘right’ to rediscover what one is and all 
that one can be…”35 The apparatus that stresses health promotion might 
cause the normalized health-centered individual to turn against work at the 
workplace arguing for better health care, longer vacations, better leave for 
pregnancy—all things that may run counter to some of the interests of eco-
nomic forces that may wish to maintain a certain productive level of health, 
but not one that is too costly.
In A Brief History of Neoliberalism, David Harvey points out that for 
any theory to sway vast amounts of the population and policy makers, it 
must appeal to us on some level—it must satisfy us in some intuitive, and 
I would say existential, way. Harvey writes that for a “way of thought to 
become dominant, a conceptual apparatus has to be advanced that appeals 
to our intuitions and instincts, to our values and our desires, as well as to 
the possibilities inherent in the social world we inhabit.”36 Indeed, the lan-
guage of biopolitics for the individual is often cast in terms of the individual 
now being capable of being in charge of her health, or that of her children 
as discussed above. While one might skeptically wonder if this very idea 
of self-control and freedom is the ultimate indoctrination of the neoliberal 
program to roll back all governmental support to allow the flowers of the 
free-market bloom unhindered—the desire for control over one’s circum-
stances is hardly a newly created emotion. While certainly not every person 
in every period of time found the concept of freedom central, it seems also 
rush to assume that we desire something like free control of our situation 
simply because of our current historical era.
Contrary to the highly individualistic way of thinking enshrined in neolib-
eral approaches to the population, ancient Daoist texts are filled with various 
means to caution humans against their desire to mold and control and to 
encourage proper leaders to permit things to occur with as little interference 
as possible. In the Zhuangzi, Hui Sui asks Zhuangzi if one can be without the 
impulses of man. Zhuangzi replies that, “What I mean by being without the 
essentials of man is that the man does not inwardly wound his person by likes 
and dislikes, that he constantly goes by the spontaneous and does not add 
anything to the process of life.”37 However, Zhuangzi acknowledges while 
it is desirable to be in this state, it would be impossible for almost everyone 
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but a Daoist sage. In the Daodejing, the sage understands like heaven and 
earth to not be humane. The sage “regards all the people as straw dogs” thus 
emphasizing the foolishness of rituals obsessed over human life and death.38 
However, like in the Zhuangzi, only the sage can take such a step. Humans 
are partial and filled with preferences, desires, and fears. But if one is a sage, 
one can learn that error doesn’t come from bad policies, but more from the 
human desire to shape and make policies. Humans came out, in a sense, 
wrong with this arrogance that we do not see the much more harmonious 
and self-less universe. While today we caution people to take control, not to 
wu wei—non-action—still such a different cultural reference suggests that 
very different persons in different times did see the human desire for control 
as something common about human experience, even if this example above 
indicates, something, perhaps counter-intuitively, to be avoided.
To many, the kind of self-determination espoused in the good health 
imperative is a champagne of ideas—something we want but now are find-
ing out that we can obtain. Harvey thus points out that if a way of thought 
successfully feeds on desires, then when it becomes dominant it “…becomes 
so embedded in common sense and is not open to question.”39 Feeling that 
we could take charge of our bad habits and replace them with good ones is 
psychologically satisfying. While Foucault might not agree with the concept 
that there is something inherently human about certain norms that gives 
them part of their appeal, a critical phenomenological approach is able to 
accept the idea both that one is shaped by one’s circumstance, even to the 
point of one’s desires and sense of self, but that there can also be found a 
shared set of existential concerns and desires that span, with obviously large 
modifications, across cultures and peoples. How then do we separate out 
what is constituted by a culture bent on political and economic aims that 
have little to do with well-being and the possible value of such self-directed 
action toward health?
Foucault argues in an interview close to his death that he is not looking 
to find the right solution, but rather to “problematize” the ways in which 
regulatory and monitoring systems of power achieve their ends. He does 
not argue for a set of alternative policies, governmental structures, or social 
norms, but points out that certain problems cannot be erased by the influ-
ence of certain kinds of policies and disciplinary practices.
It is true that my attitude isn’t a result of a form of critique that claims 
to be methodical examination in order to reject all possible solutions 
except for the valid one. It is more on the order of “problematiza-
tion”—which is to say, the development of a domain of acts, practices, 
and thoughts that seem to me to pose problems for politics. For exam-
ple, I don’t think that in regard to madness and mental illness there is 
any “politics” that can contain the just and definitive solution.40
Sexuality, madness, and criminality are not elements of individual psyches 
that “exist apart from a relationship to political structures, requirements, 
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laws, and regulations that have a primary importance for it.”41 However, 
even if one’s sexuality is thoroughly understood and lived within such struc-
tures, the wild diversity of humanity suggests that no politics can create a 
space in which sexuality, for instance, will cease to be a problem, and within 
this space one can think about how one is constituted without requiring 
that one can take some kind of universal, God’s eye view, of humankind. 
Foucault points out that while one cannot exist outside one’s situation, to 
think that one’s sense of one’s own body is problematic—one’s experience 
must have become uncertain, have lost its familiarity, or provoked some 
kinds of difficulties.42
To problematize the good health imperative, we can consider what is not 
discussed that might equally, if not more so, demand the attention of the 
social whole. Tracking of the population has permitted us to see trends in 
weight gain among children. Parallel research in the issues associated with 
high weight gain encourage the conviction that something should be done. 
However, such a move requires not just the documentation of weight and 
overweight-related illnesses, but the rationale that it is this kind of issue, 
and not others, that justifies governmental and social intervention. For that 
to work and to compel individuals, we must see a certain kind of attitude 
and accompanying behavior toward one’s health as universally imperative. 
With the right measures, it should be necessary for all individuals to have 
the responsibility and competence to address their health which requires 
that they identify with this responsibility. In the case of individuals who are 
not capable of such responsibility—such as children—their caregivers need 
to pick up this mantle. While this reasoning might seem obvious to many, 
what a society attends to and what it ignores reveals that this focus excludes 
while it includes.
Consider the overwhelming documentation about the increasing gap 
between the richest and poorest in society, and the how the latter’s situation 
worsens each year, and with minorities having the least gains, the most 
losses, and the greatest disparities with the wealth which we see magni-
fied under COVID-19. The typical net worth of a white family is “nearly 
ten times greater than that of a black family” in 2016.43 During the reces-
sion, from 2007 to 2013, median net worth for Black families fell 44.3%, 
whereas it fell comparatively only 26.1% for white families. The Brook-
ings Institution reports that, “the ratio of white family wealth is higher 
today than at the start of the century.”44 Little organized action on poverty 
exists, even despite repeated documentation on its adverse effects and its 
growing racial disparities. Under COVID-19, which kills Blacks at a rate 
three times that of whites, we also find that job losses are concentrated at 
the bottom fifth of earners—jobs that are largely held by Black and Latino 
workers.45 Despite these alarming long-term and short term trends, neither 
the mainstream Democratic nor Republican party have made alleviating the 
situation of the poor a rallying cry for decades, preferring to focus on the 
concerns of the middle-class. Corporations are not interested in paying their 
workers more, governments look for ways to reduce support for the poor 
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in order to support tax cuts to promote business and middle-class inter-
ests, and charities fight in disparate, uncoordinated ways to aid the needy. 
One possible solution to the problems facing minorities with poor work 
and health prospects is to address systemic racism and poverty, rather than 
providing farmer’s markets, but because no such apparatus exists around 
poverty—no coordinated action exists as well as no coordinated sense of 
obligation is imparted to us to address it.
The relative lack of an apparatus to support alleviating poverty and the 
increasingly robust one to promote health demonstrates how discriminatory 
power can be present even with everyone having the very best intentions. 
Someone who personally takes it as a calling to help the poor is certainly 
not reviled and is praised, but such an inclination does not command as 
universally as that of working on health. One may feel a deep guilt for 
not helping the poor, but not helping the poor as a central life project is 
quite normal. One may be lauded for charity for the poor, but it would be 
a kind of morally beneficial hobby and not seen socially as necessary for 
acceptance in polite society. To work on ameliorating the condition of the 
poor is like playing an instrument that helps others. Smoking, however, 
is an affront to any public space, any workplace, and is a scarlet letter 
for the smoker as a personal failing. Someone who despite the capacity 
to do better fails to ameliorate her behavior to improve her poor health 
is generally judged to be guilty. My workplace, like most in the developed 
world, makes no particular effort to encourage us to care for the disadvan-
taged, but it does provide a series of initiatives, including recently becoming 
smoke-free, to encourage our better health. To judge someone based on her 
or his health, or perceived health, is simply normal, and to hate oneself for 
one’s fatness or bad health is much more common than to hate oneself for 
one’s lack of commitment to improving the condition of the least fortunate. 
Parental responsibility is thus not a global responsibility—but a targeted 
one. One may or may not raise one’s children to be advocates for the poor, 
but one must raise them to be healthy and in so doing be capable of seeing 
health as a personal imperative.
Parental responsibility
At the time of finishing this book in August 2021, over 4.43 million people 
have died from COVID-19 globally, 628,625 in the United States.46 The 
United States is also currently under the highest growth in cases during 
the pandemic due to the Delta variant, vaccination hesitancy, and a lack of 
public health protocols being enforced in the hardest hit states like masks 
and social distancing. In the United States, many of the deaths and serious 
illnesses caused by COVID-19 were preventable by basic public health rec-
ommendations such as mask-wearing and not gathering in large crowds. A 
study by Columbia University published on October 21, 2020, estimates 
that 130,000–210,000 deaths were preventable and, since that publication, 
we have seen the numbers of new cases and deaths skyrocket.47 Cases and 
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deaths have mainly been born by the elderly, the disabled, and racial, and 
ethnic minorities. These disparities have laid bare the vast disparities in lives 
that are valued and those that are seen as disposable in the United States. 
Studies have revealed the intersectional nature of this burden. For instance, 
people with disabilities who are Black, Asian, Hispanic, Native American, 
below poverty, young, and female have greater incidences of COVID-19 
than older white men with disabilities even when one controls for social 
distance and community.48 Moreover, front-line workers in meatpacking 
and food production have higher rates and those workers are more likely 
to be non-white.49
Infamously, white male Republican and staunch Trump supporter, Dan 
Patrick the Lieutenant Governor of Texas argued that given the fears of 
economic turndown, old people should be willing to die in order for us not 
to have to endure the financial fallout of shut-downs.50 In Texas as well, a 
(now former) mayor Tim Boyd of Colorado City said that “no one owes 
you or your family anything” during a devastating state-wide power shut 
down with much of the state in single-digit (Fahrenheit) temperatures.51 
After quick outcry, Boyd, after quitting, tried to clarify what he meant by 
saying,
I was only making the statement that those folks that are too lazy to 
get up and fend for themselves but are capable should not be dealt a 
handout. I apologize for the wording and some of the phrases that were 
used!52
No one can pull themselves up by the bootstraps if they are freezing to death, 
so one must assume that the background for Boyd is that one wouldn’t be 
in such a position if one had previously led one’s life well. In other words, if 
one had of been responsible and organized one’s life accordingly. Likewise, 
Patrick gave himself as an example since he was a grandfather, he had lived 
a good life, so he could sacrifice it for the economy. What is striking too is 
that these politicians did not see themselves as needing to do something, as 
politicians—to help those who need help. Instead, it was those that need 
help were in fact understood as the problem to good government. In biopo-
litical regimes the management of life is not the promotion of life—it is 
about management. Lives are simply to be managed or left to die as needed.
White people and Republicans (who are overwhelmingly white) are the 
least likely to consistently wear masks.53 Important work is being done in 
understanding just how misinformation has complicated basic public health 
protocol compliance as well as how the politicization of COVID-19 by 
Republicans has muted effective responses. While misinformation, lying, and 
politicization have certainly contributed to many having a strongly held view 
on something that they might not have bothered to otherwise, I argue also 
that mask wearing to attend to the health of others is a violation of the path 
of personal responsibility, and thus, personal control that makes thinking 
systemically and structurally anxiety provoking. There is, following Linda 
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Martín Alcoff, an epistemology of ignorance, of refusal to understand, accept, 
or even engage with public health recommendations paradoxically in a world 
awash with celebrations of “healthy behavior.”54 I argue that while such igno-
rance can result in illness and death, it is not opposed to the good health 
imperative, but continuous with its main conclusion that it is the individual 
who is master of his fate (and here I use “his” purposefully) and by his own 
hands can create his bodily state for better or for worse. Likewise, children 
who have poor health outcomes, being that they cannot take up individual 
responsibility themselves, have guilty parents who have failed to take up their 
responsibility properly. Race, social class, and environment fade out of any 
kind of analysis if the target is the individual’s freedom and responsibility. 
And as we see in the rejection of vaccines, even basic scientific information 
cannot override the sense that an individual or a family can control their own 
fate and any “interference” is met with skepticism, if not anger.
One common justification for such intertwining of charities, schools, 
and governments about the weight of children is that fact that most par-
ents of overweight children report finding their children to look fine.55 This 
has changed significantly in the last ten years, in particular among African 
Americans and lower-income parents. The shift is attributed to the overall 
growth of obesity and overweight in society. Thus, being overweight and 
obese is actually the norm, so one’s child being this way is as well. Many 
parents are suspicious of the medically received charts, seeing them as mis-
representative of what is normal.56 The authors of one study on paren-
tal perceptions argue in their conclusion that “Novel strategies should be 
developed to target parental recognition of their child’s weight status. Sensi-
tive and culturally competent dialogues to encourage parental involvement 
are needed to unleash parental power.” 57
This rationale that parents have “power” and that the right policy would 
harness that power and make parents more responsible caretakers under-
lines a certain conception of what the identity of a good parent is: a good 
parent is the protector of the child’s health and thereby from the apparatus’s 
point of view a good protector of the future health of the population. Paren-
tal power is thus refining a certain kind of responsible behavior. The parents 
serve to uphold long-standing moralizing about the sanctity of the family 
and benefit the preferred minimal investment from insurance agencies and 
social support systems. Thus, the shift to the “power” of the parents and 
away from the children with actual or likely future poor health is a subtle 
move. The obvious goal is to help the children achieve healthy weights, but 
if it is parents who are responsible, then structural issues such as the larger 
social, economic, and political world are less important. Charities, govern-
ment agencies, health agencies, and doctors are responsible only insofar as 
they have not communicated the responsibility of parents to take up their 
“parental power” and provided the necessary incentives for them to do so.
Nikolas Rose documents how the biopolitics of health has become a mat-
ter of a moral necessity that trumps all other concerns with ideologies of 
choice and responsibility as its hallmarks:
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…[T]he rise of a secular morality in which life and health are the only 
ends thought worth pursuing, and so forth—in the process we are see-
ing the emergence of an innovative new ethics of biological citizenship 
and genetic responsibility. Our somatic, corporeal, neurochemical indi-
viduality now becomes a field of choice, prudence, and responsibility.58
Rose explains how personal striving for health and wellness are closely 
allied with political, scientific, medical, and economic interests; he docu-
ments the convergence of a variety of factors that encourage seeing biology 
as merely a starting point toward greater and greater perfection. Our popu-
lar media devours stories of heroic parents who against all odds are able to 
find a solution to a child’s illnesses through fatigueless devotion and careful 
attention to detail. These stories have for the American spirit an almost 
opioid quality—anything is achievable with the right mix of moxie and 
determination. But even beyond this Horatio Alger quality of such tales, 
there is something all-too-human—who doesn’t want to think it is possible 
to aid one’s loved ones if just enough effort is made? Who wouldn’t make 
that effort? Hence, it is no wonder that the parents who fail to control their 
children’s weight are seen, and may see themselves, as failures.
Frieder Vogelmann argues that contemporary responsibility in work is 
not a simple continuation of something inherent in adult, rational beings, 
but rather a form of self-understanding, self-making, and social normal-
ization.59 Of interest for our study here, he draws attention to how the 
intensification of practices of instilling responsibility (he takes up labor, 
criminality, and philosophy as three practices) is uneven between the attrib-
utors of responsibility, say management, and the bearers, say the workers.60 
For instance, in the 2008 recession, white-collar financiers who created the 
situation often made out quite well, whereas working class persons who 
lost their jobs are now “responsible” for finding new ones. Likewise, in the 
COVID-19 pandemic, workers in food service, health care, food produc-
tion, and nursing homes find themselves faced with the responsibility of 
caring for their own health and being responsible workers (two things that 
are opposed) in a way vastly unequally borne by professionals who are now 
able to telecommute. While Vogelmann does not take up Marxist critiques 
of wage-labor, reproductive labor, parenting or schooling, his analysis of 
how “the spell of responsibility” functions in contemporary management 
ideologies for wage-laborers provides a fertile ground for considering just 
what a good child product is for the wealthy and why children’s health is 
read as a central matter of responsible parenting.
Vogelmann uses a largely Foucauldian perspective to argue that one’s 
development of self increasingly occurs as a set of practices. The stability 
of a subject is a process of a small number of practices in which a core 
of identity forms around, but is also constantly reproduced in “a whole 
web of practices.”61 These practices are not indoctrinations that create 
uniform subjects, but patterns of intensifying one’s relationship to one-
self in such a manner that one sees oneself as responsible for oneself. This 
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responsibility is not an only a burden, but a productive place of self-forma-
tion and self-transformation. The change toward a responsible self is a self 
who thinks of oneself reflexively. One can think of the process of encourag-
ing young children to think of others in their acts—would you like it if Jane 
hit you?—which requires the capacity to think of oneself from outside. The 
child’s hitting Jane upon the frustration of her having a favored toy must 
develop into a space in which the “I should not hit” intervenes. Responsibil-
ity might appear merely prohibitive at times—that is when it would be nicer 
to not need to think about oneself—but also can be very productive as one 
can see oneself as something to transform, not just to obey.
One crisis that we face today as parents who wish our children to have 
good employment is the constantly shifting nature of the workforce for 
educated and wealthy persons. Fewer and fewer white-collar wage-laborers 
work for a single company for life, often changing careers, not just jobs. The 
problem becomes what Vogelmann calls in relation to the unemployed—the 
“transformation problem”—that is how does one turn the capacity to work 
into real work?62 How does one raise one’s children to be adaptable to their 
future wage labor? Vogelmann argues that the training of employees to be 
see their labor not as toil, but as a source of value and of personal value. 
The subjectification of labor that “by way of recoding and attaching more 
and more importance to the employee’s relation to self.”63 The unemployed 
that depend upon taxpayer dollars are problems of the wrong kind of sub-
ject, not individuals luckily freed from toil who might be costly to the rest 
of us. They should not just work; they should want to work. However, the 
more one sees one’s labor as one’s personal project, the more responsibility 
becomes intensified in those least situated to be in charge and those who 
suffer most from economic and social contingencies.
The following chapter will begin by expanding upon the idea of parental 
responsibility and its connection to work by exploring reproductive labor 
in general. In reproductive labor, we find that it is, as Vogelmann notes, 
those most vulnerable to their situation as most responsible for their work 
and health. The role of working on one’s health in our neoliberal capitalist 
society will be seen as a manner in which to obtain surplus labor and is 
encouraged by fetishizing the body as a product. In conclusion, the next 
chapter will discuss the idea of the healthy body as a fetish that organizes 
our behavior under the sway of an ideology of affirmative culture.
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5 Marxism, reproductive labor, 
and the body as fetish object
Reproductive labor—dirty and clean work
If I can take better care of my children and I do not, it is I who is to blame, 
not the government, or charitable agencies. Hence, even though academic 
researchers who work on childhood health highlight the need for more 
intervention within poor and minority populations, the logic of “parental 
power” also argues at cross purposes. While the child can be understood 
to be blameless, policies shift the responsibility to the parents under the 
guise of parental autonomy. Thus, large scale systematic inequalities are 
rarely addressed since it is at the level of the bodies of children via paren-
tal responsibility that intervention is the most justified, not at the level of 
addressing the historical and economic factors that make for such wide 
disparities in standards of living.
Poor and minority populations do not only have larger numbers of child-
hood obesity in the United States, they have across the board significant 
health disparities with wealthier white children.1 In addition, minority chil-
dren have less insurance coverage and it is less consistent.2 While sensi-
tive public health policies are concerned with such disparities and advocate 
for increasing insurance and providing support for better healthcare, food 
access, and safe streets, research is also finding that poverty and access are 
not sufficient to explain disparities in health between white and minority 
children. For example, in a study on childhood asthma, researchers found 
that living above the poverty line is related to less asthma in children. How-
ever, they found that living above the poverty line provided a greater asso-
ciation of less asthma for white families than for Black families.3 They cite 
the “Minorities’ Diminished Return Theory” that argues that the protective 
effects of socioeconomic status are weaker for racial minorities than for 
white families.4 Shervin Assari writes
In nearly 20 papers, my colleagues and I have found that in the United 
States, economic resources and psychological assets systematically result 
in a smaller health gain for Blacks compared to Whites. These findings 
hold for a wide range of SES (socio-economic status) resources (eg, 
education, employment, neighborhood safety) as well as psychological 
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assets (eg, emotions, anger management, sleep quality, self-efficacy, per-
ceived control over life, and self-rated health) on health.5
Disparities in healthcare access between white and Black and Hispanic 
children is also correlated with higher rates of unusual childhood illnesses, 
longer treatment cycles, and higher rates of infant mortality.6 In order to 
consider how this particularly affects parenting, I turn to a discussion of 
reproductive labor and health. The bifurcation of reproductive labor into 
what I will call “visible, responsible parenting” and “invisible reproductive 
labor” is often ignored in discussions of parental power.
What is reproductive labor? I take here a definition from Mignon Duffy 
that it encompasses two main branches—“Work that maintains daily life 
(physical or mental health, food preparation and service, cleaning, personal 
care), or work that reproduces the next generation (care of children and 
youth).”7 With Duffy’s definition, we can think of the work of parenting—
the education, feeding, and raising children as visible, responsible parenting 
and the dirty work of producing and harvesting food, preparing it, and 
providing basic physical care as invisible reproductive labor.
Reproductive labor has a place in Marx and Engels’s theory, but times 
have significantly changed. Marx and Engels understood the family house-
hold as the locus of both visible and invisible reproductive labor, for both 
for the wealthy and the poor, even if the wealthy often have servants to per-
form this labor. However, most contemporary American children spend a 
great amount of their lives in school, and even insofar as children are raised 
at home, the work that maintains daily life is largely outsourced outside the 
house. Duffy documents in the United States, among the middle and upper 
classes, either single women for the less affluent or a collection of serv-
ants for the wealthy, were commonly employed in both visible and invisible 
labor at the turn of the twentieth century.8 Food preparation, cleaning, and 
caring for children was laborious and required significant time and energy. 
Today live-in servants are rare. Statistically, in the United States, since the 
1900s much of the invisible reproductive labor that constituted household 
work has been outsourced. Food is much more packaged and prepared than 
ever before, children are often cared for in daycares or schools rather than 
at home, and if one has cleaners, they do not usually live in one’s house.
With the changing makeup of reproductive labor, the dirty work of 
reproductive labor has significantly shifted the racial-ethnic makeup of 
reproductive laborers. In addition, the gendered nature of such work from 
almost exclusively female in the past to today larger percentages of the 
food preparation being performed by men, and in particular Hispanic men.9 
Duffy notes that what she calls the “dirty work” of reproductive labor done 
behind the scenes such as cleaning and basic hospital care is increasingly 
done by racial-ethnic persons and the front room work by white women 
such as nursing and childcare. In addition, much of the goods we use every 
day are produced not just by minority workers, but by people from the 
global south. Among white, wealthy parents in the United States, the tight 
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focus on individual success qua economic success and personal fulfillment 
encourages individuals and families to focus on their futures exclusively, 
seeing children as a product to be protected from any social threats to the 
child’s promotion. Chandra Montany points out that the focus on freedom 
as a personal affair of self-promotion, or in the case of the good health 
imperative, one’s health, makes it challenging to think collectively about 
our freedom, saying, “ideology and popular culture emphasize the individ-
ual maximization of options for personal success. Individual success is thus 
severed from union activity, political struggle, and collective relations.”10 
Mohanty notes that the division between the first and third worlds creates 
two kinds of workers—there are those citizen-consumers, that is those of 
us in the first world who dedicate ourselves toward personal fulfillment 
and family promotion, and the worker-producers of the third world upon 
whose backs our lives of individual freedoms to pursue family advancement 
are based.11 We can see the visible responsible parents as the citizen-con-
sumers and the invisible, reproductive laborers as the worker-producers. It 
is no wonder that the focus of parental responsibility focuses on the visible 
kinds of parental work—what one purchases in snacks for one’s children, 
how one’s child performs at school and not on who is growing, cultivating, 
and packaging the food the child needs to live.
Using the invisible labor of the less fortunate, parents in affluent situa-
tions are not largely free from the demands of parenting as perhaps one 
might imagine they were in households staffed by servants where expecta-
tions of time with children were minimal. If anything, parenting has become 
an even more complex and regulated social practice with a myriad of ways 
in which we measure good and bad results. Juliet Mitchell writes, “Parent-
hood becomes a kind of substitute for work, an activity in which the child 
is seen as an object created by the mother, in the same way as a commodity 
is created by the worker.”12 After all, just keeping children alive is not con-
sidered sufficiently proper parenting. Indeed, the demand to take very seri-
ously childrearing and to continue to work on one’s parenting has become 
the norm for upper- and middle-class parents. This “intensive parenting” is 
where raising a child is a complex carefully mapped journey involving time, 
money, and attention to details such as extracurricular sports and hobbies, 
good work in school, healthy meals, and structured family time around 
growth-inducing activities.13
Consider the way in which we understood food as “good” or “bad” and 
what we imagine responsible families feed their children. On the one hand, 
we have ample documentation that the kinds of things promoted as good 
food—fresh fruits and vegetables, lean meats, whole grains—do seem linked 
to variety of positive health outcomes. Likewise, sugary processed foods 
have been linked to poor health outcomes. The healthy food movements in 
the United States often call for a reimagining of what we feed our children 
and locate those kind of choices at the grocery store (or farmers’ market) as 
key to this vision. But this means turning away from the capitalist system 
that produces the disparities in wealth. Kim Q. Hall argues that healthy 
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food movements in the US have fallen into individual-centered concerns 
about what to consume—“the mainstreamed alternative food movement 
in the United States is a neoliberal hygienic eating project fixated on the 
achievement of virtue, health, and good citizenship through appropriate 
consumer choices at the table and in the (farmers’) marketplace.”14 The 
more that popular ideologies claim that the right kind of consumption can 
prevent illness or cure current ailments, the more likely, Hall points out, that 
disabled bodies will be seen as sites for even more intensive proper-choice 
models to aid them to become as “healthy” as possible.
Hall argues that the idea of alimentary ableism tends to evoke a met-
aphysics of purity, where “bad” food consists of kinds more removed 
from their “natural” state. Thus, fast-food and other kinds of heavily 
processed food are the worst of bad foods, and organic fresh produce 
is the best. In their extremes, such purity models can themselves foster 
horrible health outcomes such as in the anti-vaccination movement and 
cases of child endangerment or death based on strict ideals of “healthy” 
food. In their more moderate forms, they tend to not promote political 
calls for change toward the kind of world in which healthy food can be 
produced fairly by workers in a safe manner for the environment and in 
forms for all kinds of bodies. Instead, health is tightly tied to the practices 
of citizen-consumers and distanced from the most pressing concerns of 
worker-producers.
For women, very often gendered perspectives on the value of seeing fam-
ily as a key personal goal encourages the lack of demand for compensation 
for the care work involved in raising children; hence, women’s positions 
are economically more fragile. Women are encouraged to see family and 
devotion to good mothering as something desirable and natural; hence to 
not want to participate in the family qua personal project is to be abnormal. 
While it is true that affluent white women still take on the larger share of 
visible, responsible parenting, Black and Hispanic women in the United 
States are engaged more frequently in invisible, reproductive labor and are 
thus unable to find their or their children’s futures as neatly pointed toward 
lives of personal fulfillment and transformative work. In addition, Black 
and Hispanic women are more likely to themselves be the single parents. 
Women overall are more likely to be solo parents than men (81% of solo 
parents are women), solo mothers are twice as likely to be Black.15 Thus, 
simply to call for more help in visible, reproductive labor does not actu-
ally address the inequalities at the heart of reproductive labor. As Elizabeth 
Spelman points out, when white feminists call for the value of meaningful 
labor and rejection of the demands of domesticity, “exactly who do we 
think is going to do it? Have we attended to the role that racism and classi-
cism historically have played in settling that question?”16
Invisible labor in all these discussions above remains obscured in this lan-
guage of personal responsibility. The brutal nature of our bifurcated system 
of reproductive labor is shown in the deaths of COVID-19 in the United 
States.17 In a comprehensive study, researchers found that
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Black and Latino people have been disproportionately affected by the 
coronavirus in a widespread manner that spans the country, throughout 
hundreds of counties in urban, suburban and rural areas, and across all 
age groups. Latino and African-American residents of the United States 
have been three times as likely to become infected as their white neigh-
bors, according to the new data, which provides detailed characteristics 
of 640,000 infections detected in nearly 1,000 U.S. counties. And Black 
and Latino people have been nearly twice as likely to die from the virus 
as white people, the data shows.18
Not only is the Minorities’ Diminished Return Theory helpful in thinking 
about these disparities, but the actual way in which invisible reproductive 
labor is much more likely to be performed by minorities also contributes to 
the disparity in rates of COVID-19. In an examination of the wealthy sub-
urb of Washington, DC—Fairfax County—where three times as many white 
people live than Latinos, at the end of May 2020, four times as many Latino 
residents had tested positive for the virus. The authors note that “Across the 
country, 43 percent of Black and Latino workers are employed in service 
of production jobs that for the most part cannot be done remotely, census 
from 2018 shows. Only about one in four white workers held such jobs.”19 
COVID-19 has increased discussion of “essential workers” but often the 
focus is upon healthcare workers rather than farm laborers, grocery store 
workers, or food preparation workers, truck drivers, and other workers 
who produce, package, and deliver what we need to live. The visibility of 
doctors and nurses makes it much more likely for us to identify their labor 
in a pandemic. Like many, my interactions with invisible laborers are infre-
quent and in the case of farm workers and workers in the global South 
non-existent. This is even more the case in the pandemic when online shop-
ping and grocery deliveries have become frequent. The ideal of health as 
being about good personal responsibility wherein I can control my health, 
or good parenting being about parents making good decisions, require not 
attending to all the manifold and complex structural requirements that 
make something like pursuing a new eating plan or providing your children 
with quality time possible for only citizen-consumers. Below, I discuss how 
a certain view of the body as a product has fostered ignoring the kinds of 
racial, ethnic, class, and structural disparities behind poor health outcomes.
The evolution of human need
Marx argues that the connection between need and consumption is histor-
ical, not simply natural. In addition, he argues that the act of consumption 
transforms the individual. One might assume that consumption is simply an 
extension upon our most basic form of consumption—that of eating and 
drinking. In such a view, one might separate out needs (such as sufficient food 
and water) from desire (another pair of shoes)—but assume that both need 
and desire are structurally similar. Marx agrees that in consumption, one’s 
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desire is evoked by the object, but argues that many objects must be learned 
to be objects of consumptive desire. As discussed in Chapter 3, we learn our 
bodily habits of self-care in socially intimate fashions as children. In addition, 
we learn what objects are and how they are to be used. Objects are cultural, 
not natural, even if they appear to satisfy a natural need like hunger.
Marx gives the example of appreciation of art as something that arises 
from the introduction of the product to the public who can then create a 
need for more art. In so doing, he writes that one produces a different kind 
of subject.
When consumption emerges from its original primitive crudeness and 
immediacy—and its remaining in that state would be due to the fact 
that production was still primitively crude—then it is itself as a desire 
brought about by the object. The need felt for the object is induced by 
the perception of the object. An objet d’art creates a public that has 
artistic taste and is able to enjoy beauty—and the same can be said of 
any other product. Production accordingly produces not only an object 
for the subject, but also a subject for the object.20
The interest in art cannot precede the exposure to art. In addition, I am 
now a different kind of subject who appreciates art. The production of art 
produces both art and the lover of art. Marx discusses how need can be 
understood existentially—that is, about the human condition as such—but 
also about the way it becomes transformed in the cycle of production and 
consumption in a contemporary society that changes our identities and thus 
our needs. This provides a helpful guide to thinking about how one lives 
in a society where the good health imperative shapes one’s view not just of 
health, but of one’s sense of self. As discussed in Chapter 3, body image dis-
satisfaction is real and significant, but it is also learned through habituating 
women to the idea that they must work on their looks to be acceptable.
Looking at how contemporary life is constructed around a distance from 
food in its natural forms both in consumption as well as in production, we 
will see how reducing activities like eating as responding to a transhistorical 
human need for survival obscures the historical development of our relation 
to food. My existence is conditioned by the need to survive, but my current 
identity as a citizen-consumer is much more connected to the socially condi-
tioned experience of consumption in the twenty-first century. Consider one 
of the most common foci of the good health imperative—the individual’s 
food intake. Eating, the most basic need of all—even the infant comes to 
the world having an instinct to suck—would seem to be ahistorical, one 
of the most basic parts of the human’s extension toward the world. While 
smoking, drug, and alcohol consumption are possible to avoid, one cannot 
stop eating. If any need transcends the need for a historical analysis it would 
seem to be eating. The most basic kind of consumption is certainly in its 
rawest form a natural tendency or intentionality toward survival. However, 
Marx argues that once hunger is satisfied by a historically mediated and 
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produced meal, such as “cooked meat eaten with knife and fork,” it is actu-
ally a different hunger than that which is found in the devouring of “raw 
meat with the help of hands, nails, and teeth,” because one has become a 
different kind of human who consumes processed food with utensils.21 To 
reduce eating down to the demand to survive is to forget to acknowledge 
that eating, as discussed in Chapter 3, is a deeply social and developmental 
acquisition.
Of course, one could imagine insisting that no one “needs” meat cooked 
and served on a plate with a knife and fork to continue mortal existence. 
In such a manner, any amount of food that allows for the continuation 
of existence satisfies this need, and hunger remains something ahistorical. 
I would eat raw meat with my hands if I found myself in a situation of 
starvation where this was my only option. But if one really thinks about 
living in such an example and how radical this moment would be—how it 
would shape one’s very sense of self. If I found myself at some future point, 
surviving by eating raw meat with my hands with no other means to con-
tinue living—in this possible world, this future Talia would inhabit such a 
different kind of existence, it is hard to imagine my identity could remain 
the same. What would have possibly led to me being in such a situation? 
Some kind of apocalypse? Was I lost in the wilderness? To read a story 
of concentration camp survivors, as in Viktor Frankl’s Man’s Search for 
Meaning, struggling to stand on a diet of watery soup is not a story where 
those that survived and ate again normally had not been radically altered 
by the experience.22 One cannot separate the starvation from the situation 
that produced it. Even a study where the participants willingly underwent 
starvation are transformed by it for the rest of their lives.23
Food consumption is highly mediated by technologies of food produc-
tion as well as perhaps the more evident cultural differences in foods and 
traditions that surround it. In addition, the need to survive that encourages 
eating as an activity is not just a repetition of fulfilling that need but takes 
place within a world in which that need is understood to be satisfied in a 
very mediated fashion. I, like most everyone I know, have no connection 
to food production. Other than a few tomatoes and some peppers, I pro-
duce no food, rather purchasing it in stores or restaurants. I cook most 
days, so I do engage with food in raw forms, but even this food has been, 
at minimum, grown, picked, transported, and displayed in a store. All the 
food I consume has been transformed by other hands than my own. In the 
developed world there are some people who hunt, garden extensively, raise 
livestock, or farm, yet this production only constitutes some of their food 
consumption.
Many economists try to see a generic human experience in complex his-
torically situated exchanges. Marx takes up political economists’ love of 
the Robison Crusoe stories in Capital as a way that they hide the social 
nature of commodities. Crusoe’s story allows one to focus on how labor 
responding to needs permits this small “economy” to occur. By thinking 
that they can reduce the essence of labor down to the work a man might 
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do to continue his survival alone on a desert island, these economists think 
they have isolated the essence of production and consumption.24 They then 
conclude that contemporary commodity exchanges, production, and con-
sumption are more complex formulas for solving basic human needs. How-
ever, as Marx points out, we do not relate to commodities in any complex 
society in such a manner. I do not produce the food I eat directly, rather I am 
dependent upon social labor to produce food for my consumption.
There is another way we can highlight the curiosity of thinking that Robi-
son Crusoe tells us much about what is essential in human activity, beyond 
its use in political economy. When I am hungry, I have very specific foods 
that interest me. Since my habitual background is one where I never worry 
about having enough food, my attitude toward food does not appear so 
much as satisfying a primal need than as selecting from a variety of options 
to find the one that at that moment is the most tasty, healthy, convenient, 
and provides a certain amount of variety. If I were a castaway like Crusoe, 
I would obviously not be concerned with these secondary issues but rather 
with sheer survival on all fronts. Everything would be different. Real-life 
stories of castaways are compelling reads for their drama, for the lengths 
to which people go, and for the sheer detail and impressive ingenuity some 
show in figuring out how to survive. Yet, the narrative from the castaways is 
one of constant pining and hope to be rescued from their plight or to figure 
out a way to liberate themselves from it.25 They want to return to the social 
world—to their families, to occupations, to a varied diet and comfortable 
living: to move beyond a situation where death is always intimate.
Need is not just the need to continue living, but the need that an individ-
ual perceives to continue being that individual. I need my son to be safe; 
I need to work at something I consider valuable; I need to enjoy myself; I 
need to have some time with my family. These are needs in so far as they 
constitute who I am as a mother, a wife, a friend, and a professor. Moreo-
ver, they require that in the anticipated future these things will largely stay 
stable. In phenomenological terms, my extension into the world requires 
a background of stability where my projects can be both lived, but also 
imagined. Removing the stability of the most important things that con-
stitute my identity would be to change myself significantly. To reduce me 
down to what one might assume sheer existence is in its rawest form would 
perhaps expose what a human can endure, but surely I would not be this 
Talia anymore. The loss of one’s social world with all its attendant affec-
tions and investments is not just removing extraneous levels of social com-
plexity from primal need, but it is what constitutes a person as that person 
and not simply as a being who is managing to survive.
This primitive concept of need fostered by some economists assumes that 
a linear causality exists between an individual’s needs and her actions. Since 
on the most basic animal level it is true that one can see the need to eat as 
connected to “doing things to get food” it is appealing to then extend it to 
our complex, historical social world in which “doing things to get food” is 
never just an individual action. To raise my fork full of food to my mouth 
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depends upon contemporary food production, not just my motor actions. 
When health behaviors are employed, all sorts of really optional behaviors 
are read as somehow mystically part of the original need—that is, some 
kind of need to do things to survive. Our needs have a heritage that we 
share with all animals, but they are not experienced as raw need coming 
from a sentient animal. A particular individual with a particular historically 
and personally located identity had developed needs and desires. The indi-
vidual’s identity is importantly not just some set of “internal” characteris-
tics one often hears about as personality types (such as an introvert), but a 
way of being in the world, so one’s temporality is shaped around that sense 
of identity. Someone who is introverted is anxious about future spaces in 
which social interaction is demanded—thus it is her imagined virtual exten-
sion into this upcoming future that is upsetting. This only makes sense if 
her identity is tied not to who she is in some moment now, but who she will 
be in the moments in the future. In the case of being food insecure, whether 
due to poverty or an extreme situation, one might experience moments of 
not being hungry when one is able to obtain food, but one’s days are con-
stantly colored by the concern for future food. To think that the food inse-
cure individual is the same as the one who has never experienced true need 
misunderstands that satisfying needs is not just about any one need, but 
about the how one experiences the world as a place in which one’s needs 
will or will not reliably be met.
Body as fetish object
If one thinks about the actual acts one engages in to produce good health, 
then the picture is a complex series of actions that only are possible and 
make sense within certain historical environments. If one is counseled to 
take certain preventative and largely self-directed practices to better one’s 
health—stop smoking, lose weight, increase exercise, reduce alcohol con-
sumption—then one enters into a cycle of certain kinds of consumptive and 
productive behaviors. One needs information on what programs, products, 
and appropriate measures are needed in order to produce the proper set of 
activities. One needs to alter one’s consumption as well—perhaps one needs 
a treatment program, a patch from the drug store, a gym membership, a new 
diet book, or different foods. One notes one’s progress with various metrics 
in order to determine whether the product—one’s body—is on the right track 
or not. Typically, these programs and products must be purchased by the 
individual, even if there is some kind of financial incentive or health insurance 
payout. One must go to the store to get one’s medication, purchase healthier 
food, and buy those sneakers. In such a manner, as noted above in Chapter 
3, these consumptive practices are common in beautification regimes, but the 
moral is different for food consumption as health promotion.
The consumption of healthy food and the activity of exercise are not 
static things. One must continually re-engage with such practices, shift-
ing and moving the identity of the healthy performer. The idea that I am 
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somehow responsible for my health also arises in a world in which we have 
come to understand ourselves as a project, as a production. I make myself 
healthy by doing certain things to and with my body; I am not healthy as a 
static state but a moving one. It is the affirmative ideal of the future healthy 
body that motivates my need to continue engaging in certain productive 
actions. In the Grundrisse, Marx connects consumption and production as 
having a dynamic relation where consumption is not the end of the produc-
tion but actually tied to the positing of an ideal. “If it is clear that produc-
tion offers consumption its external object, it is therefore equally clear that 
consumption ideally posits the object of production as an internal image, 
as a need, as drive, and as purpose. It creates the objects of production 
in a still subjective form.”26 In this parallel, I become healthy through the 
labor of health which is motivated by the internal image of a certain future 
body as having such health. I cannot cease this labor, or I cease to be a 
healthy person. Thus, I am not acquiring health, but health is only within 
the relation between a self who decides upon the object of health, engages in 
certain practices, evaluates, and then repeats. If I am engaged in a complex 
consumptive set of processes to produce a healthy body, there can be no 
separation from the dialectical process of health behavior and health itself. 
Health no longer exists as a state that I either have or do not have. I have 
to produce health constantly by engaging in proper consumptive activities. 
The healthy body-object I have come to appreciate and endeavor to obtain 
is always just beyond me, which encourages my continual labor.
Marx points out that when the worker produces an object, say, a ham-
burger at a fast-food restaurant, she does not own that object and has no 
say over how she produces it, and thus is alienated both from the product 
and the activity of her labor. Marx says in such a position the worker is in 
servitude because “it is only as a worker that he can maintain himself as a 
physical subject and that it is only as a physical subject that he is a worker.”27 
Only because my body is capable of performing some tasks for remunera-
tion can I continue to exist. While this works for hamburgers, does it work 
for the healthy self-controlled labor? When it comes to self-regulation for 
health, it is evidentially about continuing one’s existence or at least contin-
uing one’s existence in a preferable form—less fat, less chance of cancer, 
more mobile. But it seems nonsense to say that one is alienated from the 
object of one’s labor, as one is the object of one’s labor. Indeed, one might 
think of this as the most freeing way in which to live—where one can just 
attend to oneself.
The odd thing about health as a process of health work on oneself is that 
any one state is insufficient in itself. Even a good biometric screening will 
require continued effort to maintain that score. If health is constituted by 
the activity of producing health and is as such never achieved, it might be 
said that one does not possess health at any moment but is constantly work-
ing to produce it in the next moment which will then extend again into the 
next one. As one has the additional issue that one’s body is itself a fluid and 
aging thing subject to illness and disease, even those with the most fortunate 
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genetics will face an object that requires more health labor for diminishing 
returns. What is the body that we are trying to produce? I will argue here 
that it is the body taken as a future fetish object.
I must engage with others in the market where products of my labor and 
products of others are exchanged through the exchange of money. However, 
once we do this, we now do not relate to each other but through things, 
including money. In his discussion of commodities and money, Marx notes 
how commodity-objects often become fetishes—that one takes their value to 
be disconnected from the systems that make them possible. To follow this 
argument, Marx requires that we perform a phenomenology, as Christopher 
Durante Araujo points out, to look into the essences of things that constitute 
their outward appearances.28 The commodity is such a thing that is evident 
and meaningful, but when one stops to simply examine it, one finds it is a very 
odd thing whose seemingly natural and evident state is much more complex: 
“A commodity appears at first sight an extremely obvious, trivial thing. But its 
analysis brings out that it is a very strange thing, abounding in metaphysical 
subtleties and theological niceties.”29 The commodity is in many of Marx’s 
examples, a tangible thing, like an iPhone or a hamburger, but its value has 
become abstracted from the conditions in which is it made and consumed.
The fetish arises when we forget any real connection that we have to 
our own labor or that of others, and we take our true objects of desire to 
be natural objects with self-evident value. It is objective since commodities 
do have at any particular moment a socially determined value in a system 
but abstract since there is nothing in the commodity that demands that it 
has that value other than its real or potential exchange at the moment. In 
such a way, I relate to things as persons—as things with inherent value. A 
fetish object, say, an iPhone, so understood is not some kind of pathological 
delusion. iPhones are valuable in our society because of the social relations 
that constitute this commodity as an object of exchange where other cell 
phones and the internet permit their usage. Marx wishes to underline not 
that produced objects are useless outside of capitalism, but rather that capi-
talism has abstracted their value but takes it as concrete and natural. In this 
abstraction, the object’s true genesis is obscured.
If my own body becomes an object to me, it is because I have interiorized 
the view that my body is not me but some kind of thing that carries the 
real me around and this thing has value only insofar as it is the right kind 
of thing. One’s current body is now substandard given a new, better one is 
perceived to be possible with the right actions. Under the good health imper-
ative, the body is indeed me, but its value is a matter of it conforming to an 
abstract ideal. In executing my responsibilities, I do have to objectify my 
body by disciplining it, having it evaluated, and measuring my performance. 
In every way I am my living body, the question is how well that body is 
doing. This parallels a religious person who concerns herself with the state 
of her soul, worried that her actions are sinful and insufficient to provide her 
entrance into heaven. She labors to be the kind of person who will be pro-
vided God’s grace, but until judgment day she will need to be vigilant since 
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some good actions, thoughts, and deeds could always be overwhelmed in the 
next moment by temptation. Producing a healthy body has one also living in 
limbo since any good production is never sufficient. Healthy behavior must 
be a “lifestyle”—that is, a continual reproduction of healthy behavior.
In Marx’s example above, he employs an idea that what one gets from art, 
once one has developed a taste for it, is the appreciation of beauty. While 
this might be the case for some forms of art appreciation, many body-objects 
we are presented with are perhaps beautiful but also indicative of something 
else we should do, as opposed to simple enjoyment of the object. A body that 
demonstrates a fit physique can be enjoyed as an object, but if it is advertising 
a product, practice, or workout facility, then one is supposed to move from 
the appreciation to self-examination. Does one’s own body-object appear 
like this attractive one? What might one do to obtain a better body-object? 
The interest in a manicured, highly managed body is achieved after the expo-
sure to such objects and importantly the apparatuses that allow for one to 
see one’s own body as being something that can achieve such a state. Such 
body-objects are valuable in our economy—as objects for selling. What is 
critical is that such bodies appear to be possible to obtain but in fact are 
not. Their exclusivity is part of why one can continue to sell products. Some 
kind of hole in the populace must exist in order to justify selling something. 
This works well in health labor as well as we are encouraged to not just be 
sufficiently well enough to live our lives and engage in our projects, but to 
be really well—well enough to run a marathon or well enough to have a diet 
free from preservatives and fast food. The more bodies that run marathons, 
the more that run Ironmans, and then Ultramarathons. In 2014, the number 
of Ultramarathons (any race longer than a marathon’s 26.2 miles) doubled 
from the previous decade. Some of these races are over 150 miles and cross 
desserts.30 In the face of such activities, running a few miles a day seems 
positively frail. Running as an identity now is often about running in these 
expensive, mediated, and competitive situations.
In such a manner, one might see the body as a fetish object of desire—
but this object is one that is continually postponed as one never is finished 
with the labor to produce the right one. How one actually produces such 
a body—the complex economic situation wherein only citizen-consumers 
have such an option, where the diet-exercise industry, food production, 
safety, means, and resources to engage in such activities—fade into the 
background with the body-object front and center. In the next section, I 
will discuss how this ideal of a body as a fetish object can also help create 
more surplus labor in capitalism. However, given we often have to spend 
our limited time and resources on such work, the chapter will turn to Mar-
cuse’s idea of an affirmative culture to explain why we do so.
Affirmative culture and the good health imperative
I relate to my body not directly but through received ideas of what I should 
feel and experience, including names of just what those feelings are. As La 
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Rochefoucauld famously opined, “Some people would never have fallen in 
love if they had never heard of love.”31 Whatever feelings we have that arise 
from the body alone without cultural interference, to think about them 
requires an overlay of culture’s language and morals. In the case of the 
work involved to have a healthy body, I can come to see such work as 
necessary for good “self-care.” One problem is that the more one empha-
sizes health work, the more it may become apparent that the other work 
one does limits one’s health. Many kinds of labor are themselves inherently 
unhealthy—exposure to toxic chemicals, long hours, and sedentary jobs—
to name a few common health concerns at workplaces. The genius of the 
good health imperative is that if one’s own body is a fetish object of desire, 
then one will willingly take up the labor, or at least feel one should do so, 
outside of work. In such a manner, health work that offsets the poor health 
conditions of work can be seen to be a kind of free, surplus labor. Marx’s 
theory of labor in capitalism divides labor into necessary and surplus labor. 
Necessary labor is the average workers need to maintain their lives and 
the lives of their children (to create new workers). On average, how many 
hamburgers must be sold to cover the costs of the materials, the process, 
and through the worker’s pay, her food, rent, clothing, healthcare, and those 
costs for her children?
In order to create wealth, the capitalist must obtain surplus labor. It might 
take the average fast-food worker only three hours to cover necessary labor 
time and with the additional five hours all these hamburgers can be sold at 
a profit. Various means to extract more surplus labor exist. One could have 
fewer workers to do the same work, more machines to replace costly work-
ers, move a factory to a lower-cost labor market, and increasingly today 
rely on work outside the office, such as the pervasiveness of email at all 
hours. In addition, another manner in which one might obtain more surplus 
labor is to reduce the need to provide benefits to workers, such as quality 
healthcare. This is a tricky proposition because, of course, one does need 
workers who are healthy. But if at least some of the burden of health work 
is part of the worker’s docility in assuming that her self-care is something 
she must do herself outside of work to be a good person, then it seems less 
the responsibility of the employer to ensure that the working conditions are 
not deleterious for one’s health. Problems caused by working conditions 
are now not issues that the larger social community or employer should 
address, but instead manifested within the unhealthy worker’s body as a 
personal responsibility for that worker to take care of herself more care-
fully. If one works long hours at a desk, making it difficult to be physically 
active and maintain a healthy weight and all the other benefits of an active 
lifestyle, one often thinks the employee should spend more time outside of 
work to offset the unhealthy nature of her workplace, and not that such 
workplaces are themselves to blame. After all, if it is not what she wants to 
do—that is, do healthy things in her free time—she should do it nonetheless 
since it is good for her. The circling of the locus of responsibility on the 
individual increasingly makes it hard to even discuss such issues outside 
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what the individual workers can do to be healthier. Moreover, the growing 
disparities between the health of worker-producers and citizen-consumers 
can now be explained away by the former simply not taking good care of 
themselves instead of the structural reasons why this is impossible.
In Marx, Capital, and the Madness of Economic Reason, David Harvey 
discusses how a “fetishism of technology” leads to the widespread belief 
that “there must be a technological solution to any social or economic 
problem.”32 Influenced by the very real benefits of technological advance-
ment in manufacturing and the rapid rise of Silicon Valley’s profitable tech 
industries, businesses, governments, and individuals might all come to 
imagine that to any woe a technological solution is just on the horizon, 
and if one invests enough in it, it will spring forth and solve all ailments. 
In my own city of Chattanooga, Tennessee, a city with extraordinary and 
growing racial division of wealth between wealthy whites and poor Blacks, 
there is a well-touted desire to create it as a “smart city” with our “gig-
speed” internet and a new “innovation district.” These initiatives promote 
economic growth for those with such skills with little or no attention to 
the long history of gentrification that leaves some communities behind and 
the lack of any real investment in addressing social disparities other than 
through “innovation.” My university, the city government, and local busi-
nesses all unite in their vision of the future to “change Chattanooga…” 
with no addressing of actual poverty and the reasons behind it.33 It is hard 
to see how the disenfranchised will benefit from tech start-ups and peerless 
internet service. Harvey notes that such a vision of smart cities “creates a 
fetish fog—a vast distraction—between political activism and the urban 
realities…”34 The self-produced healthy body as a fetish object can be seen 
as parallel to the idea of technology solving all of our troubles. The healthy 
body, bolstered by constant scientific and technological improvements in 
the healthcare field, will come to answer any individual ailment and any 
social woe. If one still finds one’s body lacking, it is simply a matter of more 
personal investment, more labor, and more careful attention.
In “The Affirmative Character of Culture,” Herbert Marcuse points out 
the great difference in art appreciation between the Ancient Greeks and what 
he considers the contemporary bourgeois view. For the Greeks, happiness 
enjoyed by the appreciation of beauty is reserved for the elite few. One needs 
the hierarchical division of the slaves and other attendant lower servants 
in order to provide the kind of space in which the higher men can have the 
luxurious lives needed for such pleasures. Today, we find such explicit elitism 
distasteful and are at pains to point out that beauty can now be enjoyed by 
all. The concept of the individual, instead of group identities, abounds where 
the enjoyment of culture is for everyone, not just the high born—“…the 
bourgeois liberations of the individual made possible a new happiness.”35 
However, the problem is that since capitalist production only allows a few 
the possibility of purchasing the goods necessary to secure happiness, our 
actual concrete situation does not truly permit happiness for the masses.36 
The culture of the rich is just as exclusive, but the ideology has changed.
Marxism, reproductive labor 117
How is it possible to continue to affirm the capacity for all to be happy 
if only some can be happy? The response, Marcuse argues, is for the cre-
ation of an abstract ideal—of “affirmative culture.” This is a culture that 
always postpones the true, material gratification of its consumers by pro-
ducing works of disconnected beauty and escapism. Marcuse argues that 
bourgeois society “liberates” the mind while not changing the fundamental 
condition of the masses. “The freedom of the soul was used to excuse the 
poverty, martyrdom, and bondage of the body.”37 Instead of considering 
culture in the manner Marcuse does, I am interested in how the idea of 
the future healthy body promoted by images and stories presents a similar 
kind of affirmative culture that creates a patina of “everyone can do it.” The 
kind of lifestyle most conducive to allowing for exactly those activities that 
promote health—good medical care, a good diet, low stress, capacity and 
opportunity to be active, resources to overcome addictions, illnesses, and 
diseases—are only possible for the privileged few in our world. Yet the more 
one becomes convinced that only by some effort all persons can maximize 
their health, by repeated mantras of transformed bodies, the more the con-
crete differences fade into the world of possible future improvement. It is 
this false narrative that motivates the search for health without any interest 
in changing social conditions.
For Marcuse, in affirmative art, the medium of beauty decontaminates 
truth and sets it apart from the present. But importantly, this illusory world 
produced by art has real satisfaction; it is truly enjoyed by the masses.38 
But, it obscures true suffering and doesn’t allow true individuality to come 
forward. While Marcuse is interested in the possibility of rejecting such 
false culture, what is interesting here is to consider the idea of the good 
health imperative as a similar move to make an assumption of equality. 
If one assumes the equality of individuals, then the actual physical condi-
tions of the masses of unhealthy poor bodies are now no longer crises that 
demand the examination of the social relations that permit such differences, 
but abstract, individual crises that call the subjects themselves to engage in 
certain behaviors to achieve the presented ideals of good healthy bodies. 
Fueled by the projection that such rituals will occur tomorrow if not today, 
the fantasies of affirmation become tools for further labor. Government 
sponsored social services and charities likewise work to create worlds in 
which everyone can make the choices that are actually only really viable 
for the rich.
Another element that requires constant fantasy creation to promote this 
idea of good health for all is that good health is not just predicated upon the 
time required to attend to one’s health and the finances to purchase health 
goods, but the access to highly specialized and very expensive medical care. 
The fights in the United Kingdom over the National Health Service and the 
inability of the United States to provide quality medical care for the poor 
all center around the extraordinary cost of medical care. One option to this 
cost problem would be to live with a much-reduced form of care where spe-
cialized treatments would be few. But this would mean that the wealthiest 
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individuals would not be able to enjoy the luxury of first-class healthcare—
both currently and the new forms that have yet to arrive. The other would 
be to provide first class healthcare to all, but this is only possible if money 
is diverted from other areas, and the amount needed is so extraordinary 
that it would necessarily have to be the wealthiest who would fund such an 
endeavor either directly or by a serious reduction in their capacity to amass 
wealth. Instead, one function of the good health imperative is not just to 
mystify those who are the healthiest and why into the banality of the fetish 
ideal of healthy bodies for all, but to extract surplus health labor from the 
population so that the cost of healthcare can be reduced without actually 
spreading good quality care or reducing the excellence in care that the rich 
enjoy.
As previously noted, one of the challenges when considering health has 
been to acknowledge its rootedness in our basic natures, but still to find 
a way to consider its historical nature. After all, our cultural bodies are 
also natural bodies. But why are we so likely to fall into this belief that we 
can with some effort change ourselves? One can alter one’s body through 
concentrated work. While such affirmative culture might include aspects of 
fantasy, the good health imperative offers real tales of personal transforma-
tion. The background in which they occur is not just one of various tales of 
personal transformation as one might read in popular self-help texts, but 
connected to the progressive healthcare sciences.
How I understand health as a middle-class person living in the devel-
oped world in the twenty-first century—is radically different than others 
in dissimilar situations or at times in which the science, technologies, and 
cultural norms around health had different forms. One feature of how our 
burgeoning field of health sciences has provided us with behavioral recom-
mendations is that health is a state that I am at least in part responsible 
to produce in myself. My identity as producing a healthy body is not just 
determined by certain kinds of consumptive and productive activities, but 
also how these activities themselves take place within the frame of a large, 
progressive, and complex medical establishment that informs our relation-
ship to our health activities. This is the backdrop for assessing whether one 
has produced the right kind of body project. The doctor can run a series of 
more sophisticated tests with tools I do not have, and outside the doctor’s 
office I can test myself by measurements such as weight and size, days not 
smoking, hours exercised.
Consider how we understand medical care today. If I am very ill, I seek 
medical attention. If I am ill but the severity is unclear, I entertain the possi-
bility of going to the doctor or taking some medication. Health and illness 
are always understood within a world in which medical care is integral to 
the understanding of health. It is hard for me to know how I would relate to 
illness in a world where there was no institutional medical care, where one 
suffered and perhaps prayed to one’s god, and perhaps some healers offered 
some therapies, but the medical profession as we know it now did not exist. 
Critically, the existence of this field of knowledge and my awareness of it 
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encourages thinking about health and illness as transitory states that may 
be altered by personal and medical practices.
I can easily imagine medical care being denied to me, not being able to 
afford medical care, or medical care not being able to aid me, but in all such 
cases medical care still operates as the background in which I understand 
my health and illness. Like everyone I know, I was born in a hospital. My 
entire existence is pervaded by contemporary medical care just as my food 
consumption is determined by capitalist food production. I understand the 
medical profession not as a collection of people with some skills in healing 
but as a complex progressive, professional, scientific, and technological set 
of institutions. Even if nothing is currently capable of aiding me or prolong-
ing my life at this moment, I know that in the future such advances may 
happen. Such a view of the progressive nature of healthcare is, historically 
speaking, quite new, and is integral to how we understand our health and 
why we feel such responsibility for it. In phenomenologies of illness, stress 
is placed upon how the meaning of an illness is about not just physical 
states but virtual, imagined states—future possibilities, changes in relation-
ships, capacities to engage in future projects. These imagined futures are 
both tightly connected to the individual’s life, relationships, environment, 
and desires but also to the larger cultural ideologies and where the individ-
ual finds herself in society.
One might agree that while it is the case that my idea of my responsibility 
for health is quite different than it would have been 5,000 years ago, surely 
the human then and the human now experience health and illness the same 
way (even if the earlier human had no hope of medical intervention), since 
our bodies have not changed significantly. The fact that we see our own 
lives reflected in stories from foreign lands and ancient times suggests a 
common human thread of experience. Yet, health as that capacity to feel 
capable of going forth in the world and being-with others is affected by 
one’s idea of possible scientific cures, new treatments, and new ways to bet-
ter oneself that at any time might be discovered and developed—ideas for-
eign in other times where self-directed development did not operate within 
the medicalized world.
The healthcare sciences provide a virtual backdrop to my personal 
experiences of wellness and for the purposes of the good health impera-
tive provide the ideology of constant future improvement. My lifeworld is 
one where health is not something outside my understanding of the health-
care sciences but something understood in relationship to them. The hope 
of a cure colors the experience of illnesses in ways unknown in the past. 
Maybe a medication will aid me; maybe a medication in development will 
aid me; maybe a doctor can cure me; maybe a hospital team can; maybe 
I can undergo a combination of treatments. In addition, we will discover 
more ways in the future to refine our health. I can, in the words of a health 
coach, constantly get better even in the case of a debilitating illness or aging. 
We are social, historical beings in highly developed social systems wherein 
we understand even natural needs such as the need for health. Health has 
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become a produced object for us—produced by the histories, medical tech-
nologies, and ethical norms that shape our attitude toward it. This not only 
makes the way I understand health something that cannot be understood 
outside my situation as true for all persons at all times, but also, interest-
ingly, something that shapes who I am fundamentally.
Consider the use of Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART) today. 
Formerly infertility would have been seen as bad luck, but not something 
that had any possible solution. Now medical technologies have transformed 
the future of people wishing to be parents. One’s infertility is not necessarily 
a hindrance to childbirth. Bjørn Hofmann and Fredrik Svenaeus point out 
that the existence of ART can make an experience go from one where one 
perceives oneself as unfortunate or unhappy to ill, “For example, assistive 
reproductive technologies have redefined the experience of childlessness 
from being faith or bad luck to be something to alter and treat by making 
it a disease (infertility).”39 While ART has greatly assisted many to become 
parents, it also has created a landscape where it is unclear when one should 
stop with such technological intervention. Is it after one failed attempt? 
Two? Five? As I wrote regarding my own experience with IVF, a highly 
medicalized world alters one futurity:
Testing makes the horizon of one’s future shift from day to day. If one 
has embarked upon ART, one now will need to consider how to make 
one’s day fit around such testing and will regard each test with concern. 
Will this be the end of this journey? Will this medication produce the 
proper result in my body? Testing shapes temporality, not just in the 
sense of the horizon that might hold a child and one that shifts with 
the medical practice, but also insofar as temporality returns again and 
again the past. The virtual possible child is tied up with evaluations 
of if one would need such elaborate measure if one’s life had of been 
different, if one had of made different choices perhaps. Time extends 
strangely in the future even when one has received a bad result since the 
progressive nature of ART often means that one can always try again. 
Another IVF trial, or now perhaps get an egg donation, a sperm dona-
tion, an embryo donation. Or perhaps there will be some new advance-
ments that currently aren’t available but might be soon enough.40
Docility in biopolitical discourse is often conceived of as mystification as in 
Bartky’s work—that is, one does not see oneself as docile but rather as fulfilling 
one’s individual desires. These desires are manufactured due to an expanding 
world of normalized behavior bolstered by a variety of institutions and knowl-
edges. Hence, many biopolitical theorists have been deeply skeptical of phe-
nomenology’s use of the first-person, since the first-person is exactly that being 
who is constituted by normalization, and indeed focusing on the first-person 
is itself exactly what docility demands: an obedient being who self-regulates.
However, I think a key to today’s vision of the healthy body is that it can 
be understood as docility, but importantly also as a kind of self-conscious 
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productive labor on the body—fostered by a fetish belief in the power of 
medical and technological progress to constantly help “perfect” that labor. 
This docility helps modify the worst excesses of capitalist oppression by 
creating healthy bodies that can work better and necessarily question less, 
given the amount of free time that must be used for this endeavor of healthy 
body production, but it also has to be understood as connected to some-
thing all-too-human—that is, the fear and concern with suffering and death. 
Thus, this labor is both a historically constituted labor as well as a labor 
that responds to something existential.
In The Problem of Work, Kathi Weeks discusses the work ethic in both 
capitalist and Marxist theory. In both, one sees a great valorization of work 
and its importance. The Protestant work ethic fits well into capitalism’s fold 
by promoting individuals who will work hard—“work is understood and 
experienced in a field of individual agency as a sign of and path to self-re-
liance.”41 The vision of work as a key to emancipation, self-reliance, and 
self-promotion in our capitalist world argues that with a little moxie, some 
determination, and a will to work one can rise above the conditions of one’s 
birth. This illusion, increasingly incoherent in the face of post-1970s data 
in the developed world where the fortunes of the hardest working classes 
continue to fall along with the “middle class” as the fate of the wealthiest 
grows exponentially, is surprisingly robust. One can point to the various 
forces that uphold this meritocratic ideology that are not just about capi-
talism’s use of such an ideology, but also in personal experiences of work.
There is something to the tale of “work will equal success” that must also 
lie at the heart of our love with working on ourselves. We can see in our 
own lives how effort is connected to achievement, how not just in tales told 
to us, but in personal and social experiences. My work as a professor—both 
in research as well as in my role aiding students—fosters certain kinds of 
deliberate efforts to yield better knowledge. And while body work does not 
yield the same immediate results as getting one’s hair dyed does for one’s 
appearance, it does yield results. Hence, the work ethic both operates as a 
large social indoctrination linking labor to results as well as to personal 
experiences of effort paying off and a lack of work often resulting in less 
success. If one does achieve some success through effort, Weeks argues that 
we increasingly only count work that permits more purchasing, that is work 
that is paid, as real success, writing that “the work ethic was always already 
also an ethics of consumption, one that avows the necessary, legitimate, and 
indeed ethical link between hard work and whatever might count in differ-
ent economic phases as deserved and responsible spending.”42 My students’ 
hard work studying pays off in getting a college degree which increasingly, 
in particular for lower income students, is advertised as a means of earning 
a better salary, with no more romantic discussion of the inherent values 
of learning. As any philosophy major will testify, when one returns home, 
once declaring such a major the question is always—but what will you 
do? It doesn’t make sense to say, “think critically” or “ponder life’s great 
questions.” The question is not what will one do?, but how will one earn 
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money?. Weeks notes that such buy-ins to the value of certain kinds of hard 
work “constructs docile subjects.”43 Yet this docility only makes sense if the 
subjects themselves clearly see how their work is tied to success. Often the 
success attached is minimal in the face of economic wealth disparity. One 
may use a college degree (with its attendant debt) to rise from working 
class to middle class, but it is almost impossible to rise to the level of the 
wealthiest of people if one was not born into such a circumstance. However, 
microlevels of differences are the ones we pay attention to, and within these 
levels one can see a correlation between effort and level. A student can get a 
B rather than her fellow students’ Cs and feel good about her performance. 
I can get a merit raise over my less published colleague.
However, a curious thing seems to be occurring in the case of some self-di-
rected body work. Something like significant attention to working out—
whether in its most extreme forms like ultramarathons, or in everyday gym 
classes—is actually not revenue producing, but costs money. It might also take 
time away from one’s paid labor. If we tend to devalue work that is not highly 
attached to monetary gain—like studying philosophy, say—why then do we 
spend so much time and money working on our bodies? Insofar as we become 
increasingly invested in the idea of a good person being a person who takes 
care of herself in a certain healthy way, one might simply see it as immoral to 
not engage in such practices even if the cost to one’s other projects is high. In 
addition, the lack of compelling well-paid labor, the collapse of lifelong work 
in a company, the reduction in pensions, and the dissolution of jobs to over-
seas or to automation make the exchange of money for time itself something 
the individual must not just do, but constantly innovate herself to respond to 
a precarious shifting ground. The individual becomes a product not simply 
a laborer. The rise of healthism in the 1970s was linked to the recession, a 
lack of good work, and a sense that meaning and achievement must be found 
elsewhere.44 Surely some today invest in their body work as an alternative to 
off-set personally meaningless work, but increasingly self-modification is itself 
part of the “product” that one is going to sell. As cited in Chapter 3, Oksa-
la’s discusses how female beauty routines are not simply about receiving the 
desired male gaze, but to provide the proper visual cue to others of a successful 
person who should be desired for employment and promotion.45
Docility is not just that the body is obedient to some norm of behavior 
but that the body is also productive. The discipline of the work ethic, in 
Foucault’s terms, “increases the force of the body (in economic terms of 
utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience)” 
producing both a productive and subjugated body.46 The individual as the 
locus of self-reliance and effort sees her work not just tied to success but as 
what she truly wants. One might do all sorts of things to earn some money, 
but not identify with these activities other than practically as an exchange 
of time and expertise for money. Such a worker is unlikely to devote free 
time to the job. What would be ideal is to have workers that see their true 
life’s desire to have a certain position that remains above them and are will-
ing to put in any number of unpaid hours to obtain it.
Marxism, reproductive labor 123
In The Wellness Syndrome, Cederström and Spicer note that the idea of 
being a constantly adapting, flexible employee, always improving skills and 
responding “creatively” to new shifting economies creates a self as a con-
stant virtual product:
We must be on the move, constantly. We are tweeting, posting, hosting, 
sharing, linking, liking. The flexible worker’s wall is never dry. What is 
crucial is not what you have achieved, but what you can become. What 
counts if your potential self, not your actual self.47
The challenge to examining the good health imperative more closely is that 
one needs to get outside the individual’s own potentiality and see the other 
factors that contribute to this desire. The question of whether this individ-
ual is healthy or not and what could better her health needs to be placed in 
brackets. Such discussions help reenact the location of health as a matter of 
personal responsibility. Instead of debating what produces good health we 
must ask more into why we insist locating it in the individual and insofar as 
it is an individual project what the value of this value is.
We are caught in a unique position—research continues apace to discover 
new ways in which bodies can be modified and can modify themselves to 
achieve different amounts of longevity or increased performance. Given this, it 
will only be likely that in whatever spare time we do have, we will be encour-
aged to spend it working on ourselves, and this demand will not decrease with 
time, but, like the paid laborer in Marx’s vision, our work will only increase 
with diminishing returns. And unlike Marx’s prescriptive vision, it is hard 
to really imagine what would possibly change this situation given the rapid 
development of more health-related sciences, products, and practices to return 
us again and again the body as modifiable object. There is no communist 
revolt possible in relationship to health normalization or rejection of it whole-
sale. Existential angst about suffering and death will follow us in any new 
political regime. Turning away from the individual toward the way in which 
such healthy behavior is another form of labor helps return our focus to the 
historical and economic situation in which such labor takes place. Chapter 6 
looks toward thinking what ways might exist to take up healthy self-care in a 
more reflective manner that refuses easy moralization or abstraction.
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6 Alternative visions of health- 
somaesthetics and innumerable  
healths
Create dangerously
In a lecture entitled “Create Dangerously” given in 1957 at the University 
of Uppsala, Albert Camus argued that what differentiates the artist of today 
from that of generations past is the clear awareness of “the masses and 
their wretched condition ... We know that they exist, whereas we once had 
a tendency to forget them.”1 Mozart did not compose his music with daily 
knowledge of the horror of war, environmental collapse, and social unrest. 
Since we now know such things (and today even with more frequency and 
rapidity than in Camus’ time), artists must now ask whether or not they 
should address the condition of their world as part of their art. Even if the 
artist is not particularly inspired to create art that addresses human suf-
fering, is this lack of inspiration possibly a kind of moral failure? Camus 
argues that the ideology of “art for art’s sake” arose to isolate art from the 
troublesome, messy nature of our awareness. For Camus, the idea that one 
would absent oneself from the world and fall into one’s art is a “voicing” 
of “irresponsibility.”2 The alternative, to make art the handmaiden of polit-
ical action, Camus also rejects as “socialistic realism.” Such a move makes 
art propaganda. Instead of these two approaches to our human condition 
today, Camus argues that:
Art is neither complete rejection nor complete acceptance of what is. It 
is simultaneously rejection and acceptance, and this is why it must be 
a perpetually renewed wrenching apart. The artist lives in such a state 
of ambiguity, incapable of negating the real and yet eternally bound to 
question it in its eternally unfinished aspects.3
Camus argues that the freedom of artists places them in an ambiguous space 
where they are of this world and yet have the capacity to create new ones.
In this chapter, I take up the question of creative artistic expression as 
one means of examining our body work. This work does not occur out-
side the knowledges of the healthcare sciences, nor is it beholden to that 
work; rather it permits us to think about the work on our bodies as akin 
to a personal art, rather than obeying a universally moral imperative. This 
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provides some respite from the moralizing that serves the ends of others. 
It expands the possibilities of what a good life is outside of pre-packaged 
ones. To this end, I will use some of the themes brought up in Richard 
Shustermann’s somaesthetics and Nietzsche’s idea of innumerable healths. 
The idea of body work as somaesthetic practice draws our attention toward 
experience and away from objective measures of health (such as BMI, blood 
pressure, etc.). As such, it can allow for a self-conscious form of personal 
development that is not reducible to the good health imperative even if it 
considers health as one of the products of somaesthetic practice. Cressida 
Heyes and Marjorie Jolles see promise in somaesthetics as a way to provide 
feminist self-care that resists normalization. In the subsequent two sections, 
the limits of somaesthetics will be considered due to its reliance on the 
idea of a single form of self in its self-development model. In Nietzsche’s 
model of “innumerable healths” and “many wills” the status of a unitary 
nature of health is disputed alongside the idea of the individual as having 
only one core self-identity. Finally, Kathi Weeks’ use of Nietzsche’s eternal 
return of the same as a way to reject self-improvement will complicate and 
complement the somaesthetic and phenomenological views of health and 
flourishing.
Creative self-fashioning
Richard Shusterman coined the term “somaesthetics” to provide a name 
around which to organize a diverse and interdisciplinary style of thought 
and practice. What Shusterman works toward, given some of his own theo-
retical reflections (as well as his personal work with body training technique 
“the Feldenkrais Method”), is that philosophy has for too long ignored 
thinking about the body.4 When it has, philosophy has shied away from 
advocating for particular kinds of body development. Instead, it leaves 
such work to other disciplines, such as those that support the various cor-
porations, charities, and government institutions that use the good health 
imperative as their justification. Shusterman acknowledges that much of 
the attention to the body serves to profit companies, encourages sexist and 
racist views, and normalizes our behavior. However, he considers that “the 
critical study and meliorative cultivation of how we experience and use the 
living body (or soma) as the site of sensory appreciation (aesthesis) and 
creative self-fashioning” can provide a site that neither ignores the body nor 
takes our current methods of training it as sufficient.5 It also extends us far 
beyond the kind of theorizing that dominates Western thought, which tends 
to take the body at arm’s length, if it considers the body at all. Somaesthetics 
instead is “devoted to the knowledge, discourses, practices, and bodily dis-
ciplines that structure somatic care or improve it,” thus making considera-
tion of things such as digestion, nutrition, physical therapies, sports, and the 
bodily arts integral.6 Yet, these practices, knowledges, and techniques are 
not merely practical for obtaining the ends of better health or reduced suf-
fering. Rather, the idea of somaesthetics is to make such practices aesthetic 
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experiences. One must also attend to how those practices contribute to a 
somaesthetic self-creation as an on-going experiential practice that betters 
one’s appreciation of oneself, not merely whether one achieves the deter-
mined benchmark. In such a manner, somaesthetics is a practical philosoph-
ical attempt to embody what the good health imperative does with a more 
nuanced form that is attentive to varieties of pleasures and aesthetic delight.
Shusterman argues that “self-help was once philosophy’s guiding goal” 
even though contemporary academic philosophy finds such a research 
agenda distasteful; somehow too common and base.7 Shusterman suggests 
that this is an unfortunate development, and that a multi-disciplinary som-
aesthetics could greatly improve the lives of many just as one might argue 
that the development of finer powers of critical philosophy cultivates the 
lives of many. Shusterman provides neither a “how-to” guide for somaes-
thetics nor a set of ways one can track whether one is succeeding or failing. 
However, he does outline three “fundamental branches” of somaesthetics. 
In the following, I will take up these ideas and detail how they dovetail with 
a critical examination of the good health imperative.
First, Shusterman thinks about “analytic somaesthetics,” which is the 
“descriptive and theoretical enterprise devoted to explain the nature of our 
bodily perceptions and practices and their function in our knowledge and 
construction of the world.”8 Merleau-Ponty’s extensive work on the body, 
the work of feminist, race, and queer theorists, and Foucault’s work dis-
cussed previously are examples of such work that explore how ignoring 
the body has greatly limited our capacity to understand the way that our 
sciences, knowledges, ethics, and ontologies come to be formed. Pragmatic 
somaesthetics proposes “specific methods of somatic improvement” and 
engages “in their comparative critique.”9 It presupposes analytic work, thus 
avoiding the oppressive regimes of body discipline in a particular society, 
but it would extend beyond it “by proposing various methods to improve 
certain facts by remaking the body and society.”10 Thus, in principle, the 
good health imperative could be adjusted by somaesthetics to achieve the 
morally valuable end of better health without the limiting kinds of moral 
policing and normalization.
Finally, there is also practical somaesthetics—“pursuing such care 
through intelligently disciplined practice aimed at somatic self-improve-
ment.”11 Practical somaesthetics is the actual doing of that which the 
pragmatic somaesthetics proposes, “concerned not with saying but doing, 
this practical dimension is the most neglected by academic body philoso-
phers.”12 Importantly, practical somaesthetics is part of a “comprehensive 
philosophical discipline” and foreseeably something that philosophers as 
well as laypeople would employ.13 The various methods, protocols, prac-
tices, treatments, medicine, and testing done in the name of the good health 
imperative could be seen as practical, but not yet somaesthetic. What such 
disciplines would need is to focus on is the experiential manner in which 
something betters one’s capacities for aesthetic pleasure, for development, 
and for creative expression.
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In Chapter 3, we examined how the obsession with molding the female 
body to ever more exacting forms of beauty presented us with a helpful 
example of how one may willingly enter into normalized body discipline. 
But simply to engage in critical work on body normalization fails to cap-
ture the pleasures and possibilities of positive body work. One aspect of 
somaesthetics is to increase pleasures by considering the way one treats 
and moves one’s body as not just allowing one to not take blood pressure 
medication or lose weight, but to actually have greater, more nuanced sen-
sations. One could think here of the pleasures of learning a new dance, 
developing one’s palate for a cuisine, climbing a difficult rock, or learning 
how to meditate. Shusterman thinks about the appreciation of beauty not 
just as the contemplation of the object or even the contemplation of one’s 
own body as an object, but “the beautiful experience of one’s own body 
from within—the endorphin-enhanced glow of high-level cardio-vascular 
functioning, the slow savoring awareness of improved, deeper breathing, 
the tingling thrill of feeling into new parts of one’s spine.”14 Such pleasures, 
while perhaps encouraged by some of the practices celebrated in the good 
health imperative, are by no means exclusively held by the bodies that are 
seen as “appropriately healthy.” Foreseeably, one would consider how to 
adapt an exercise regime, say, to focus less on weight loss and more on new 
capacities for experience.
Importantly, somaesthetics takes up the experience in total and not in 
quantifiable, objectified levels such as BMI or blood pressure. Eating food is 
not a matter simply of nutrition, for instance, it is part of the art of eating—
one can explore not just different foods from other cultures, but also other 
cultural styles of eating to develop one’s own somaesthetic practice. Eat-
ing food somaesthetically would entail paying attention to the dexterity of 
using utensils, palate, season, social company, environment, accompanying 
drinks, and how one feels when eating, sitting, and chatting.15 The shared 
experience of eating food well would thus be a socially constituted art that 
can be returned to repeatedly. This leaves us open to imagining many more 
different ideals of “good health” apart from simply analyses of caloric and 
nutritional details. Shusterman argues that somaesthetics, unlike other 
models, requires one to take up the importance of the larger social and 
environmental world that permits such self-fashioning. “Such lessons of 
somatic self-conscious eventually point toward the vision of an essentially 
situated, relational, and symbiotic self rather than the traditional concept of 
an autonomous self grounded in an individual, monadic, indestructible, and 
unchanging soul.”16 Caring about the others at my meal and considering 
the situation in which I am eating draw upon how one’s embodiment is not 
contained within the layer of skin that surrounds one’s physical form, but is 
an extended, temporal, affective, and virtual world.
Interested in pursuing better ways to care for the self, some feminists have 
appealed to Shusterman’s idea of somaesthetics as a possible place from 
which to develop better ideals of self-care. Cressida Heyes, Majories Jolles, 
and Shusterman have called for the use of somaesthetics to pursue feminist 
132 Alternative visions of health-somaesthetics
ethical concerns.17 Inherent in somaesthetics is a focus on the experience 
over the product. In standard ideas of delight in beauty self-fashioning, the 
delight is the creation of oneself as an object to be viewed. The beauty is 
not in the putting on of makeup, but when one stops and is “done.” Instead, 
somaesthetics focuses on how the body achieves greater levels of beauty 
in the practice—such as Heyes describing her transformative work doing 
yoga. The delight of a deep pose held for a long time requires being in and 
with one’s body, not displaying one’s body.18 Heyes sees that this idea of the 
focus on experience runs counter to many gym and athletic cultures where 
exercise is seen as a tool to shape and discipline the body rather than an 
experience of delight in itself.19
The good health imperative’s dependency on biometric markers and 
achieving results could possibly be replaced by a somaesthetic view that 
places priority on the experience and on movement, while distancing itself 
from health as any kind of particular achievement that can be understood 
external to the experience. However, one concern is that often the kinds 
of practices that somaesthetics proposes are very self-centered works on 
self-improvement, perhaps not subjectively the same, but at least externally 
quite similar to the kinds of practices encouraged by the good health imper-
ative. One’s fellow travelers in yoga or cuisine, for example, are valuable 
insofar as they help enlarge one’s personal experience. While Shusterman 
does consider cultural, social, and other aspects of one’s environment, the 
kinds of experiences he discusses—yoga, Zen meditation, developing one’s 
culinary appreciation—are hard to imagine as ones that the busboy clean-
ing the table, the poor, or the disenfranchised could enjoy and develop. As 
Chapter 2 critiqued some phenomenologies of movement for their empha-
sis on adult solitary pursuits like playing tennis or riding a bike, the kinds of 
activities of someaesthetics are very often adult, individual, and privileged 
forms of embodiment. Surely, as Camus writes, there is something uncom-
fortable about these artistic pursuits in the face of the knowledge of the 
world.
Heyes highlights this concern among feminists by arguing that the kinds 
of self-care rituals and subtler approaches like somaesthetics discourage seri-
ous work toward solidarity and political change. “Feminists especially are 
concerned that care of the self will encourage a privileged, inward-looking 
attitude that merely taps into existing social trends toward fragmentation 
and lack of political responsibility or solidarity.”20 However, a life turned 
always outward toward the group and the society likewise reproduces the 
subjugation of the disenfranchised groups, where their purpose is to better 
the lives of the husband, the boss, the man, or the leader. What Heyes appre-
ciates about somaesthetics is that it provides a much-needed discussion for 
self-care that isn’t sold to women in such a manner as to further their sub-
jugation. Another problem with somaesthetics, as Shusterman expresses it, 
is that it doesn’t address how I am represented will co-constitute how I 
experience myself. The experiences of delight at normalization rituals are 
not false—that is, experiences that are faked or inauthentic, even if they 
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may indeed require docility and a lack of creative self-fashioning. There can 
be great collective and personal pleasure in engaging in highly commodi-
fied and limited kinds of body work. Jolles argues that Shusterman’s work 
doesn’t respond to the way in which our experiences are themselves based 
in cultural representations we have acquired.21 Jolles considers that instead 
of focusing on practices for certain kinds of somaesthetic development, 
such as thinking about food or movement, one could attune toward narra-
tives that would include the capacity for greater freedom that springs from 
a complex look at experience.22 Jolles further argues that a feminist ethic 
of embodiment seeks to make the damaging effects of normalization visible 
so that we can better organize to work against them. Yet she cautions that 
“The obvious limitation of any program that interrogates the edges of nor-
malization is that the subject who would take up such a program is likely 
to be already aware of those effects, and perhaps even already equipped to 
resist them.”23
The very fact that I can think about how I am shaped suggests that some 
part of my experience exceeds indoctrination. Not only do my experiences 
transcend in part any tools I’m given to explain them, which surely is part 
of the impetus for writers, artists, and musicians to create, but I am capable 
of thinking about how I am constituted without violating some rule of that 
very same constitution. It does not free me from anxieties that have been 
deeply embedded in my upbringing, but certainly being able to think about 
the question if a life spent concerned with my looks might be a pointless 
pursuit is itself a kind of space into which I might explore a new way of 
being. Feminist embodiment ethics’ engagement with Foucault and other 
biopolitical theorists does not mean that they argue one cannot exit nor-
malization in any manner. Heyes notes that there is “nothing in Foucault’s 
work to suggest that we are incapable of critical reflection on normaliza-
tion” even if the “larger historical and genealogical picture of normalization 
is beyond the control of any individual.”24 Heyes situates the idea of critical 
reflection with her idea of self-transformation. Hence, feminist embodiment 
ethics can be viewed as sympathetic to analytic somaesthetics and its advo-
cating for new styles of embodiment as a practical somaesthetics.
Chapter 5 explored the ways in which the good health imperative, 
despite its seeming benefits, produces a different kind of work that is now 
demanded of all subjects regardless of their embodied condition. Somaes-
thetics is a compelling way to think about long-standing forms of self-cul-
tivation—such as developing one’s palate, learning a sport, practicing 
experience-based forms of self-awareness (yoga, tai-chi, martial arts, or 
learning the art of using one’s body to sing or play music)—as ways in 
which one may include health concerns without letting such concerns be 
about the production of the right kind of body. While it seems possible 
to draw out and expand upon some styles of self-directed body work in 
a more creative, experiential fashion as an alternative (or addition) to the 
medicalized “passing” of certain tests, such work relies upon a view of a self 
that has predetermined goals and will continue, more or less, as the same 
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bodily subject over time. This greatly limits the creativity possible in such 
work. Instead, the idea of self-transformation in Heyes can help underline 
the idea of a new self or selves, not simply the same one with better aes-
thetic pleasures and tastes. Oksala writes that bodily agency needs to not be 
understood as a possession but as an opening:
There is “freedom” in the unpredictability of our embodied experiences 
that establishes the always incomplete character of the body’s cultural 
constitution. This freedom is not to be understood as an inherent capac-
ity or attribute of the body as such, but is more like a ‘Foucaultian’ 
understanding of freedom as the freeing or opening of new possibilities 
for living our bodies, sexualities and lives.25
While perhaps somaesthetics produces these kind of possibilities, its reliance 
on a self-same subject who works on her body also would seem to continue 
to place health on the front burner. After all, if I am ill to the degree that I 
cannot develop myself, this takes precedence over any creative self-fashion-
ing. Development itself has at its core the idea that one is developing a self 
whose will and self are known and thus limit consideration of the unpre-
dictability of our embodiment. Below, I will explore Nietzsche’s idea of 
suffering as part of health and health as constituting a wide variety of states 
in various individuals. In conclusion, I will consider how in addition to a 
critique of a unitary, objective concept of health, one also finds in Nietzsche 
a view of a diversity of selves and wills. Self-development and self-transfor-
mation become much more complex and ambiguous in this reading.
Nietzsche's innumerable healths
There are two kinds of depictions of illness and health in Nietzsche. One is 
to diagnose moralists; in particular, Christian moralists and their partners in 
crime for most of the history of Western ethics, with sickness and weakness. 
In discussing the origin of morals in On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche 
provides a psychological and language-based account of what might have 
motivated the first “moralists”—the first people who started seeing human 
experience as differing in value. He argues that prior to our contemporary 
morality, moral terms were to create distance from the low-born. Original 
master moralities were unsophisticated in that they did not depart from 
the experiences of the knightly-aristocratic class. They were not abstract, 
as no attempt was made to universalize them. What they espoused was a 
strong love of the physical and of health. “The knightly-aristocratic value 
judgments presupposed a powerful physicality, a flourishing, abundant, 
even overflowing health, together with that which serves to preserve it: war, 
adventure, hunt, dancing, war games, and in general all that involves vig-
orous, free, joyful activity.” 26 When Odysseus is praised for his looks, clev-
erness, and skill in battle, it is not hard to deduce the kinds of persons that 
might celebrate the values behind those attributes. Those not lucky enough 
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to be born into bodies and conditions that fostered such physicality grew 
resentful and gave birth to what we would now think of as morality—a 
universal set of judgments that often are decidedly against the physical. Just 
as the knightly-aristocratic values sprang from the masters’ own condition 
as powerful, the slave morality of the priestly class springs from their weak-
ness. The impotence of the priests causes them to create values that reject 
the physical because of their own weakness. They do not create from a love 
of self, but a hatred of what they are not:
…As is well known, the priests are the most evil enemies—but why? 
Because they are the most impotent. It is because of their impotence 
that in them hatred grows to monstrous and uncanny proportions, to 
the most spiritual and poisonous kind of hatred.27
This hatred is borne out of a lack of having the kinds of positive qualities 
that make for a well-lived life. “While every noble morality develops from 
a triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says No 
to what is ‘outside,’ what is ‘different,’ what is ‘not itself’; and this No is 
its creative deed.”28 The sophistication of contemporary morality would 
be lost on Nietzsche’s pre-moral knightly-aristocratic class since, to a large 
degree, their health is a simple affirmation of what they are, and not, as in 
contemporary Western morality, what they should be.
Shusterman sees some forces of inspiration for somaesthetics in Nietzsche 
and Foucault, but ultimately judges their work as too unconscious, wild, 
and without the kind of deliberate, recursive practice he calls for in prag-
matic someaesthetics. For Shusterman, Nietzsche’s main positive contribu-
tion is his emphasis on bodily sensation, passions, and emotions over the 
idealist mind and soul centered philosophies in the West. However, Shus-
terman thinks Nietzsche goes too far in his celebration of the body, arguing 
that what he calls “Nietzsche’s hyperbolic somaticism” is ultimately uncon-
vincing because of the body’s weakness:
The problem is not simply that body over mind goes too much against 
the grain of philosophy’s intellectualist tradition. Nor is it merely that 
the reversal seems to reinforce the same old rigid dualism of mind and 
body. Somatic deficiency is, unfortunately, such a pervasive part of 
experience that Nietzsche’s inversion of the mind/body hierarchy seems 
too much like wishful thinking (particularly when we recall his own 
pathetic bodily weakness).29
For Shusterman, the body qua unconscious, silent force is fundamentally 
limited even if it is true, like Nietzsche argues, that it has powers beyond 
the mind’s ability to control and introspect. We are not just beasts of prey; 
we are also fragile, sickly beings subject to illness, disease, and decay. We 
are also beings who can develop themselves, Shusterman argues, through 
conscious, mindful practice.
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One does not have to read much of Nietzsche’s corpus to find thought that 
works against the idea that Nietzsche views master morality as some kind of 
animalistic, bodily strength. Nietzsche wrote often about frailty and sickness in 
ways that derail the theory that his work is merely “hyperbolic somaticism.” 
The values Nietzsche clearly celebrates include not just elitist values that seem 
untimely today, but also the value of difference, including characteristics that 
we would normally think are at minimum undesirable, if not outright evil. Suf-
fering is not an objection to a flourishing existence, but actually essential to it.
“We think that hardness, forcefulness, slavery, danger in the alley and in 
the heart, life in hiding, stoicism, the art of experiment and devilry of every 
kind, that everything evil, terrible, tyrannical in man, everything in him 
that is kin to beasts of prey and serpents, serves the enhancement of the 
species ‘man’ as much of its opposite does.”30 In this passage from Beyond 
Good and Evil, one notes that improvement or progress is not made solely 
on the back of “positive” virtues such as charity. Thus, progress is gar-
nered on the basis of danger as much as clear-headed rational planning.
In a similar vein, health is not the opposite of sickness, but something that 
takes place in a certain relation to it. Since change is inevitable and our 
condition leads us not just to the joys of life but the obvious difficulties, 
health outside of sickness is not any more possible than life without death. 
Nietzsche even counsels that sickness can be philosophically profound in 
that it portrays the vitality of life more explicitly:
For a typically healthy person, conversely, being sick can even become 
an energetic stimulus for life, for living more. This, in fact, is how that 
long period of sickness appears to me now: as it were, I discovered anew, 
including myself; I tasted all good and even little things, as others cannot 
easily taste them—I turned my will to health, to life, into a philosophy.31
Nietzsche celebrates his own “fickle health” as giving him a capacity above 
“robust squares.”32 For Nietzsche, his moving between health and sickness 
and having different qualities of existence actually carries him through 
“an equal number of philosophies.”33 Sickness creates the need to create 
a “spiritual form and distance”34 from such states, but this fundamental 
lesson is not to leave sickness behind, but to see its value in transfiguration. 
Philosophers
…are not thinking frogs, nor objectifying and registering mechanisms 
with their innards removed: constantly, we have to give birth to our 
thoughts out of our pain and, like mothers, endow them with all we 
have of blood, heart, fire, pleasure, passion, agony, conscience, fate, and 
catastrophe.35
Hence, while one might not pursue sickness, it is not the case that sickness 
is always limiting: it may be transforming.
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Sickness as perceived suffering, as the unthematic body forcing itself 
upon the individual requiring her to respond, is in not an objection to 
health. This would contradict the idea of illness as privation in Heidegger 
and, in Merleau-Ponty, the idea of illness as limiting the body’s natural, 
spontaneous extension toward the world as discussed in Chapter 3. Upon 
reflection, extreme states of joy or passion are intense and bring us away 
from unthematic being-in-the-world, but are typically seen as states that 
give our lives great meaning. While certainly people must forgo at times in 
their lives, or even consistently, any great passion for fear they will lose their 
object of affection or fail to achieve their ambition, a life spent avoiding any 
possibility of suffering would be a diminished one. Even physical pain is not 
in-itself always to be avoided. Many experiences that are sought-after such 
as natural childbirth and running marathons are painful. We would find 
someone who avoided pain at all costs unreasonable and likely incapable 
of a life worth living.
The good health imperative works in this fear of suffering, and while 
Nietzsche’s dramatic language might not seem particularly practical to the 
question of how to live in a world saturated with the moralizing about 
health, it does help to think about how our fear of ill health might encourage 
a kind of unquestioned value of one kind of health and hence our too quick 
willingness to submit to the good health imperative. Marc Letteri argues 
that Nietzsche teaches us the distinction between sickness and sickliness:
Health is, however, not simply the absence of weakness: it is, rather, 
the free admission of weakness into the arena of struggle with the aim 
of conquering it and thereby becoming stronger. An untested will is 
an unknown quantity, and a will which actually shirks tests is even 
worse—much worse. It suffers not from sickness but from sickliness: it 
is characterized by an inveterate inability, an inability to deal profitably 
with impediments and obstacles.36
Moralists blame the senses and thus the body for disrupting their search for 
“truth.” They object to change, divergence, difference—all the elements that 
constitute our embodied existence. This springs not from a serious desire for 
universality, but rather from an inability to endure human existence and a 
search for a solution outside of it. The sickliness of the moralist is not physical 
sickness so much as a kind of inability to face being embodied with its vacil-
lating states, including pain. The weakness is thus not necessarily connected 
to the weakness one has when one has the flu or when one is being treated for 
cancer, but rather a fear of variety, since variety brings with it great joys and 
ecstasies but also suffering and disintegration, in other words, what it is to live.
For Nietzsche, moralists want conformity of souls not because conform-
ity exists, but because it serves the aim of creating distance from the body. 
Identity for Nietzsche cannot be universalized any more than morality can. 
The moralist who wants to deny the charming diversity of life will seek the 
idea of there being only one way to see health and one way to see suffering:
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Let us finally consider how naïve it is altogether to say: ‘Man ought to 
be such and such!’ Reality shows us an enchanting wealth of types, the 
abundance of a lavish play and change of forms—and some wretched 
loafer of a moralist comments: ‘No! Man ought to be different.’ He 
even knows what man should be like, this wretched bigot and prig: he 
paints himself on a wall and comments ‘Ecce homo!’37
The changes of my body will bring transformations that may not be willed, 
and perhaps the willed ones will fail to take hold. In addition, as discussed 
in Chapter 2, any one person’s sense of well-being or suffering is deeply 
intertwined with virtual, subjective aspects of her life. Thus, one cannot 
really say what it means to have a “normal” course of cancer as an experi-
ence even if many aspects of how cancer develops as a disease are known. 
It is also the case that those who on objective levels have good health like-
wise do not experience this in a similar manner. Of course, ceteris pari-
bus, it would be odd to find someone who would in the abstract prefer ill 
health over good health. But it is not necessarily the case that improving 
one’s health according to healthcare guidelines would always improve one’s 
well-being if one assumes that one’s well-being is more complex than biom-
etric screenings.
Nietzsche’s idea of “innumerable healths” is tied to his rejection of 
equality. For Nietzsche, what is healthy for one person might not be so for 
another. This idea would seem to run strongly counter to much of our sense 
of health being a medical matter that is determined objectivity. Nietzsche 
counsels that “there are innumerable healths of the body; and the more we 
allow the unique and incomparable to raise its head again, and the more 
we abjure the dogma of ‘equality of men,’ the more must the concept of a 
normal health, along with a normal diet and the normal course of an illness, 
be abandoned by medical men.”38 Phenomenologists, in particular exis-
tential phenomenologists, would find much in common with Nietzsche’s 
celebration of the senses, of change, of accepting aging, birth, death, and 
difference among humans. Merleau-Ponty writes that mechanistic models 
cannot explain the rich diversity of styles of embodiment. In his lectures on 
child psychology and pedagogy, Merleau-Ponty repeatedly draws attention 
to how physical maturation is necessary but not sufficient for development:
Development is as little a destiny as it is an unconditioned freedom, 
for the individual always accomplishes a decisive act of development 
in a particular corporeal field. We find here once again Hegel’s idea of 
“surpassing while preserving.” The individual only moves beyond his 
first states if he agrees to retain them. Thus, we rejoin our general con-
ceptions of the personal and interpersonal dynamic.39
One can have precocious children or delayed children; it is a matter of 
their larger connection to others and the world around them. In the case of 
sexist societies, with the closing off of many possible worlds to the young 
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girl, her development is shrunk.40 Here we can see a tie back to the previous 
discussion of how health for phenomenologists is also about the possible, 
the virtual—my health is in part conditioned by how I imagine my future 
and not just my present physical state.
Yet despite these resonances with Nietzsche’s texts, phenomenologists 
might pause at the discussion of illness as essential for health. After all, it 
is the suffering of illness that breaks the harmony of the body schema in 
its everyday actions. It is pain that commonly restricts one’s life. However, 
Nietzsche’s work does not in principle run counter to the kinds of ideas 
Svenaeus, Carel, Toombs, and others interested in more phenomenologi-
cal approaches to medical practice offer. Instead, the idea of “innumerable 
healths,” including pain, suffering, and illness offers an important exis-
tential rejoinder to considering just what health is. Peter Sedgwick notes 
that Nietzsche’s view of health helps to counter the tendency to think of 
health as something that is the opposite of sickness, “Medical practitioners, 
therefore, ought to abandon the modern tendency to think of health as the 
opposite of sickness, and instead consider health as something tied to one’s 
frailty and finitude.”41 Similar to the idea of unheimlichkeit, illness is not a 
rejection of health but part of what it is to exist—to be both at home and 
not at home.
What Nietzsche’s critique of sickliness, rather than sickness, and the illu-
sion of a stable self provides the phenomenologist is a way to avoid think-
ing about health as a background in a reductive fashion. While it is valuable 
to think about how good health often recedes into the background when 
one takes up one’s tasks, the possible danger is to then think of health as a 
kind of steady state where variance, both individual and social, is an objec-
tion to it. If we think about health as “innumerable healths,” we capture 
both individual and social diversity more accurately.
If suffering and health are intertwined, we can look to Svenaeus’ sep-
aration of suffering into different types.42 He notes there is the suffering 
that arises from illness, what would be most often addressed in healthcare 
settings, but there is also political, existential, and bad luck suffering. Elim-
inating suffering is not in this account always beneficial to the individual. 
For instance, pharmaceuticals that flatten my anxieties to find a personally 
relevant existential quest for meaning in an ambiguous universe might actu-
ally detract from a true well-being, even if admittedly discomfort is allevi-
ated. 43 Noting that this would seem to work against his ideas of health as a 
homelike being-in-the-world, Svenaeus argues that this would be to confuse 
all suffering as illness-suffering. Rather, some suffering might be essential 
to a life well-lived. Sveneaus writes, “A flourishing life rests on authentic 
self-understanding, according to most phenomenological thinkers…”44 
Such thinking can complement a more complex relationship to suffering 
rather than seeing all suffering as something to be eliminated.
If the solution to systemic economic and political inequalities is simply 
treating the individuals who are suffering as needing more medical treat-
ment, one will fail to actually address the real source of suffering. More 
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invasive intrusion into the bodies of fat children because of their fatness 
encourages not attending to the political reasons behind the disparities in 
weight between the rich and the poor. Moreover, suffering can be seen also 
as an impetus for advocating for change and for articulating ways in which 
one is unable to voice one’s lived experience. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
feminists in the phenomenological tradition stress the importance of con-
sidering our experiences as epistemologically relevant. This is not to assert 
that they are relevant as we initially might interpret them, as this interpreta-
tion is often culturally bound, but that frustration and pain can themselves 
be important rejoinders not to change ourselves, but instead to change the 
world.
Innumerable selves and eternal return of the same
In the conclusion of her book The Problem of Work, Weeks also turns 
toward existentialist themes of trying to find new ways of considering 
meaning by taking up Nietzsche’s much discussed, and perhaps little under-
stood, idea of the eternal return of the same. One trend in scholarship is to 
see Nietzsche’s idea of everything returning repeatedly as a kind of carpe 
diem: a practical existentialist ethics where we can affirm our lives and find 
joy in what is here and now, rather than religious and moral illusions.45 
Weeks takes a similar view; she sees the eternal return of the same not as 
a grand cosmological statement that everything shall return again in time, 
but something we can use. She thinks of it as a kind of self-help idea that 
has an “affective impact” on our lives.46 To accept where one is and who 
one is unequivocally in order to reach into the future afresh. Refusing work 
is a way to accept what is without qualification and without the need to 
transform oneself through labor.
Weeks thinks that the affirmation of the eternal return acknowledges the 
past in order to move forward without resentment or circularity. “The eter-
nal return acknowledges the lingering impact of the past on the present and 
future, and attempts to disallow a particular mode of that lingering that 
results in ressentiment and even nihilism.”47 Using Nietzsche’s concept of 
the eternal return at the end of a book on work might appear peculiar, but 
it allows Weeks to provide a kind of conceptual space in which to imagine 
what lives not organized around work might be. Given that discourses on 
work so dominate both right and left politics, all future models use from 
the idea of “solving” work by other kinds of work. The left might empha-
size better paid work, more fulfilling work, more independence at work, 
and better working conditions. The right focuses on promoting competition 
and good incentives for high performers. Neither suggests that not working 
might be a viable space around which a society might organize itself. The 
eternal return might get out of this issue by taking a step away from the 
model of work as being a problem in need of a solution.
One reason for thinking that philosophy in its more difficult forms (not in 
easily acceptable “motivational” quotes or self-help guidelines for physical 
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change) is valuable for self-development is in its focus on how a philosoph-
ical approach explores questioning unexamined cultural norms about what 
a good relationship to the self is. Philosophies like Nietzsche’s, Foucault’s, 
and Merleau-Ponty’s pull apart our easy ideas of the “self.” When consid-
ering a standard idea of self-mastery, I am split between the self who must 
obey and the self who orders. After all, I am not who I want to be, so this 
current self needs to change her behavior. Another part of me commonly 
called “the will” takes command. If I am inspired by the somaesthetic phi-
losophy of Shusterman, and I think about how my life could become more 
directed and aesthetic, I should learn to see typically unreflective parts of 
my life as needing directed alteration—from my breathing to my eating 
habits. But anyone who has engaged in some kind of self-development pro-
ject knows that the obeying self doesn’t always follow orders. A standard 
notion is to say that here the will has failed. The commanding self gave up 
under the force of habitual behavior or was taken away to attend to more 
pressing issues. A common direction for many is trying to eat better, but 
then of course, a crisis at work, a bad night’s sleep, and a particularly tempt-
ing candy bar is the cause of many failures. But is this really the correct way 
to see self-mastery? In such a view, the self that desires change is considered 
to be the mindful identity of the individual with the habitual and non-obe-
dient parts of oneself taking the role of the animal, unconscious bodily self. 
Here I am trying to shape myself into a more mindful person in the same 
way I am struggling to shape my front yard into a flower garden. Yet, my 
resistant body is far more diverse and far more intentional than a piece of 
dirt (not to say that dirt doesn’t have its own resistances).
What often breaks the commander is the desire of these other wills, not 
some kind of mindless habit or unconscious bodily imperative. It is an insist-
ent and clear pressure that often takes the form of articulated desire. After 
all, I don’t “find” myself eating a candy bar and think “what happened?!” I 
have a very clear desire that comes as a thought: “Chocolate—go get some 
chocolate,” then “commander” self says, “you had enough chocolate” and, 
well, one knows who wins this battle.48 To claim that these other wills are 
not me seems to return me to the dualistic thinking where I disavow my 
bodily nature and try to isolate myself in one aspect of my being.
In addition, one cannot help but wonder whether the “commander” of 
self-development should be followed? Why not the rebellious “troops” 
refusing to obey this tyrant? Nietzsche writes about the problems of under-
standing our “manifold” will; we do not understand the complexity at play 
in our identity:
…[W]e are at the same time the commanding and the obeying parties, 
and as the obeying party we know the sensations of constraint, impul-
sion, pressure, resistance, and motion, which usually begin immediately 
after the act of will; inasmuch as, on the other hand, we are accustomed 
to disregard this duality, and to deceive ourselves about it by means of 
the synthetic concept ‘I,’ a whole series of erroneous conclusions, and 
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consequently of false evaluations of the will itself, has become attached 
to the act of willing—to such a degree that he who wills believes sin-
cerely that willing suffices for action.49
For Nietzsche, the “I” is a creation after the occurrence of the act. It gives 
the individual an extra pleasure to look to the past and say, “this was my 
commanding will that did this,” but this is a creative story put upon a much 
more complex experience where many selves battle at times for dominance. 
One may find that one’s consciously directed self-development presents one 
with new pleasures, new experiences, and possibly even true transforma-
tions that are unexpected products of self-fashioning. Yet perhaps the other 
recalcitrant selves, even rebellious ones, cannot be so easily led. Moreover, 
perhaps those other wills might know better than the commander.
In the pursuit of health as something I can develop in myself, one might 
assume that the real fear is illness, suffering, and death. Illness surely reminds 
us of our own mortality and that of those we love. Equally terrifying is how 
serious illnesses alter individuals. It is not unlikely that I might contract a dis-
ease in aging that in previous generations I would have died too early to have, 
such as Alzheimer’s, cancer, or heart disease. Many of us in the developed 
world are pointed toward futures where advances in medical science will 
keep us existing in states radically different from those we occupy in health. 
This being-toward-illness means that I will not be when I die, but also, I will 
not be this same me when I am still here. The most striking examples are 
raised by those with illnesses that strongly alter one’s capacity for self-under-
standing and of connecting various life experiences into a meaningful whole.
We see two kinds of themes of the self in Nietzsche that seem to work at 
cross purposes. On the one hand, Nietzsche often discusses self-improvement 
as a kind of willed overcoming of one’s various desires, urges, and natural states 
toward a singular one—one goal, one focus—upon which to live out one’s will-
to-power. On the other, there is an articulation of the thesis that an individual 
is a fated product of the past. In On the Uses and Disadvantages of History 
for Human Life, Nietzsche writes that “since we are the outcome of earlier 
generations, we are also the outcome of their aberrations, passions and errors, 
and indeed of their crimes; it is not possible to wholly free oneself from this 
chain.”50 Rejecting our historical situation does not wipe our slate clean, “If we 
condemn these aberrations and regard ourselves as free of them, this does not 
alter the fact we originate in them.”51 Every woman raised on Princess myths 
of beauty, charm, and the need of a male savior will need to wrestle with such 
ideas that determine her sense of self from an early age. Even outright rejection 
of them always operates in relief. It is impossible to know what it would mean 
to have a sense of sexuality that had no relationship to the norm of one’s cul-
ture as one grows up in a world in which sexuality has been given a meaning 
that one may reject perhaps, but from which one cannot be entirely free.
To uncover what now appears necessary and see it in its contingent ori-
gins includes both the descriptive analysis as well as a potential for libera-
tion. Nietzsche offers a sense of a kind of personal transformation we can 
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make in response to our historical origin: “The best we can do is confront 
our inherited and hereditary nature with our knowledge of it, and through 
a new, stern discipline combat our inborn heritage and implant in ourselves 
a new habit, a new instinct, a second nature, so that our first nature withers 
away.”52 This is a type of self-overcoming, where one rallies one’s forces 
toward one goal and masters those bad historical habits in which one has 
been raised. Likewise, in the Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche argues that “If 
we have our own why or life, we shall get along with almost any how,” a 
dictum Frankl will stress in his survivor memoir and logotherapy master-
piece Man’s Search for Meaning.53 While not necessarily somaesthetic, these 
kinds of statements encourage seeing the self as choosing a path and organ-
izing its forces to achieve it. “The formula of my happiness: a Yes, a No, 
a straight line, a goal.” 54 Such discussions appear to be a kind of self-help 
discourse for those not beset by the sickliness of our age.
Yet at the same time, as with his discussion of health, there are discussions 
in Nietzsche that argue against the idea that any kind of masterful “self” even 
exists. The illusion of a stable identity that lies beneath the vicissitudes of the 
joyous, painful, and mortal body is needed to support certain ideologies of 
health. If health is a background state that permits me to engage in my projects, 
I might be tempted to fall into dualism, seeing the healthy body as a nicely 
functioning car I drive around in to get my destinations. When my car breaks 
down, I am inconvenienced, but I am still me. It also seems to suggest that 
bodies might differ, as cars do, but the passengers are all alike. Such a model is 
often supported in popular language where one “fights” the disease, where one 
is encouraged to “take charge” of one’s health as if the healthy body were an 
object one can battle or master that is separate from the willing subject.
Peter Sedgwick writes that “A philosophy worthy of the name, Nietzsche 
thus argues, must celebrate embodiment in all its most painful possibilities, 
for suffering and illness are connected in an essential way to human iden-
tity.”55 He goes on to describe the experience of a dementia unit in the U.K. 
where the “victim of dementia” increasingly loses their “ability to narrate 
their own life…” but still continues to persist living.56 The commanding 
self-conscious self is lost, but there certainly remains a will to continue with 
life. This existence that is increasingly a loss of self, or at least a loss of the 
sense of a commanding unitary self, cannot help to bring us to an existential 
anxiety that can be more acute than the fear of death. Sedgwick argues that 
medical practice would benefit from giving up the idea of a stable identity:
The frailty of embodiment made manifest by individual suffering and 
vulnerability to disease shocks us into the uncomfortable acknowl-
edgment of our own finitude. To be human, in other words, means to 
respond to the travails of arbitrary suffering (i.e., the casual onslaughts 
of pain that embodiment necessarily entails) by seeking meaning.57
Identity, both the identity of the self and the idea of an identity to health, 
misleads medical practice.
144 Alternative visions of health-somaesthetics
Modern medicine’s most pervasive and dubious metaphysical presuppo-
sition likewise resides here, for modern medicine’s conception of health 
presupposes a stable and definable selfhood hidden behind the shifting 
and mysterious vicissitudes of the suffering body that, as Nietzsche’s 
explorations of the domain of identity reveal, is a pure chimera.58
I do not desire my current self-conscious sense of self-possession to change 
since it is unclear what that would mean. Yet, to reflect upon my life so far 
is to realize how much of who I think I am is not a matter of my self-posses-
sion but rather an infinitely varied set of circumstances that radiate around 
each moment of my life: where I happened to be born, to whom, the nature 
of my body, what changes in culture, politics, the randomness of meeting 
certain people at certain times. If one is interested in creating, be it “dan-
gerously” as Camus lectures, or in self-care somaesthetics, it might be most 
valuable to exit our sense of self-possession to find new openings.
It was noted above that many take up Foucault’s interest in care of the self 
as a possible bulwark against the normalizing discourse in our contempo-
rary neoliberal biopolitical world. Shusterman’s earlier work reflected that 
he had not read later Foucault. Instead, as with Nietzsche, Shusterman also 
discusses how some parts of Foucault seem to engage in the same move to 
celebrate the unintentional and extreme over conscious deliberation. Shus-
terman presents Foucault as overemphasizing the unconscious and wild ele-
ments of embodiment, as opposed to the more delicate and deliberate work 
of self-transformation. Shusterman argues that what Foucault discovers in 
considering self-care is how it mirrors philosophical work that destabilizes 
a cohesive sense of self.59 Thus, one cannot really develop oneself: rather it 
seems the creative project in Foucault is to dismantle the self.
Foucault’s use of limit-experiences, such as taking drugs and sadomas-
ochism, can be seen as ways in which he pursued a body without a mind. 
Foucault contrasts his limit-experiences with phenomenology. Phenomenol-
ogy is guilty of clinging to the subject, trying to “organize perception” and 
“grasp the significance of daily experience in order to reaffirm the funda-
mental character of the subject.”60 Instead of this limited, unimaginative, 
Cartesian approach, Foucault celebrates the philosophies of Nietzsche, Bat-
aille, and Blanchot who “try through experience to reach that point of life 
which lies as close as possible to the impossibility of living, which lies at 
the limit or extreme.”61 Foucault argues that such authors provide a way to 
“‘tearing’ the subject from itself in such a way that it is no longer the subject 
as such, or that it is completely ‘other’ than itself so that it may arrive at its 
annihilation, its dissociation.”62 Shusterman argues against this extremism 
in Foucault in Body Consciousness by arguing that Foucault takes up a 
common contemporary cultural obsession with the best somatic experience 
being that of “radicalization and violent sensationalism.”63 Foucault sees 
direct and intimate connection with bodily experiences as philosophically 
revelatory; he prizes the disunity of the subject (qua self-controlled agent) 
to the chaotic and uncontrollable body.
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Unlike somaesthetics which has a practical application in one’s life, it is 
hard to integrate such discussions into a critical reception of wellness doctrines 
that would have relevance for personal practice and social policy. Even if one 
accepts there are innumerable healths and many selves—what would this mean 
for how someone who seeks to live their life authentically? At the end of “Cre-
ate Dangerously,” Camus writes that the artists may need to stay in combat 
to find themselves, “‘Every wall is a door,’ Emerson correctly said. Let us now 
look for the door, and the way out, anywhere but in the wall against which we 
are living.”64 For Camus, the tension the artist faces is that of being in reality 
but also extending beyond it. In the case of thinking of oneself as having “innu-
merable healths” and possibly many selves, the ambiguity is how to live with 
these possibilities in the world. What tenuous positions can we take without 
subsuming our freedom into obedience to the good health imperative, obedi-
ence to just one of our rich ways of being a self, or obedience to the whims of 
our mercurial physical natures? Chapter 7 will explore reasons to return to the 
question of freedom more seriously as a critical and existential imperative.
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7 Toward an existential ethics 
of working on the self
Existential anxiety and bracketing the good health imperative
Another writer, in a much darker mood, also writes about walls. In Fyo-
dor Dostoevsky’s, Notes from Underground, the first-person narrator—the 
underground man—rails against bull-like men who tell him that the truths 
of math and science are the final word. The underground man—awkward, 
isolated, and painfully self-conscious—could not be more opposite to these 
confident purveyors of truth. In replying to his futile railings against the 
trials of his existence, the strong rational men, reply with—“Nature doesn’t 
ask your advice. She isn’t interested in whether or not you approve of her 
laws. You must accept nature as she is with all the consequences that that 
implies.”1 Yet, as the underground man points out, stating the facts of a wall 
does not make the wall therapeutic:
But, good Lord, what do I care about the laws of nature and arithmetic 
if I have my reasons for disliking them, including the one about two 
and two make four! Of course, I won’t be able to breach this wall with 
my head if I’m not strong enough….As if such a wall could really leave 
me resigned and bring me peace of mind because it is the same as twice 
two makes four. How stupid can one get?2
The underground man’s increasing alienation from society is due in part 
to his refusal, or inability, to accept socially determined ideas of scientific 
“fact” as meaningful. He neither accommodates himself to the truth, nor 
does he expect this free choice will produce any outcome other than more 
misery. We find, after reading his shameful accounts of his youth, he refrains 
from further social interaction, staying in his room for the rest of his days.
The underground man points out that the bull-like man, the one who 
accepts and adjusts his behavior to nature, remains like every other man. 
His absurd and counterproductive behavior in the face of these “laws” 
defines the underground man as an individual, even if this individual is a 
rather pitiful character. It is only within irrational action that the under-
ground man finds his freedom. In the underground man’s anxious soliloquy 
on his own nature, he wonders if he should change himself even if he can:
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…I felt I was already up against the wall; that it was horrible but 
couldn’t be otherwise; that there was no way out and it was no longer 
possible to make myself into a different person; that even if there were 
still time enough to change myself; and that, even if I wanted to, I still 
wouldn’t have done anything about it, because actually, there wasn’t 
anything to change into.3
One might see the existentialist view of how to live as one of freedom, but 
a freedom without purpose given the world provides us with no meaning in 
itself. This absurdity of our existence could lead one, perhaps, to a kind of 
nihilism about the value of any action.
Camus writes that the world appears absurd, but this is not the case. It is 
rather remote from our desire for clarity and purpose.
I said that the world is absurd, but I was too hasty. This world in itself 
is not reasonable, that is all that can be said. But what is absurd is the 
confrontation of this irrational and wild longing for clarity whose call 
echoes in the human heart.4
In a similar vein, the famous death of god passage in Nietzsche’s The Gay 
Science has a madman crying at “many who did not believe” to awaken 
them to the ramifications of disbelief. To draw their attention to how signif-
icant disbelief is, he asks the fellow non-believers questions:
What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? 
Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away from all 
suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, 
in all directions? Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying, as 
through an infinite nothing?5
Can one really establish what is valuable in a world deprived of an absolute 
source of sense? The death of god can be seen as the death of an inherent 
meaning where we are now left to “become gods” as the madman says in 
order to create our own values in the world. To answer the underground 
man’s question—if we are not obligated to do what we are told is good or 
follow convention, what then should we do? If we can change, whom shall 
we change into?
Edmund Husserl called for phenomenologists to engage in a method 
called the epoché—a bracketing of previous forms of philosophy in order 
to “get at the things themselves.” When one examines a perception, one 
should avoid investment in the reality or value of the perception—say if the 
tree I am looking at is as it appears—and focus instead on the structure and 
nature of any perceptual experience to highlight the necessary and contin-
gent features of what it is to experience. One can also bracket moral invest-
ments. One goal of this book was to foster a more critical attitude toward 
the ethics and policies of the good health imperative. Since promoting health 
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appears so obviously valuable, the claims of the good health imperative are 
not always examined. In conclusion, I want to think through what existen-
tial alternatives might appear if we bracket the universal moral imperative 
associated with self-directed good health labor.
This book had moved between two themes regarding the good health 
imperative. One theme is the value, pleasures, and possibilities inherent in 
working on one’s health. Creating greater capacities to go forth in a home-
like manner in the world can be a result of some self-directed health work. 
Moreover, as we are fragile beings easily able to suffer from illness, health 
work can help provide both a protection against illness as well as alleviating 
anxiety about our condition. As discussed in Chapter 6, working on one’s 
health in a creative fashion might be a means in which to explore new, 
aesthetic styles of living. On the other part, this book has examined critical 
analyses of the good health imperative. The overwhelming disparities in the 
US on basic healthcare and protection against COVID-19 underline that it 
is not solely at the level of the individual that health is won or lost, but at 
the systemic level. Focusing on individual work and performance to pro-
duce good health increases ableism, racism, and classism by assuming those 
with good health have “deserved” it and likewise those without it haven’t 
made enough effort. Population management for the economic benefit of 
the wealthy encourages limiting social solutions in favor of increasing the 
workload on the individual.
The idea of a constant need to work on all the aspects of one’s life—health, 
relationships, career prospects, education, mental well-being—makes indi-
viduals see themselves as the source of and solution to all suffering. If one 
has not achieved “results” from working on the self, then what is demanded 
is not to look out, but to put one’s head down and work more. A significant 
amount of discussion has surrounded the concern about the medicalization 
of all aspects of our lives under the need for ever better health. Does a life of 
testing and submission to every possible medical protocol make sense? Does 
such medicalization create illnesses?6 The good health imperative encour-
ages social and political compliance since suffering is never directed out-
ward, but now, always inward toward the individual. Everything becomes 
a matter of individual will; all problems can be treated as problems of the 
body and not problems of the social world. In such a manner a critical 
examination of the good health imperative lies both within concerns about 
the reach of the healthcare apparatus and within concerns about neoliberal 
political systems of oppression.
Yet developing oneself purposefully is not always the handmaiden of capi-
talist motivations or socially repressive ones that encourage the view that the 
problem lies within rather than without. Dedicating some time to self-care 
can be transformative and provide one greater capacities for a richer expe-
rience. At minimum, it might simply make life more livable. However, given 
that one can always improve one’s health with finer and finer refinement, it is 
hard to know what limits to put on such a project. Due to the possible end-
lessness of the demand, what kind of labor on the self is worthwhile? How 
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can one accept the existential value of individual health work, and retain a 
critical perspective on such work? In this final chapter, I will explore the idea 
of good health work as an existentially ambiguous project that should be 
situated within the larger context of our shared social world. First, I will dis-
cuss how heteronormativity and ableism are emboldened by a narrow view 
of lives worth living. The idea of normative paths, drawn from Sara Ahmed’s 
work provides of model of how the good health imperative is about a kind 
of directionality. Simone de Beauvoir’s discussion of roles and ambiguity in 
The Ethics of Ambiguity draws our attention toward the pitfalls of pre-es-
tablished paths and the possibilities of accepting our ambiguous condition. 
The path this book problematized the most was the idea of health as a kind 
of work one does on the self. In appealing to Hannah Arendt’s critique of 
work and labor in The Human Condition, I highlight that thinking is often 
overlooked in our interest in work. In conclusion, I turn toward our vulnera-
bility rather than our capacity for self-directed work on the self, and explore 
how that might transform how we think about our responsibility for health.
Paths and fitting
One of the ways in which the good health imperative shapes us is it provides 
us what direction a life well lived should take. While certainly a life of health 
and vitality is ceteris paribus preferable to one of illness and suffering, one can 
question if the work involved in producing that life might be spent in other 
projects or investments. I argue that this is particularly the case when one 
considers the very thing such work cannot eliminate—one’s eventual death. 
Imagine witnessing a eulogy of a good friend and hearing a tribute to how well 
she kept her blood pressure within normal levels or her good work eating in 
order to maintain an ideal weight instead of the impact her life had on others. 
One would be perhaps horrified, but at least one would find such comments 
bizarre—why mention such things? Such work in her life may have permitted 
her to do things otherwise she could not have, perhaps to have lived longer 
and better, but is this how she would want to be remembered?
In addition, the idea that one’s individual agency can and should be 
directed toward the production of better health encourages seeing all bod-
ies as bodies of possible intervention for future flexibility and adaptability 
to our current social and economic situation. Critical disability theory has 
drawn attention to how ideals of health are almost always tied to ideals 
of the right “kind” of workers. Robert McRuer illustrates how the idea of 
creating a future orientated worker who is not only able-bodied, but flexi-
ble to any new situation that arises encourages both compulsory able-bod-
iedness and compulsory heterosexuality.7 In a similar fashion, Sara Ahmed 
discusses the manner in which certain paths are drawn in advance for us as 
trajectories for what a “good” life is.8
Heteronormativity depends upon a set of implicit norms around gender 
and sexual orientation. Ahmed writes that that assumption that humans are 
all straight is a background created by repeated acts of “straightness.” She 
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asserts that “Following Husserl, we could say that heterosexuality functions 
as a background, as that which is behind actions that are repeated over time 
and with force, and that insofar as it is behind does not come into view.”9 To 
become straight is a matter of learning patterns of behavior. What we learn 
in our upbringing that is reinforced in adult social life is how to “become 
straight.”10 Sex is given to us as “homework” in which we must learn appro-
priate behaviors, attitudes, and desires. Ahmed writes that, “compulsory 
heterosexuality operates as a straightening devise, which rereads signs of 
queer desire as deviations from the straight line.”11 These acts of straight-
ening are not just acts in a moment; they orientate us. We can think of how 
the heterosexual norms can be read a series of destination points along a 
route—the first opposite sex romantic experience, dating, marriage, and 
then children. These norms are not just about sexuality; they are about how 
one should organize one’s life. As such, heteronormativity extends beyond 
sexual orientation to how societies are structured. The acts demanded to 
create the background appear obvious as they are learnt in development 
and socialization and thus appear as things are, as discussed in reference 
to docility in Chapter 4. Who receives the benefits of this organization are 
unlikely to want to see its nature be revealed as contingent.
Queerness disrupts organization—it makes the background become 
apparent and even in inclusive spaces is often marked out and noted as 
different. Individuals who do not engage in the acts of heterosexual part-
nership makes the path of such partnership become a path, not the path. 
In critical phenomenology, stress is placed upon the need to understand 
the phenomenological attention to experience in such a manner that what 
is hidden in plain sight—the organization of our social world—becomes 
capable of being examined. In other words, to bring backgrounds into focus 
often does not expose something buried deep that motivates discrimina-
tion, but rather something all too present that shapes our worlds as a kind 
of atmosphere. In such a manner, seeing the straightening device of com-
pulsory heterosexuality is not simply a matter of changing beliefs, but a 
matter of changing how lives are lived and understood and advocating for 
different possibilities. Ahmed writes that things appear “correct” when they 
are “rightly” aligned—that is when they repeat the normative paths, but it 
is when we understand this as a historical process and not a given that we 
can see this alignment as not natural; we can imagine other possibilities.12
The critical phenomenological project brings into focus how those 
backgrounds have created benefits for those who live seamlessly in them. 
Long-standing sexist, heteronormative, ableist, and racist institutions are 
comfortable for many because their orientation and organization is taken 
for granted and those who have benefited from them are reluctant to change 
for fear of losing their privileges. Ahmed examines how living outside the 
paths of compulsory heterosexuality and sexism interrupt the sexist struc-
turing of our society.13 Those who deviate are not just read as different or 
morally repugnant, they are threats—they disrupt the happiness of others. 
Feminists are famous for being killjoys—a term Ahmed takes up for herself 
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and other killjoys.14 Everything from refusing to laugh at sexist jokes to 
refusing to ignore institutional discrimination makes people uncomfortable. 
It disrupts the flow of business as usual. One can think here of the violent 
and extreme reaction to Black Lives Matter (BLM) in the United States. 
BLM demands attention to systemic violence against Black and Brown peo-
ple in the United States and it refuses to be absorbed into some trite decla-
ration of “all lives matter.” Some white people have gone out of their way to 
denounce it, to label it as terrorist, to take up arms against protestors, even 
though many of these people have no objective reason to feel threatened. 
BLM protests do not threaten their lives, their livelihoods, or their children’s 
well-being. Rather the threat is an organizational threat—it brings what for 
white people operates as a background into uncomfortable focus. Racism 
is, as Helen Ngo discusses, a habit, a style of being that resists change.15 
Pointing out racist systems means former patterns of behavior that seemed 
“normal” are now pushed into the forefront. They thus, like illness, inter-
rupt everyday projects and styles of being and are felt as intrusive to those 
who have long had the privilege not to consider them.
Health is a curious thing to actively not want if one understands health 
as an absence of illness. Within the mantra of the inherent value of healthy 
self-labor, it is hard to get a clear picture of how attention toward the pro-
motion of this value and its attendant paths of “good healthy behavior” 
entail a removal of focus on other issues. On the personal level, it can erase 
considerations of what one could do other than this project of health. On a 
social level, this focus makes it hard to see the systemic reasons that create 
possible healthy futures for some a likely path and for others not. Personal 
health promotion is the most achievable for those who have the leisure 
time and disposable income. As the economic divide between rich and poor 
grows, so too do health outcomes.16 While certainly the need for better 
healthcare services would greatly aid the situation of the poor, many are 
still fixated by the notion that what they most need first and foremost is 
better consumption. For instance, the British celebrity chef Jamie Oliver 
is famous (or infamous) for turning his attention toward the betterment 
of children’s diets.17 Oliver likes to point out that his proposals, such as 
limiting junk food advertising and sin-taxing sugary drinks, are “common 
sense.”18 There is concrete evidence linking better diets to better health out-
comes and increasingly worrisome news about the rate of childhood obe-
sity and its likely lifelong implications. Proposals for better consumption 
are not necessarily unjust, but they tend to concentrate our focus on the 
issues of nutrition and diet in isolation. Systemic issues such as poverty are 
not ignored, but rather not seen as a situations that pervade all choices. 
The guiding principle seems to be that at least you would not be poor and 
unhealthy.
My university is becoming smoke-free this year. When I started 20 years 
ago, the buildings still had the remnants of being part of the tobacco belt; 
we had smoking rooms in most classroom buildings, and one could buy 
cigarettes at the student union. The rooms are closed; cigarettes are no 
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longer sold, and now one cannot smoke on-campus at all. In this same time, 
research has found that the initial wave of research documenting a reduction 
in heart attacks in a smoke-free town (leading to the widely publicized con-
clusion that smoke-free areas save lives) has been shown to be misleading. 
The largest comparative study in 2010 by the Rand Corporation found “no 
evidence that legislated U.S. smoking bans were associated with short-term 
reductions in hospital admissions for acute myocardial infarction or other 
diseases in the elderly, children or working age adults.”19 Little evidence has 
been able to support the cherished ideas that smoking bans promote health 
because second hand smoke is dangerous.20 Like most college campuses in 
the United States, the impact of this ban on the campus will be slight. Fewer 
and fewer students smoke, and fewer and fewer faculty and staff do.
Is it the case that such bans are really about health promotion, or simply 
about adherence to the norm of health promotion? The masses’ poor health 
must be understood in relation to the good health of the wealthy. Insofar 
as any one person could improve her health cannot be taken as a reason 
to think of public health outside the history of how the good health of the 
wealthy is connected to their wealth and privilege in turn which is based 
in the lack of resources of the poor. A critical phenomenological bracket-
ing over the concern about whether or not individuals made the “right” 
choice can help look at the situation of different classes. To examine the dis-
junction in health outcomes exposes differences in situations. The well-off 
have situations that permit the time, resources, and environment to improve 
one’s health and opportunity for varied pleasures.
As outlined in Chapter 1, Guthman notes how the obsession with personal 
behavior, in particular the personal behavior of the poor and unhealthy, 
has occurred alongside the rollback of social services for those very poor.21 
While the reasons for social service rollback are politically complex, given 
that access to high quality medical care is strongly associated with longevity 
the constant focus on the data that documents certain behaviors—smoking, 
diet, exercise—returns the conversation again and again to the individual’s 
behavior and not the individual’s situation as not having access to quality 
medical care, good working conditions, low stress, clean water, clean air, 
safe and affordable housing, and safe streets. While smoking remains the 
most preventable cause of early death, is it the case that one can abstract 
smoking from the individual’s milieu any more than one can discuss drug 
addiction without attention to the addict’s personal story?
Bracketing the moral value of any person engaging in healthy self-care 
does not mean that it is not a worthwhile endeavor. It also would not be to 
argue against good public health funding or various initiatives to encourage 
healthy behavior. Bracketing helps expose the path of healthy self-care as 
a path of privilege. Punitive charges such as higher insurance now become 
questionable instead of a “common sense” means to promote healthy 
behavior. I argue that we should see such body work as voluntary but not 
as a prerequisite to receive the same kind of treatment, care, and approval 
as others do. One could see such a move to bracket the moral value of such 
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self-care work as similar to the feminist revision of beauty work. Many 
receive aesthetic and personal pleasures from such work. The idea that we 
could determine “good” and “bad” beauty work in some absolute fashion 
seems hard to imagine. At most, we could think about such work in con-
text and consider if at times this work can be liberating or demeaning. The 
important feminist claim is to argue vehemently against the idea of the 
value of a woman as being based upon her performance of such work.22 In 
the case of health, loosening the grip of healthism would likewise permit a 
wider appreciation of different bodies and encourage looking away from 
individual consumption toward the larger situation in which that consump-
tion takes place.
Paths operate as a means for the socially privileged to maintain their sta-
tus quo. Since one can claim one has no racist or sexist views, one can con-
tinue living in a world that privileges whiteness, maleness, and straightness 
with a free conscience. Calling into question such habitual styles of social 
organization is met with resistance because it seems unjust—“I’m not a 
racist, I’m just living my life!” Paths help one “unnotice” the path itself—its 
directionality is not seen as a direction, but simply what is. Attending to the 
paths laid in advance requires more effortful critical reflection if that path 
suits one’s desires, social situation, and ambitions. If one sees the world as 
being rightly aligned, one is unlikely to see the ways in which this is not the 
case for all subjects. In Chapters 4 and 5, I discussed how the serving the 
economic interests of the few in capitalism creates worlds where individuals 
are to be managed in order to extract the greatest profit from them. Individ-
uals who are deemed replaceable, such as worker–producers are invisible in 
the paths of self-promotion qua individual economic and physical perfec-
tion. Individuals who hold no economic benefit, like the elderly or the disa-
bled, are disposable, as we can see so blatantly in the COVID-19 pandemic.
Critical phenomenology also draws upon critical disability theory to 
complicate the seeming naturalness of some phenomenological descrip-
tions. Christine Wieseler argues that this is a problem with many interpre-
tations of phenomenology that come from Merleau-Ponty:
Merleau-Ponty seeks to clarify the characteristics of the “normal” sub-
ject, locating normality at the level of the individual. This is opposed to 
what many disability activists and theorists hold to be a central tenet: 
normality and disability are not traits of individual bodies but are 
instead the results of social values, attitudes, and practices that enable 
some types of bodies and disable others.23
As argued in previous chapters, the focus on ideals of fit and capacity drawn 
from solitary endeavors like playing tennis or riding a bike often pass over 
the complexly built environments in which those activities occur. Rosemarie 
Garland-Thomson speaks about the idea of misfitting and fitting in order to 
think critically about disability. In traditional phenomenologies, one could 
read “fit” when one can “naturally” extend out into the world and misfit 
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when one is ill, or disabled, and cannot. But the idea of fit/misfit better 
explores how extending out into the world is as dependent upon the world 
as upon one’s inherent capacity toward it. “Misfitting serves to theorize dis-
ability as a way of being in an environment, as a material arrangement.”24 A 
welcoming environment depends upon built spaces, buildings, roads, com-
munication devices, policies, procedures, laws, and the social world. The 
literal paths to a home, a store, or a workplace are designed for certain 
kinds of bodies, but this is neither necessary nor natural.
The good health imperative, as discussed in Chapter 2, also includes the 
idea that while disabled persons might be blameless, unlike those considered 
to have violated the standards of proper self-care, they are also individuals 
to make fit. As research develops into ways that we can perform genomic 
testing, alter fetuses in utero, and alter disabled bodies to better resemble 
able-bodied persons, we can see this too as the “path” for which disabled 
persons should embark upon willingly. The idea that a disability is always a 
reduced kind of being, instead of a different kind of being is most glaringly 
seen when prenatal testing is used to abort fetuses who have a likelihood 
of having future disabilities. The assumption is that the life of such children 
will be an unhappy one and the life of parenting will be suffering as well. As 
discussed above in reference to heteronormativity and sexism, the idea that 
disabled lives are doomed to be unhappy is about a sense of direction—of 
the path that life should take. Rosemarie Garland-Thomson explains these 
tests as “the modern existential dilemma” where we are presented with 
opportunities to manage future life in ways unthinkable before.25 Being 
able to extend into the world is a matter of what kind of body one has but 
also what kind of social world one finds oneself in, including what kind of 
orientation we associate with well-lived lives.
The rise of more and more complex medical testing permits humans to 
remove diversity in order to conform to ideas of what kinds of bodies are 
acceptable. Health functions not so much as the alleviation of suffering, but 
rather as an idea of what is a normal life course. For example, the use of 
prenatal tests to provide information to parents as to whether or not the 
fetus may have disabilities has already—and increasingly will—shape the 
nature of humanity. In The Atlantic, an article discusses the rapid decline 
of children with Down Syndrome being born in Denmark after universal 
prenatal screening was provided.26 Any parent-to-be worries about the life 
one’s future child will live. Being handed a list of possible complications 
and living in an ableist world naturally induces many parents to opt for 
abortions, even in a country like Denmark where extensive socialized med-
icine and a robust social welfare system exists. Garland-Thomson argues 
that testing tells one little about what kind of person, what kind of life, that 
fetus might have.
Yet, such a preemptive diagnosis doesn’t give us meaningful informa-
tion about that person’s capabilities, relationships, or actual lived life. 
Such genetic knowledge, like the knowledge that someone has the gene 
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for maleness, really predicts little about how a particular lived life actu-
ally unfolds: genetic knowledge tells us something, but not very much.27
The wild contingency of existence has yet to be determined. Insofar as such 
decisions are made based in a view of health as progression, as betterment, 
we might ask what we lose when we accept this as our direction and the 
direction for others. We also fail to consider what kind of worlds we build, 
and how we are free to imagine and create worlds that do not yet exist. 
Studying the parents who decided to abort after having prenatal testing in 
Denmark, researchers found that they often assumed the worst possible sce-
narios for the future child, “In a study of 21 women who chose abortion after 
a prenatal diagnosis of Down Syndrome, she found that they had tended to 
base their decisions on worst-case scenarios.”28 Testing reduces the possible 
child down solely to one possibility where if any likelihood of the worst 
case exists, the life is deemed untenable. Certainly, whether to continue a 
pregnancy or not is a personal question and not one that is merely about 
conformity to ableism or openness to diversity. Likewise, serious conditions 
are possible with Down Syndrome. Yet, it is striking how quick the end of 
Down Syndrome has come in Denmark given these prenatal tests, and this 
certainly tells us something about the difficulty parents have in imagining 
happy lives for themselves and their, possibly, disabled children.
Roles, ambiguity, and natality
Beauvoir does not locate freedom in satisfying one’s consumption or pro-
ducing what has been predetermined as valuable. Rather, freedom is the 
capacity to be authentic to one’s ambiguous condition. Like Dostoevsky’s 
Underground Man, Nietzsche’s madman, and Camus’ view of an unreason-
able universe, Beauvoir thinks that before answering what a good life is and 
whether it is worth living, one must first wrestle with freedom.29 The idea 
that the world is absurd is a declaration of a relativist incapacity to estab-
lish any sense, leaving us able to change but without direction of how we 
should change. Yet for Beauvoir, we only can intellectually occupy this kind 
of space. I do not live as if everything is meaningless, even if I might assert 
it in theory. Beauvoir appeals to the idea of ambiguity rather than Camus’ 
idea of unreasonableness. “To declare that existence is absurd is to deny 
that it can ever be given a meaning; to say that it is ambiguous is to assert 
that its meaning is never fixed, that is must be constantly won.”30 The dif-
ference between absurdity and ambiguity is that absurdity suggests nothing 
is better or worse than anything else. The idea that an existentialist ethics 
makes all choices equally valid is sensible only if removed from our experi-
ences. Our existence is situated, and as such, it is imbued with significance. 
Any life is pervaded by meanings and values learned in one’s upbringing, 
one’s culture, one’s education, and one’s social group. Certainly, at times, 
working on one’s blood pressure through exercise can seem a rather futile 
act if one thinks about something as grand as the universe’s meaning, but 
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this is merely a momentary reverie. In one’s everyday life, one’s investments 
are meaningful. Even in the most philosophical of moods, I do not find 
what I am going to have for lunch as relevant as the illness of my loved one. 
This threat of relativism only makes sense in the abstract. In actual life, I am 
always already invested in my situation, my history, my relationships, and 
my embodied condition.
We act in the world through following paths laid out for us and thus rein-
forcing them, or embarking upon different less common paths, or by forg-
ing new ones. In these actions, we constitute what is meaningful. Beauvoir 
writes that “…freedom realizes itself only by engaging itself in the world: 
to such as extent that man’s project toward freedom is embodied for him in 
definite acts of behavior.”31 The textbook example of not being free, being 
imprisoned, highlights the importance of the possibility of action. Thus, 
freedom is not just about some internal capacity of “free will” but impor-
tantly if one can follow one’s intentions to act in the world. As such, our 
freedom is both made possible and limited by others—by whether or not 
their actions, projects, votes, and lifestyles permit our own. In our actions, 
we shape the world both for ourselves and others. As Ahmed describes the 
backgrounding of heteronormativity as a series of acts repeated over time to 
establish well-trodden routes of normality, Beauvoir highlights how when 
we see our acts as subject to freedom, they become ambiguous paths. We 
can commit to retreading them to continue affirming pre-existing meaning, 
or we can step off the well-trodden path to walk a new one.
In The Ethics of Ambiguity, Beauvoir outlines a series of “men”—kinds 
of roles that people fall into, which are manners of refusing the ambiguity of 
human existence: the sub-man, the serious man, the nihilist, the adventurer, 
and the passionate man. We might add today—the devotee of health. Each 
role provides a valuable psychological benefit to the individual—it frees the 
person from wrestling with certain kinds of freedom and from engaging in 
honest, vulnerable, and equitable relationships with others. We can think 
here of a boss who takes his charge so seriously he refuses to acknowledge 
the costs of his decisions on individual lives in the name of the well-being 
of the company. Or, based in concern over dire statistics, insurance compa-
nies push various kinds of higher costs for “bad” behaviors related to poor 
health outcomes. Beauvoir does not suggest we should reject scientific facts 
or the condition of our bodies as irrelevant, but she does not think that our 
bodies determine our paths, writing, “…the body itself is not a brute fact. 
It expresses our relationship to the world, and that is why it is an object of 
sympathy or repulsive. And on the other hand, it determines no behavior.”32 
Certainly, the nature of my body and the nature of the changes it undergoes 
in my life affect my experience and my possibilities. At the same time, the 
meaning of my embodied life extends far beyond my skin. My history, my 
relationships, and my actions have all determined who I am, what I desire, 
what I plan to do, and how I understand myself. These non-bodily parts 
of my sense of self cannot be explained by reference back to the material 
givens of my body.
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One role that encompasses many of the kind of “meaningful” ideas of 
what good lives look like are ones wherein one defines oneself as a certain 
kind of worker and then organizes one’s identity accordingly: a teacher; a 
politician; a musician; a scientist. Other areas of one’s life—such as health 
or parenting—are likewise conscious work projects to be taken up as seri-
ously as one’s paid labor is. Hannah Arendt argues that contemporary ide-
ologies are concerned largely with work and labor, but that in so doing, 
they fail to address what make our human lives unique and valuable to 
us beyond the ways in which they might continue to serve to sustain our 
physical existence. Her idea of the importance of natality provides another 
way to stress the point raised by Garland-Thomson about the existential 
uncertainty of the life that will follow any birth.
The seeming political neutrality and evident value of health encourage 
working for it without reflection. In the critical phenomenological tradi-
tion, we can stop to reflect upon this drive to not think about health criti-
cally. In this space, one can ask about the work required by the good health 
imperative. Arendt thinks of labor as the cyclical work that sustains human 
existence—what for Marx would be reproductive labor. Work is the creation 
of objects, sometimes in the service of labor, and other times for their own 
sake—such as in the case of art. Objects of work often have lives that extend 
beyond those that create them. Arendt thinks contemporary society’s focus 
on life and the possible pleasures from it have created a consumer-based soci-
ety of labor, where work plays the subservient role. Our current society of 
consumption makes all work labor as the “leveling of all human activities 
to the common denominator of securing the necessities of life and providing 
for their abundance.”33 In this society of consumption, the artist is “the only 
‘worker’ left in a laboring society.”34 If we are no longer obligated by religion 
or social traditions to venerate religious or cultural products of work, then 
we are freed to just attend to our mortal existence and its pleasures and pains.
Marx, for Arendt, was mistaken in thinking that if humans were to be 
freed from the crushing nature of hard labor and provided free time, they 
would fill it with noble pursuits. Instead, we have become a society of end-
less waste consumption. We find that we do not, like Marx perhaps envi-
sioned, become amateur artists freed from constant toil, but we instead 
simply consume more. “A hundred years after Marx, we know the fallacy 
of this reasoning; the spare time of the animal laborans is never spent in 
anything but consumption, and the more time to left to him, the greedier 
and more craving his appetites.”35 Work in this manner becomes merely 
how to satisfy our desires, not devoted to the creation of new products for 
their own sake. Dorothea Olkowski summarizes Arendt’s views saying that:
As Arendt points out, when there is no distinction between menial tasks 
and the making of durable things, between skilled and unskilled, man-
ual and intellectual tasks, then social has arrived at a one-dimensional 
point of view, the social point of view, for which all things belong to the 
natural life process as objects of consumption.36
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One can see such a world in the high estimation of salary over occupation. 
If one earns a good salary, if one is able to consume a great deal; ergo, one 
is successful. Arendt argues that in this kind of society life and its happiness 
qua consumption have become the highest goods.37 For the good health 
imperative, we can see that one typically needs no justification to argue for 
the value of health; it is assumed that the promotion of the pleasures of 
health are evident and that we would pursue its extension as a primary goal. 
In such a manner, all work is work in service of the citizen as consumer 
since much of health work, like beauty work, is deeply intertwined with 
purchasing products and programs.
From an existential point of view, why not attend only to one’s life and 
one’s health via consumption, as one is now freed from the need to obey 
antiquated traditions for their own sake? For Arendt, what such activity 
fails to do is think. Work devoted to an end already affirmed by the group, 
here attending to one’s health as an obligation, is when thinking stops, or 
in phenomenological terms, when one fails to bracket one’s pre-existing 
conceptions. In a society of labor, thinking becomes, like art, superfluous. 
To make this case, Arendt distinguishes cognition from thought. Cognition 
“always pursues a definite end.”38 Once this end is reached, “the cogni-
tive process has come to an end.”39 Hence, cognition is the mental activity 
attached to work and labor with a predetermined goal. Thought, on the 
contrary, “has neither an end nor an aim outside itself.”40 Arendt locates 
thought as an endless activity:
The activity of thinking is as relentless and repetitive as life itself, and 
the question whether thought has any meaning at all constitutes the 
same unanswerable riddle as the question for the meaning of life; its 
processes permeate the whole of human existence so intimately that its 
beginning and end coincide with the beginning and end of human life 
itself.41
As such, thought is valueless to ideologies that prize results, such as the 
“the lovers of the results of the sciences” or products, such as the affection 
for work.42 Since thought does not produce things that can be consumed 
or “solved,” it is held in little regard. Without a guiding principle behind 
thought, it can become, as Arendt noted above, a kind of endless project. It 
does not definitively answer the question that haunts existentialist thought 
as epitomized in the underground man’s questioning—what is the meaning 
of life? What should one do with one’s life? For many existentialist writers, 
this groundlessness and lack of a clear “product” of thought becomes an 
alienating experience.
If one takes such theories as arguing for a relativist falling into an abyss 
when divorced from the sureness of a definitive “answer,” Arendt argues 
that one has failed to understand the generative power of thought. It is 
thought wherein Arendt finds the possibility of something new arising from 
human experience, rather than something that always already was to be 
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performed. The idea of the new as a birth, familiar since Socrates claim of 
being a midwife, is connected to the facticity of actual birth. Labor’s cyclical 
endless nature connects to the manner in which time exists before and after 
us—our short lives marking out a small moment. Work, while it can pro-
duce objects that extend beyond us, also tends to deemphasize our existen-
tial value—we become tools, or as Marx would say slaves, to the product 
of our labor. The birth of the new cuts into the cycles of work, labor, and 
nature—marking something whose tale is not predetermined and whose 
import cannot be known prior to its creation.
The oppression of thinking is part of totalitarian regimes, and it requires, 
importantly, the individual’s acceptance of non-thinking in order to follow 
such regimes. Famously, in her study of Eichmann, Arendt is struck, some-
times even to the point of humor, at his inability to speak and think. “The 
longer one listened to him, the more obvious it became that his inability 
to speak was closely connected with an inability to think, namely to think 
from the standpoint of someone else.” 43 Beauvoir likewise, associates a 
certain brand of “sub-men” as those who are blindly subservient to others. 
Sub-men follow whatever cause allows them to flee from “the agonizing 
consciousness” of themselves including the fact they could choose to make 
their own path.44 Elaine explores how for both Arendt and Beauvoir, the 
capacity to take the other’s perspective was critical to being able to fully 
think, and ultimately, to ethically engage with others politically.45 Eichmann 
appears unable or unwilling to think about his actions from any vantage 
point other than his own and like the sub-man refuses to be conscious of 
himself and hence cannot be conscious of others.
In our natural condition, we are caught in an endless cycle of maintaining 
life to only reach death. For Arendt, what saves us from the endless flow 
of life and death and a collapse of meaningful human interaction in the 
world is the fact of natality. The birth of a human being initiates the pos-
sibility of human active freedom from the repetitive forces of nature. “The 
miracle that saves the world, the realm of human affairs, from its normal, 
‘natural’ ruin is ultimately the fact of natality, in which the faculty of action 
is ontologically rooted.”46 Any new birth starts a story whose tale cannot 
be known in advance and whose story will change the course of other sto-
ries. “And this again is possible only because each man is unique, so that 
with each birth something uniquely new comes into the world.”47 The cycli-
cal patterns of nature— birth, death, growth, and decline encompass the 
human condition as well. However, human life has a linearity to it—a story 
with a beginning and an end that marks it as unique, unlike the repetitive 
cycles of the natural world.
The advent of a new person brings forward a new story; a story that 
has not been written before and whose end and import, we cannot tell 
in advance. We can see here how Garland-Thomson’s eloquent statement 
above regarding how little some genetic data tells us about the future of 
a child can be read now with Arendt’s idea of natality. Outside ideas of 
healthy bodies and lives directed toward certain kinds of work and certain 
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kinds of lives, we cannot know in advance the value of the new creation any 
birth might bring. The good health imperative has decided in advance that 
this kind of lifestyle and these kinds of bodies are valuable to produce and 
as such discourages thinking more broadly about what lives worth living 
are. Importantly for Arendt, the newness of natality is not about its connec-
tion to work or labor. In the above example, part of the reason for aborting 
fetuses who have risk factors for disabilities is the tight focus on lives worth 
living as being lives that will fit into our contemporary capitalist world. One 
clear path that orientates our lives since birth is the question that we con-
stantly ask any college student—what are you going to do post-graduation? 
By which we mean—what are you going to do to earn money? The focus on 
“responsible” parenting, discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, can be also seen as 
a way in which only some kinds of paths are considered valuable. If natality 
is the possibility of the new, the point of childrearing is not to produce a 
good citizen-consumer who will slide easily into the pre-existing system, but 
to permit the child the space to think and act beyond the pre-given values 
and lifestyles we currently promote.
Arendt ties the idea of birth again to her ideas of action where, with 
action, separate from the activity of work and labor, we can begin some-
thing new. Like human birth, this idea of action is always a social experi-
ence, and predicated upon the community of others in which my acts can 
take form. However, our free action, like our free thought, is not subject to 
the group in the way that one might be at work:
With word and deed we insert ourselves into the human world, and this 
insertion is like a second birth, in which we confirm and take upon our-
selves the naked fact of our original physical appearance. This insertion 
is not forced upon us by necessity, like labor, and it is not prompted by 
utility, like work. It may be stimulated by the presence of others whose 
company we may wish to join, but it is never conditioned by them; its 
impulse springs from the beginning which came into the world when 
we were born and to which we respond by beginning something new 
on our own initiative.48
For Arendt, the exclusive focus on labor and work in many contemporary 
societies has erased places in which the new can come into being through 
one’s own initiative. Free action for Arendt is the process of bringing some-
thing truly new to the world, not merely executing what has already been 
determined by others to be valuable. It is feared in totalitarian regimes 
because it cannot be controlled as it is not known what the action will be 
and what the outcome will be.
The reason why we are never able to foretell with certainty the outcome 
and end of any action is simply that action has no end. The process of 
a single deed can quite literally endure throughout time until mankind 
has come to an end.49
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Hence, we are lost in thought and action only if we assume that we must 
know their value, qua their purpose, in advance. The value of the new is 
that is has no pre-given purpose; it brings forth new values.
Arendt argues that thinking about politics has likewise become hampered 
in its reach because of its inability, in phenomenological terms she does 
not use, to bracket its purpose. Arendt draws inspiration from the Ancient 
Greeks who celebrated the political world of free action and speech as fun-
damentally distinct from any kind of labor or work.50 Once politics is tied 
to doing a particular thing, it has ceased to be about thinking and now is 
about work and labor. Arendt thinks that the long history of thinking politi-
cally has erased the idea of politics as a distinct practice from work. Instead, 
politics is about things that are actually not politics, but rather about labor 
and work concerns, such as fostering economic growth, safeguarding the 
citizenry, caring for people’s health, and building infrastructure. Political 
philosophies become manuals of how to best achieve these ends, not free 
discussion—“…the greater part of political philosophy since Plato could 
easily be interpreted as various attempts to find theoretical foundations and 
practical ways for an escape from politics altogether.”51 Politics is a matter 
of cognition in Arendt’s terms, not thought. Political discussion is thus not 
valued in itself as an existential experience, but is valued only if it achieves 
some aim.
Arendt argues that when we think politics must be concerned only with 
the maintenance of life, we reduce politics to a matter of necessity, about 
which there is no point arguing the value, rather only the mechanics of how 
to best go about this project. In Between Past and Future, she writes that 
we must have the courage to not give life the primary and exclusive focus in 
the political realm, not because of an indifference to life, but because of the 
nature of our worldly existence. “For this world of ours, because it existed 
before us and is meant to outlast our lives in it, simply cannot afford to 
give primary concern to individual lives and the interests connected with 
them…”52 Arendt says if we allow this conversation to dominate our polit-
ical thinking, we will be unable to think beyond it. Akin to the discussion 
on biopolitics in Chapter 4, we can see how management of the population 
in order to serve the economy now has become what is seen to be the only 
legitimate focus of political discussions.
It is not within pleasure or even the maintenance of my own life that I find 
freedom. Rather it is in the political world where I or my fellow humans act 
in such a manner that there is no carved place or practical end into which 
we can immediately understand. We are also encouraged within labor to 
not see ourselves connected to those who do not further our labor through 
our mutual work or who do not lesson our burdens. For Arendt, the respect 
for those whom we do not care for and with whom we do not work with 
is the hallmark of free political action instead of these people being help-
ers or stumbling blocks to get what we want which dominates work-labor 
cognition. When politics becomes a politics of not doing politics, politics 
is the servant of work and labor. Arendt notes that the worker and the 
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laborer see something like free political discussions not aimed at “solving” 
things as idle timewasting—what do such discussions do? What is the point, 
after all, of philosophy? Will it solve some “real-world” problems? Can its 
majors find paid labor? Here Arendt comes closer to the Marxist critique 
of capitalism where the tail wags the dog—that is, where politics follows 
corporate—not citizen—demands. The more politics is merely a function 
of ideologically serving repressive corporate interests by making us good 
workers, the less anything new will be thought. And the last and worst stage 
of labor’s valorization is the political obsession with job creation—where 
we are nothing but a society of jobholders with no individuality or possi-
bilities to think outside how we can best earn our paychecks to consume.53
Vulnerability and health
Ambiguity captures our nature as political beings, as Arendt discusses, and 
also our nature as ethical beings. Debra Bergoffen argues that there is a 
distinction between political and ethical in Beauvoir. She delineates the 
political as that which projects itself into the world to make a path that 
perhaps others might follow, whereas the ethical acknowledges others and 
the impact of others.54 Bergoffen highlights that in Beauvoir’s theory, ethical 
acts are manners of providing the space for others to live their freedom,
From this perspective there are two ways of living our responsibility to/
for the other. One, the ethical, which sees itself as responsible for clear-
ing the space for the other’s lived freedom; two, the political, which 
sees itself as responsible for calling on the other to join it in the quest 
for freedom.55
She likens the ethical to gifts that ask for nothing—that do not require 
the other participate in the political project. There is nothing inherently 
bad about bettering one’s health, and likely much that helps one flourish. 
Others may wish to join such a project. However, as also ethical beings, we 
must attend to the impacts on others and the providing of spaces for others 
whether or not they wish to follow this project. The challenge of the good 
health imperative is that it is deeply connected to our immediate personal 
situation. However, its problem is that it is taken as a command for all with-
out room to criticize it since it is seen, like the laws of mathematics, as obvi-
ously right and true. It has been pre-decided that individual work on one’s 
health is what one should do and no more thought is required. Moreover, it 
decides for others—it removes spaces for discussion outside the production 
of healthier bodies, because who doesn’t want a healthier body?
Stavro notes that to understand Beauvoir’s thought, one must pay atten-
tion to her engaged embodied manner of understanding the perspectives 
of others: “Beauvoir, too, supports enlarged thinking, but unlike Arendt 
stresses the significance of embodiment and the effects of one’s histori-
cal social situation on one’s knowledge.” 56 Whether self-directed health 
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work is liberating or confining requires thinking about if my project as 
a path is freely chosen and how my project affects others. Any project I 
engage in, such as getting in better shape, depends upon a variety of other 
humans engaging in their projects from the streets being safe, to my doctor’s 
supervision, to my son’s school providing aftercare so I can work out. “One 
can reveal the world only on a basis revealed by other men. No project 
can be defined except by its interference with other projects.”57 The values 
I hold dear are also ones I have learned and share with others. However, 
as raised above, conditions of unequal status—such as wealth or illness—
make many lifeworlds radically different even if each might have some pos-
sibilities of freely chosen values within them. Systemic differences are not 
just about the prejudices of, say, ableism or racism, but the manner in which 
the privileged have the capacity to choose a variety of paths which they 
falsely assume exist for everyone. Throughout this book, stress was placed 
on the deliberative work needed to promote healthy body work. This work 
is not simply a matter of isolated persons taking up the mantle of responsi-
bility to better their health, but requires our complex contemporary system 
of healthcare, affiliated corporate wellness products and programs. I have 
called into question the value of such work, given its obvious placement 
within a system of radically disparate possibilities and resources for healthy 
self-care.
Beauvoir points out that what is useful—that is what is valued by some-
one—is so because it has some relevance to that individual’s life. In oppres-
sion, utility, as Arendt also argues, is used as a tool to impose itself on 
others and to make others labor. Do this, because it is good for you! Instead, 
it must be people themselves who define their projects. Beauvoir writes, 
“Oppression tries to defend itself by its utility…nothing is useful if it is 
not useful to man; nothing is useful to man if the latter is not in a position 
to define his own ends and values, if he is not free.”58 Beauvoir writes of a 
young invalid who had to leave her home, her occupations, and her whole 
past life, being told to “get cured. The rest has no importance.”59 One can 
picture the healthcare staff counseling her that her health must come first. 
Yet, if one could no longer live the way one wished with the people one 
cherished, why would one want to get better? Beauvoir says the invalid 
replied, “But if nothing has any importance, what good is it to get cured?”60 
For the woman, nothing in her possible virtual future called to her; the pur-
suit of health had little meaning. The difficulty of dictating what is valuable 
about health abstracted from the individual’s situation helps highlight how 
universal decrees are senseless.
An examination of our human life suggests that the possibility to choose 
is itself not necessarily present for all. Worker–producers are not as free to 
choose their paths and projects as citizen–consumers are. Ambiguity is the 
refusal of seeing such policy decisions as isolated debates and instead seeing 
them as political and social. As Camus encourages the artist to not deny 
our contemporary knowledge of the suffering and exclusion of the many 
discussed in Chapter 6, so too does our health work take place in the relief 
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of a world in which such work is not possible for all. It is the repeated acts, 
like Ahmed writes, that create the oppressive path that is followed without 
thinking. Sara Heinämaa explains that in the case of sexism, it is the acts of 
sexism that create oppression, not the ideology:
…this oppression is reestablished in our own acts of dismissal and 
neglect operative in the present. This means that we ourselves are 
responsible for the permanence of the sexual hierarchy, not society, not 
history, and not any of our predecessors, human or animal.61
When faced with the daunting freedom that our ambiguous condition pro-
vides us, it can be tempting to shirk our responsibility and assume oppres-
sion always comes from without, and is not bolstered by our unthoughtful 
actions.
When one reads Notes from Underground as a contemporary reader, one 
might suggest, as my students often do, that the underground man could do 
with some therapy. But, insofar as therapy reveals an inner self to one—a 
part of one that one was rejecting or ignoring—this seems inappropriate 
for his problems. If anything, he suffers consciously from an all-too acute 
self-knowledge, wondering, “can a man with my lucidity of perception 
respect himself?”62 His “friends,” a set of brutish men seem to not suffer 
from this sense of their own ridiculous and base natures, act without self-re-
flection. The underground man finds himself unable to behave in the same 
manner, yet still wants not just their approval, but also their appreciation 
that he is a nobler person given his “refinement.” His inability to give up 
the ridiculousness of romantic ideals in a world that does not reflect them 
leads to his absurd, perhaps self-inflicted condition. The only character who 
seems a whole person in the story is the prostitute, Liza. Having followed 
his friends to the whorehouse to prove he is every bit as good as them, he 
finds himself in the role of lecturing Liza. She feels a human, vulnerable 
connection to him, and comes to his apartment, only to catch him in a very 
ridiculous argument with his servant. He realizes that she sees him for who 
he truly is, not a “hero,” but an exposed human, just like her. He cannot 
come to terms with this; he insults her in such a manner that she can only 
flee, and locks himself into his rooms in the suburbs thereafter.
What the underground man perhaps needs is not a better self-reflection per 
se, but more engaging and meaningful social interaction that would require 
that he might encounter something that cannot be predicted, neatly fit into 
his romantic ideals, or in the base scientism of the age. He would need to be 
vulnerable to others. If he had not insulted Liza by giving her money after 
they slept together, he would have been in a position of not knowing what 
their next interaction would be. Arendt’s reflections on the value of social 
political action stress the existential value of interactions that are not pre-
determined. However, it is with Beauvoir that we can find the need for this 
vulnerability to others to live most authentically in our ambiguous situation. 
Indeed, one hallmark of a truly affectionate relationship is that one allows 
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oneself to be transformed by the other in unpredictable ways. The under-
ground man cannot open himself to Liza to be in position of change, perhaps 
due to his over-commitment to romantic ideologies, but also surely because 
he lacks ethical shared spaces. His life seems to be nothing but rooms of 
masculine jockeying for power or prestige, spaces in which he feels humil-
iated and debased, to his self-inflicted isolation where he gnashes his teeth, 
inwardly suffering. The underground man has found his freedom from soci-
ety’s norms and the facts of science, but he has not found a way to live with 
others authentically without being debased by them or debasing them.
Existentialism has often been seen as a solipsistic philosophy, where we 
are all lost in our own absurd universes, but as argued above, it need not be if 
one can get away from the tradition of thinking of freedom as an individual 
pursuit. 70 years ago, Beauvoir wrote that “Today, however, we are having 
a hard time living because we are so bent on outwitting death,” portending 
our own turn inward toward ever more refined forms of consumption and 
self-production and our greater isolation from engaged ethical relationships 
with others.63 In Chapter 1, the increase in longevity over the last 200 years 
was noted. During the pandemic, longevity is predicted to have reduced by 
an average of 1.13 years in the United States; however, for Black and Latino 
populations, it is predicted to have reduced by 3 to 4 times that of whites.64 
The pandemic has highlighted the need for better public health and the man-
ner in which we are all deeply connected to others. Bracketing the good 
health imperative is not to bracket the value of health, but the value of health 
as a matter of good individual behavior. Researchers studying the historical 
and contemporary outcomes of pandemics noted that COVID-19 occurred 
during a time when health inequalities had been increasing.
COVID-19 has laid bare our longstanding social, economic and politi-
cal inequalities—even before the COVID-19 pandemic, life expectancy 
amongst the poorest groups was already declining in the UK and the 
USA, and health inequalities in some European countries have been 
increasing over the last decade.65
If one continues to associate health with individual treatment and behavior, 
one will continue to pass over such systemic issues that affect health. Our 
deeply interconnected lives where infection passes because of a breath high-
light how little the individual’s solitary projects and health can be under-
stood as individually owned. A return to our shared ambiguous condition 
might permit creating more expansive spaces outside the paths of work and 
consumption toward ones where we remain open to the new.
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